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Abstract
Marine spatial property rights reduce many common pool externalities that plague wild
capture fisheries and incentivize productive use for aquaculture. Specifically, Territorial Use
Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) are a management tool whereby individuals or groups are granted
exclusive access to harvest resources within an area, and are the prevailing management of coastal
fisheries in Chile. Additionally, secured spatial property rights appear inherently obligatory for
aquaculture development; i.e., private leases in Virginia, where submerged grounds granted to an
individual or a company for oyster production are considered a form of TURF. Although the
number and extent of spatially managed areas are the highest they have ever been in both systems,
the impacts of spatial property rights on fisheries and aquaculture sustainability are still not fully
understood. The objective of this dissertation was to evaluate current challenges to the effective
use of TURFs, deepening our understanding of their efficacy for fishery and aquaculture
management. The long-term impacts of the Chilean TURFs network on harvests of benthic
resources was investigated both inside and outside TURFs (Chapter 2). Although catch rates were
significantly higher inside TURFs than surrounding open access areas, they appeared to be
decreasing over time, and, though limited, the impact of TURFs on catches in open access areas
was negative. Spatio-temporal trends in private lease use and productivity in Virginia were
examined to identify challenges faced by the oyster aquaculture industry. Constraints to
aquaculture expansion were investigated by evaluating whether a lack of space limits aquaculture
development as well as the extent and drivers of lease non-use (Chapter 3). Limited evidence of
spatial constraints was found, although results suggest additional social and regulatory limiting
factors. While rates of lease use and productivity increased from 2006 to 2016, only 33% of leases
were ever used for oyster production. The non-used leases were potentially held for exclusionary
or speculative uses. Additionally, Virginia had the second lowest levels of total production of
cultured oysters per leased acre among the states along the U.S. East and Gulf coasts, confirming
significant limitations associated with the current leasing system. Production frontier models were
used to quantify lease use efficiency (i.e., utilization of space given the underlying environment)
for oyster production (Chapter 4). Significant amounts of inefficiency in intensive aquaculture
practices suggest that production could increase by at least 64% per lease, on average (though high
heterogeneity is observed between leases). Low levels of use efficiency (i.e., underutilization)
imply that leaseholders tend to lease more area than needed, likely due to the low annual lease
costs and the absence of enforced production requirements. The number of leases held per
leaseholder increased use efficiency, whereas leases in more populated areas were less efficiently
used. This research contributes to a better understanding of TURFs’ efficacy and challenges in
Chile and in Virginia. Overall, socioeconomic and management factors appear to be limiting
productivity and sustainability of TURFs in both systems, recognizing the importance of
incentives, enforcement, zoning, and the potential presence of trade-offs between economic, social
and biological sustainability.
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Efficacy and Unintended Outcomes of Spatial Property Rights for Fisheries and
Aquaculture Management in Chile and in Virginia, U.S.A.

– Chapter 1 –
Introduction

1.1 Causes of fishery overexploitation and emergence of right-based management
Today, marine resources are facing many cumulative pressures associated with increasing
global human population, such as increasing demand for seafood (record-high global per capita
consumption of 20.3 kg in 2016; Godfray et al. 2010, FAO 2018) and continued fisheries and
aquaculture technological improvements (Squires and Vestergaard 2013, Galbraith et al. 2017).
Excessive fishing capacity, often resulting from subsidies (Martini and Innes 2018, Sumaila et al.
2019), and open access “derby-style” fisheries incentivizing overinvestment and poor
management, have led to resource overexploitation, or the tragedy of the commons, in many places
(Hardin 1968). The sustainability of exploited fish and shellfish populations are questioned in
many instances (e.g., Worm et al. 2006, Costello et al. 2008, Beck et al. 2011, Pauly and Zeller
2016), and optimal management of marine resources is a critical area of research, especially in
coastal areas attracting more and more human activities (Small and Nicholls 2003, Halpern et al.
2008).
The tragedy of the commons frequently emerges in fisheries and marine resources as they
are often common pool goods defined by two distinct features: limited excludability (i.e., inability
to exclude others from using the resource) and high rivalry (i.e., as one individual uses the resource,
it decreases the quantity available for others) (Gordon 1954). Exploitation of common pool
resources not only affects their biological productivity but also impacts economic rent (or derived
profits). The fact that resources are rival but not excludable means that resource rent is not easily
appropriated by anyone, leading to congestion, competition, and ultimately dissipation of the rent.
2

Inefficient resource use and negative externalities often result in cases of incomplete property
rights, which prohibit market formation (Agnello and Donnelley 1976). Therefore, cases of
overexploitation in fisheries are frequently associated with a lack of sufficiently well-defined
property rights (Berkes 1985, Bjørndal and Conrad 1987, Christy 1996).
Furthermore, the conventional ‘command and control’ approaches to fisheries management
– that focus on input restrictions and total catch limits – can fail to provide incentives to harvest
efficiently and sustainably, and can also be difficult to implement in small-scale fisheries (Grafton
et al. 2006). Rights-based fisheries management (RBFM, referenced first during the UN
Convention on Law Of the Sea, UNCLOS, 1982), also known as catch share programs, have
emerged over the last several decades as a potential solution to tackle the negative impacts of open
access fishing (Christy 1996, Costello et al. 2008, Afflerbach et al. 2014). Indeed, it is argued that
property rights can internalize externalities and facilitate stewardship, promoting sustainable
harvests (Hilborn et al. 2005, Costello et al. 2008). Catch share programs can limit and control
access to fisheries resources by limiting the harvest of individuals (i.e., individual transferable
quotas, ITQ, based programs) or by defining restricted use areas (i.e., area-based programs)
(NOAA Catch Share Policy). Although ITQs appear to be the most common form of RBFMs, they
have often been associated with controversies regarding fairness, equity, highgrading, and bycatch
(Copes 1986, Wilen et al. 2012). Additionally, spatial heterogeneity of extracted resources and
population processes create the need for spatially differentiated rights (Costello and Deacon 2007).

1.2 Spatial property rights for capture fisheries and aquaculture
One potentially useful form of RBFM that can help to resolve the collective use problem
is Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs). Christy (1982) defined TURFs as “a spatial form
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of property rights in which individuals or a collective group of fishermen are granted exclusive
access to harvest resources within a geographically defined area”. Though the TURF terminology
dates from 1982, exclusive rights and traditional marine tenure systems have been used for
centuries in the South Pacific (Johannes 1978, Acheson 1981). TURFs have generally evolved by
two distinct mechanisms: 1) traditional, or informal, fishing rights of local communities that may
or may not have evolved into formal TURF systems over time, and 2) deliberate introductions of
TURFs replacing command and control regimes with co-management in which power is shared
between the government and fishermen (Aburto et al. 2013, Quynh et al. 2017). Rights to the
surface, the bottom, or some combination of layers of the water column could be granted via
TURFs, and some have been associated with floating fish aggregating devices or on-bottom
shellfish cages (Wilen et al. 2012). TURFs provide access rights to individuals or communities but
full ownership typically belongs to the state (public trust doctrine), hence some form of regulation
and fees are usually associated with TURFs. To guarantee the success of TURFs, local and national
laws and institutions must protect their clearly-defined boundaries (Baskaran and Anderson 2005).
Exclusive economic zones, or “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the [ocean's] natural resources” (defined during UNCLOS 1982) are
examples of large TURFs granted to coastal states (Christy 1982). In this case, as well as in many
other cases (e.g., the Chilean TURF network addresses in Chapter 2), the TURF does not fully
eliminate the risk of the tragedy of the commons, but rather restricts the scale over which these
issues can occur, thus limiting or delaying the tragedy. In these cases, TURFs must be combined
with other forms of fisheries management to assure sustainable use.
TURFs are often implemented in communities dependent on subsistence, or in artisanal or
small-scale fisheries (Gutiérrez et al. 2011, Costello et al. 2012). Local communities benefit by
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implementing TURFs because having the ability to control access to a territory helps reduce the
risk of common pool externalities (Cancino et al. 2007). TURFs are particularly appropriate for
what Orensanz et al. (2005) called 3-S fisheries: Small-scale, Spatially–structured fisheries,
targeting Sessile species. In practice, the use of TURFs is appropriate for managing fisheries for
low mobility species (crustaceans, mollusks, echinoderms) and in areas that depend on benthic
catches because target species are likely to remain within restricted-access areas and thereby
maintain the value of the TURF (Defeo and Castilla 2005, Nomura et al. 2017).
Secured spatial property rights appear inherently obligatory for aquaculture activity (Joyce
and Satterfield 2010). Private leases, such as those granting individuals exclusive access to specific
public trust waters for resource extraction or production for a period of time, are considered a form
of TURF as they are similar in structure and function (Carden 2011, Wilen et al. 2012). Sessile
animals such as oysters and clams, clearly tied to the submerged land, have been historically well
managed by leasing (Archer et al. 1994, McCay 1998, Beck et al. 2004). Because of their spatial
nature, leases also provide leaseholders with the incentive to protect the habitat within their leased
area, to the extent that it would enhance harvests or the future sale value of a lease (Carden 2011).
However, expanding spatial property rights within coastal waters may create conflicts over seaspace with other competing uses. Social controversy over marine spatial property rights have been
observed when aquatic farming leases compete with traditional Aboriginal territorial rights (e.g.,
in New Zealand or in British Columbia, Tollefson and Scott 2006). Resistance to shellfish farming
has also been observed from waterfront residents in areas with important recreational and real
estate (esthetic qualities) interests (Knapp 2012, D’Anna and Murray 2015, Knapp and Rubino
2016).

5

1.3 Various uses of TURFs around the world
The project DiscoverTURFs (i.e., graduate student project at the Bren School, University
of California Santa Barbara and in partnership with the Environment Defense Fund) performed the
first global assessment of TURFs (Auriemma et al. 2014). The project reported that TURFs are
applied quite differently around the world with sixty-six distinct TURF systems identified from
forty-one countries (Auriemma et al. 2014). TURFs are currently used in the United States, Chile,
Japan, Mexico, Fiji, Korea, Spain, Indonesia, Philippines, Canada, Vanuatu, Brazil, Solomon
Islands, among other countries (ordered by number of TURFs identified in Auriemma et al. 2014,
Figure 1.1). Chile and Japan have been by far the most studied countries (Quynh et al. 2017), while
the United States has the highest number of granted spatial property rights, with at least 8,043
oyster leases allocated in Louisiana in 2013 (Auriemma et al. 2014).
Japan has one of the oldest TURF systems, dating from the sixteenth century where feudal
guilds were established to protect village shorelines (Matsuda et al. 2010, Wilen et al. 2012). Over
one-thousand TURFs are currently granted to fishery cooperative associations (FCAs) legally
recognized under the 1948 Fishery Cooperative Law (Yamamoto 1995, Nomura et al. 2017). FCA
coordination is favored via nested committees, whereby local sub-organizations are in charge of
day-to-day management decisions and regulations at the local level (e.g., intensive effort controls).
Inter-TURFs cooperation and pooling of harvests or revenue have resulted in successful
management of benthic and mobile species, such as the Sakura-ebi shrimp fishery (Uchida 2007,
Wilen et al. 2012). In Nomura et al. (2017), we showed that the Japanese TURF system appears to
be closely linked to regional fishing intensity and primary target species, a sign that they are
responding well to societal expectations and objectives, whereas the Japanese marine protected
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area (MPA) network is not significantly linked to potential environmental or economic drivers,
suggesting a more heterogeneous implementation and potentially wider objectives.
With a similar number of TURFs, the system in Chile is younger, established in the early
1990’s, and is more oriented toward the management of a group of species compared to a singlespecies approach as in Japan. This network began with voluntary agreements between artisanal
fishers and scientists to form a few informal TURFs in central Chile. The success of these initial
informal TURFs led to the formal recognition and codification of TURFs as central tool for
management of coastal benthic resource in Chile in a law from 1991 (see below, Moreno and
Revenga 2014). Since this time, over a thousand TURFs have been formally recognized in Chile,
producing one of the world’s largest TURF networks.
The United States of America has a total shoreline of 153,646 km (NOAA/PA 1975), and
it is believed that about one third of its submerged lands are privately leased in some form of
TURF. Submerged lands are state bottom lands, or submerged lands, up to the mean low water
mark over the past 20 years, for the first three miles offshore (Slade et al. 1997, Archer et al. 1994).
Nevertheless, this private property system has been much less studied and covers a smaller
proportion of the fishing grounds when compared to Japan and Chile. Two different types of spatial
property rights have been established in the U.S., primarily in state waters on a state-by-state basis:
1) community-managed TURFs that are designated to defend customary fishing territories; and 2)
TURFs that are subdivided into smaller areas in which individuals have the right to set fixed gears
(Auriemma et al. 2014). The Maine lobster fishery is one very successful example of the first type
(~thirty-year rise in landings, though this pattern is also due to favorable environmental conditions)
and is characterized by seven delineated lobster zones that have evolved from informal local
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fishing territories (Steneck et al. 2017). Fishermen, usually organized around harbors, manage and
control access to the fishery, and were historically referred to as “harbor gangs” (Acheson 1975).
An example of the second type of U.S. TURF network is the private lease systems existing
in numerous states to encourage shellfish aquaculture. Spatial property rights used to lease oyster
beds have been established in a few states since the 18th century (Power 1970, Agnello and
Donnelley 1975). These rights are conferred by state management bodies and granted to private
individuals or companies, yet, leasing systems differ greatly across states in terms of total leased
area, lease duration, annual fee, and production requirements. Despite differences, the existence
of private property rights across states from the East and Gulf coasts was found to significantly
increase average labor productivity in oyster harvesting (Agnello and Donnelley 1975). Indeed,
Agnello and Donnelley (1975, 1976) demonstrated that considerable benefits would be generated
by switching from common property to an entirely lease-based system with substantial increases
in production and minimal impacts on employment.

1.4 Detailed description of spatial property rights systems in Chile and Virginia
Chile established their national TURF policy in the early 1990s after the failure of many
conventional management approaches to overcome severe depletion of its most economically
important fishery for the Chilean abalone, or loco (Concholepas concholepas). The previous
“benthic exploitation regime”, which consisted of a total allowable catch (TAC) established for
each region and further split into individual quotas (IQs) among registered divers, did not succeed
in rebuilding the loco stock. An increased number of fishers, illegal trade of IQs, lack of
enforcement, and lack of incentives for conservation led to the system failure (González et al.
2006). A total fishery closure between 1989 and 1992 was also unsuccessful and led to large-scale
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illegal fishing (González et al. 2006). The Chilean Fishing Act, passed in 1991 (Fishery &
Aquaculture Law n° 18), included the implementation of TURFs, initially created around
traditional harvesting areas (Wilen et al. 2012). Known in Chile as “Management Areas for the
Exploitation of Benthic Resources” (AMERBs), these areas grant exclusive fishing rights for the
exploitation of benthic resources in defined portions of the seabed adjacent to a caleta, or artisanal
fishing cove, to its legally constituted fishing organization (Aburto et al. 2013). Around fifty
species have been included in TURF management plans, while the main species managed are the
gastropod loco (the most profitable benthic resource), the red sea urchin (Loxechinus albus),
keyhole limpets (Fissurella spp.) and kelp (Lessonia spp.) (Moreno and Revenga 2014). Cancino
(2007) analyzed the “start-up” period (1998-2005) for TURFs in central Chile and observed
increases in fishable stock biomass and density between the first and fourth years following TURF
establishment. By 2017, there were 957 designated TURFs, covering 1,500 km2 of the coastal
ecosystem. Even though the Chilean TURF system has gained worldwide attention (Van Holt
2012, Quynh et al. 2017), most studies have focused on small-scale projects in specific regions of
the country. To understand the global efficacy of the TURF system in its entirety, and at a national
level, large temporal and spatial scale datasets should be analyzed and compared.
In Virginia, the management of oyster grounds can be separated into two forms: 1) public
grounds (i.e., common property natural oyster beds), and 2) private grounds, where leases are
granted to an individual or a company for their exclusive use (Santopietro and Shabman 1992).
Although both areas are defined or permitted by the Virginia Marine Resource Commission
(VMRC), VMRC only carries out significant resource management in public grounds;
leaseholders have primary responsibility for management and exploitation of private grounds. The
difference between what is considered public or private grounds is based on the most productive
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oyster beds evaluated by the Baylor survey in 1896, which were designated for the public use
(Harding et al. 2010). Public Baylor grounds are managed by restrictions on gear, season and
harvest size (Santopietro and Shabman 1992). Usually, oyster harvesting in Virginia occurs on
public grounds during the winter, primarily confined to hand and patent tonging, while dredge
harvests typically occur on private grounds during the summer (National Research Council 2004).
Historically, policymakers have avoided imposing restrictive measures on public ground access in
order to maintain the supplemental income for local fishers, while at the same time also fostering
the production in private grounds (Santopietro and Shabman 1992). More recently, oyster
aquaculture sustainability strongly depends on private lease use and productivity.
Privately leased oyster grounds differ from many other uses of TURFs in that they
generally require seeding and other maintenance or aquaculture to be productive. Because natural
oyster beds are reserved for the public fishery, mostly soft muddy bottoms are available for leasing,
meaning that leaseholders must often invest in hard substrate and seed oysters for extensive
aquaculture or use containerized systems for intensive aquaculture. These costs provide
disincentives to productive use of leased areas, which may outweigh potential benefits afforded
through exclusive access to leased grounds. This aspect differentiates Virginia oyster leases from
other TURFs, such as in Chile, where ecosystem services stem from conservation and exclusive
access promotes resource stewardship. The productivity and the ecosystem value of TURF-based
management in oyster ecosystems are dependent on the active use of leased grounds as the oyster
itself is an ecosystem engineer species, providing many ancillary ecosystem services (Coen et al.
2007).
Both the Chilean benthic fisheries and Virginia oyster aquaculture are small-scale activities
using hand gear or small boat to target sedentary resources. Fishery harvests are economically
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important in both places and local communities strongly depend on the sustainability of these
activities. Both loco and oyster stocks were intensely harvested and driven to low abundances.
Indeed, there are strong indications that loco depletion occurred in Chile by the end of 1980’s and
oyster harvests in Virginia are now only ~2.5% of the 1950’s average (Aburto et al. 2013, Beck et
al 2011). In both systems, there has been an expansion of spatial property rights for marine resource
management since the early 2000’s. In Chile there are now about a thousand TURFs, with an
average size of 100-200 ha, granted to ~1,200 fishing organizations comprised of about forty
thousand artisanal fishers. In Virginia, ~4,700 subaqueous grounds are privately leased (with an
average size of ~5-30 ha) by about 2,300 individuals. Though there has been recent expansion of
spatial property rights in both systems, it is unclear what influence, if any, socioeconomic and
management factors may have on productivity and sustainability of TURFs and surrounding
ecosystems.

1.5 General objectives of the dissertation
The impacts of spatial property rights on fisheries and aquaculture sustainability are still
not fully understood (Orensanz et al. 2005, Aburto and Stotz 2013, Aburto et al. 2014, Quynh et
al. 2017). Comparative analyses in different environmental or socioeconomic contexts are needed
to identify differences in TURF implementation patterns and their effects. This dissertation aims
to make specific contributions to better understand drivers of TURF usage in Virginia and Chile,
and identify potential barriers to their successful implementation. The overarching objective of
this dissertation is to evaluate current challenges to the effective use of TURFs, deepening our
understanding of their efficacy for fishery and aquaculture management. By evaluating the two
systems in Chile and Virginia, I will be able to identify whether similar factors are impacting both

11

systems, and whether systems face similar limitations; and therefore, whether these factors are
more likely to be important to a wide variety of TURF systems.
In this context, I first evaluate the long-term impacts of the extensive Chilean TURFs
network on harvests of benthic resources both inside and outside exclusive-access zones. In
Chapter 2, I investigate differences in catch-per-unit effort and catch-per-unit-area of loco, limpet,
red sea urchin and kelp between TURFs and open access areas, and analyze temporal trends of
catch-per-unit-area in those systems from 2000 to 2015. Then, a penalized regression is used to
better explain recent catches for those same species in open access areas, including explanatory
variables either related to the characteristics and activity of proximal TURFs, or related to
geospatial context and number of fishers targeting a given species. Results document any trends
and interactions that might impact the ability of the TURF system to meet the objectives of
ensuring sustainability and increasing biological productivity of benthic fishery resources.
In Chapter 3, I analyze spatio-temporal trends in private oyster lease use and productivity
in the lower Chesapeake Bay. Understanding possible drivers and limitations of oyster leasing is
needed to fully understand current trends, predict future patterns, and identify impediments to
oyster production in the Chesapeake Bay. Potential constraints to expansion of oyster aquaculture
in Virginia are examined by evaluating whether a lack of space limits aquaculture expansion and
whether used and non-used leases differ in relation to variables capturing local socioeconomic and
environmental conditions. I also explore temporal and spatial trends in the use and productivity of
leases from 2006 to 2016 and compare the Virginia leasing system with those in other states from
the U.S. East and Gulf Coasts.
The fourth chapter of this thesis presents and discusses a novel approach to evaluate oyster
lease use performance using econometric production frontier methods. Those models quantify
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inefficiencies in intensive oyster aquaculture arising from lease, demographic and socioeconomic
variables, considering environmental conditions and lease size as controlling potential production.
As such, Chapter 4 estimates lease use efficiencies for oyster production from 2007 to 2016 using
Stochastic Frontier Analysis and Data Envelopment Analysis models. Model outputs indicate the
extent to which leased areas are not at full production so that limitations for aquaculture
development can be evaluated.
In the fifth chapter, I summarize the main findings of this research and present broader
implications and concluding remarks drawn from empirical analyses in Chile and Virginia. The
results of this work will contribute to a better understanding of TURFs’ efficacy, as well as indicate
potential limitations and constraints for TURF implementation.
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1.7 Figure
Figure 1.1 Global distribution of TURFs identified through the DiscoverTURFs project. Darker
colors indicate a larger number of TURFs identified within the country. Crosshatched countries
represent countries that do not currently have operating TURFs but either have pilot projects in
progress or have expressed interest in implementing TURFs. * The exact number of TURFs in
Sweden, Finland, Indonesia, the Philippines, Cameroon, Benin, Nigeria, Ghana, Turkey, Greece,
and India is not known but is expected to be higher than represented by the shading shown here.
From Auriemma et al. 2014
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– Chapter 2 –
Drivers and trends in catch of benthic resources in Chilean TURFs and
surrounding Open Access Areas.

2.1 Abstract
Beginning in the 1990’s, Chile implemented an extensive Territorial User Rights for
Fisheries (TURFs) network that now comprises nearly 1,000 TURFs. This network provides a rare
opportunity to examine spatial and temporal trends in TURF use and impacts on surrounding open
access areas (OAAs). In this analysis, landings of keyhole limpet (Fissurella spp.), kelp (Lessonia
spp.) and red sea urchin (Loxechinus albus) were used to estimate catch-per-unit effort (CPUEs)
and catch-per-unit area (CPUAs) indices inside and outside TURFs by fishing cove. For these
species, CPUEs and CPUAs in 2015 were significantly higher inside TURFs. However, temporal
trends analyzed with a linear mixed effects model indicate that CPUAs inside TURFs have been
significantly decreasing since 2000 for keyhole limpet, red sea urchin and for loco (Concholepas
concholepas), while in OAAs this measure only decreased for limpet. An elastic net regression
was used to better explain catches in OAAs during 2015, including a variety of variables related
to the characteristics and activity of proximal TURFs. Results indicate that exogenous factors
unrelated to TURF management were the primary drivers of catches in OAAs during 2015 but that
factors related to proximal TURFs appear to have a slight negative impact that grows over time.
Collectively, these results indicate that while TURFs are associated with higher catch rates than
surrounding OAAs, catch rates appear to be decreasing over time and, though limited, the impact
of TURFs on surrounding OAAs may be negative. These findings suggest a need for a more
nuanced and dynamic approach to spatial management on benthic resources in Chile.
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2.2 Introduction
Spatial property rights can eliminate many common pool externalities that plague fisheries,
thereby better incentivizing sustainable and profitable resource use (Beddington et al. 2007,
Cancino 2007, Costello et al. 2008). Specifically, Territorial User Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) is
a management tool that grants individuals or groups exclusive access to harvest resources within
an area (Christy 1982). TURFs have been associated with biological, ecological and economic
benefits in several small-scale fisheries (Castilla and Fernández 1998, Gelcich et al. 2008a, 2012,
Defeo et al. 2016). During the last decade, TURFs have been promoted as a general approach to
tackling the negative impacts of open access fishing (Wilen et al. 2012, Kratz and Block 2013,
FAO 2014, Quynh et al. 2017), particularly for unassessed fisheries in developing countries that
often suffer from overexploitation (Costello et al. 2012). However, the full impacts of TURFs on
fisheries sustainability, including long-term trends in catch rates and impacts beyond TURFs
boundaries, are not yet fully understood (Orensanz et al. 2005, Aburto and Stotz 2013, Aburto et
al. 2014, Gelcich et al. 2019). As the implementation of individual quotas and marine protected
areas has been found to have unintended impacts on unregulated subpopulations and habitats
(referred to here as “management spillover”; Hilborn et al. 2004, Murawski et al. 2005, Asche et
al. 2007, Branch 2009, Abbott and Haynie 2012), similar effects might be expected from other
area- or rights-based management and conservation instruments, including TURFs. To our
knowledge, the influence of the implementation of TURFs on surrounding areas has not yet been
assessed (Quynh et al. 2017) despite the fact that the spatial dynamics of most fisheries exceed the
scale of an individual TURF. This study looked at the long-term changes in catch and catch rates
(i.e., catch per unit effort, CPUEs, and catch per unit area, CPUAs) inside and outside TURF
managed areas and also evaluated the possibility of management spillover.
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In Chile, the implementation of TURFs was a reaction to the collapse of the economically
important artisanal fishery for the muricid snail Concholepas concholepas in the 1980s (known in
Chile as loco, elsewhere as the false abalone) (Bernal et al. 1999). The fast recovery of the high
valued loco stocks in initial TURFs increased demand for further TURF development along the
entire Chilean coast throughout the 2000s. In 2017, there were 957 officially designated Chilean
TURFs implemented as part of a national TURF policy (Fishery and Aquaculture Law n° 18,
1991). According to the Chilean Fisheries Authorities, the primary objectives of Chilean TURFs
are to “ensure the sustainability of artisanal fishing through the assignment of natural banks”, and
to “maintain and increase the biological productivity of benthic resources” (SUBPESCA, 2003).
This TURF network constitutes the dominant form of spatial management of benthic resources in
Chile and is the largest worldwide, covering about 1,500 km2 (though only about half of these 957
TURFs are currently operative). Known in Chile as “Área de Manejo y Explotaciones de Recursos
Bentónicos” (Management Areas for the Exploitation of Benthic Resources; AMERB), this system
grants exclusive fishing rights to legally constituted fishing organizations for the exploitation of
benthic resources in defined portions of the seabed – usually adjacent to a caleta or artisanal fishing
cove (Aburto et al. 2013). Each TURF has species-specific quotas proposed by the fishing
organization and approved by the Undersecretary of Fisheries. Artisanal fisher organizations have
to comply with a series of regulations, such as establishing a baseline study, management plan,
and regular stock assessments, for which they have to contract technical assistance from
specialized environmental and/or fisheries consultants (Gelcich et al. 2008b). TURFs are
interspaced with open access areas (OAAs) where seasonal closures and limits on catch size are
used, but entry, within-season effort, and total catch are not restricted. The Chilean TURFs system
was initially (i.e., from the 1990s to the 2000s) successful and associated with positive ecological
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and economic benefits, such as the recovery of loco stocks, increased species richness inside
TURFs, and increased welfare and economic revenues (Castilla and Fernandez 1998, Defeo and
Castilla 2005, Gelcich et al. 2008a, 2012). OAAs produced the majority of catch and fishing
revenues however. While income from TURFs was largely supplemental, believed to represent
7% to 41% of total incomes (Romero et al. 2016), it was thought to play an essential role in
securing fishers’ livelihoods (Aburto et al. 2013, Van Holt 2012, Gelcich et al. 2017).
Though ecological conditions appear to have improved within TURFs (Castilla and
Fernández 1998, Gelcich et al. 2012), TURF profitability is thought to have declined over the last
decade (Gelcich et al. 2017). The development of abalone aquaculture in Asia has negatively
influenced international demand for loco, leading to a reduction in exports from Chile to Asia
(from 2,400 mt in 1993 to less than 1,000 mt in 2013), and a drop in the price of loco (Chávez et
al. 2010, Castilla et al. 2016). Furthermore, the cost of TURF maintenance, which includes
assessment, enforcement, and surveillance, is thought to have increased (based on perception
surveys; Gelcich et al. 2009, 2017). Assessments are typically conducted by private environmental
consultants, whose fees have increased in part because of the relatively small number of such
companies available in Chile (Gelcich et al. 2009, Davis et al. 2015). Additionally, extensive
illegal fishing (González et al. 2006, Andreu-Cazenave et al. 2017, Oyanedel et al. 2017) suggests
that local fishing organizations must dedicate significant time and resources to enforcement in
TURFs. Though the Chilean government recognizes that there is poaching activity and, in theory,
is responsible for apprehending and penalizing poachers, in practice the responsibility of detecting
poaching in TURFs often falls on fishing organizations. Many fishers now indicate they do not
have enough capacity (i.e. resources and time) for surveillance of their TURFs and consider
“government punishment of poachers to be ineffective” (Moreno and Revenga 2014, Davis et al.
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2015, Biggs et al. 2016). Thus, the combined influence of a lower price for loco and presumed
increased maintenance costs, with a reduced enforcement capacity, have likely increased
variability in financial returns and decreased the profitability of TURFs (Chávez et al. 2010,
Gelcich et al. 2010, 2017). In fact, in recent years (roughly 2010-2017), fishers appear to be relying
on TURFs less than initially (i.e., 1990s-2000s) and TURF exploitation now represents a smaller
fraction of fishers’ overall incomes (Gelcich et al. 2017). This has coincided with an observed
increase in exploitation of OAAs (de Juan et al. 2017) and substantial illegal fishing of locos
(Andreu-Cazenave et al. 2017). Reduced incentives for the exploitation of a TURF could either
result in its abandonment (San Martín et al. 2010, Gelcich et al. 2017), its maintenance for purposes
other than fishing such as market access or social empowerment (Cancino et al. 2007, Zúñiga et
al. 2010, Aburto et al. 2013, Rosas et al. 2014, Gelcich et al. 2017), or its maintenance at a lower
but still positive level of profitability.
Potential positive or negative interactions between maintained TURFs and surrounding
OAAs are unknown. The large TURF system of Chile offers opportunities to explore the
consequences of spatial management on fisheries in surrounding areas. TURFs are expected to
secure fisheries harvests within their boundaries and provide incentives for sustainable use of
surrounding fishing grounds (Christy 1982). Recent studies in the Chilean system of TURFs have
shown higher potential egg production of two benthic species (the limpet Fissurella latimarginata
and the red sea urchin Loxechinus albus) within TURFs than under an open access scenario (67%
and 52% higher, respectively) (Blanco et al. 2017, Fernández et al. 2017), suggesting the potential
to enhance fishing opportunities both inside and outside TURFs. Negative impacts of TURFs and
other entry-restriction management and conservation tools beyond their limits are less well known.
Management spillover consisting of effort displacement from high-regulation TURFs to lower-

23

regulation areas outside TURFs (analogous to the “fisheries squeeze effect” in the context of
marine protected areas; Attwood and Bennett 1995, Bohnsack 2000, Halpern et al. 2004) could be
expected to occur, potentially deteriorating opportunities in surrounding fishing grounds. Recent
reductions in TURF profitability may provide increased incentives for TURF users to increase
fishing effort in OAAs, possibly further eroding the sustainability and profitability of Chilean
coastal fisheries in these areas.
The primary goals of this study were to analyze catch and catch rates within and outside of
TURFs to document any trends and interactions that might impact the ability of the TURF system
to meet the objectives of ensuring sustainability and increasing biological productivity of benthic
fishery resources. Specifically, we first examined and compared CPUE and CPUA indices (catch
rates) between TURFs and adjacent OAAs by fishing cove in 2015 for three important target
species (keyhole limpet (Fissurella spp.), kelp (Lessonia spp.) and red sea urchin (Loxechinus
albus)). Second, temporal dynamics in TURF and OAA catch rates were investigated by looking
at time series of CPUAs calculated for each management area by fishing cove and year. Finally,
to assess if catch rate differences between TURFs and adjacent OAAs observed in 2015 were
related to TURF implementation, a penalized regression model was developed to explain catch in
OAAs. The explanatory variables examined in the model were either related to proximal TURFs’
characteristics and activity (e.g., TURF age, TURF area fraction, TURF fishing effort), or
additional geospatial variables related to the spatial extent and context of OAAs (e.g., coastline
length, local productivity, proximity to urban areas).
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2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Data
National data on catch and effort by fishing cove were obtained from the governmental
agency SERNAPESCA (National Fisheries Service). Artisanal fishers are required to report
landings by species, weight and origin (i.e., TURF or OAA; Moreno and Revenga 2014). TURF
geographical layers were obtained from the governmental agency SUBPESCA (Undersecretary of
fisheries). Fishing coves considered for the study (Figure 2.1) had at least one designated TURF
assigned to a fishers’ organization (referred to here as a functioning TURF; i.e., an operative TURF
with a use agreement and quota in place or a stand-by TURF for which a quota has been assigned
in the last 4 years, but monitoring has not been conducted by the due date, Appendix A1).
The artisanal benthic fisheries of Chile target a variety of species, including crustaceans,
mollusks, sea urchins, tunicates and several species of seaweed (Gelcich et al. 2010). Catch data
were obtained from landings reports, focusing on the most important benthic resources targeted in
TURFs. The primary target resource inside TURFs is the loco, which has the highest commercial
value (beach sale value: 11,647 US$/mt; landings: 2,255 mt in 2011) (Moreno and Revenga 2014).
Loco extraction is banned in OAAs, and, therefore, only catches from inside TURFs were analyzed
for this species. Kelps (comprising the Lessonia nigrescens species complex, Lessonia
trabeculata, Macrocystis pyrifera and Macrocystis integrifolia) and the red sea urchin (Loxechinus
albus) are the largest landed benthic resources ranked by weight (landings: ~300,000 mt and
31,901 mt for kelp and sea urchin, respectively, in 2011). We also considered catches of keyhole
limpets (comprising Fissurella spp., Fissurella costata, Fissurella cumingi, Fissurella
latimarginata, Fissurella picta, and Fissurella maxima), another economically important benthic
resource (beach sale value: 2,354 US$/mt; landings: 1,785 mt in 2011). Individual catch reports
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from 2000 through 2015 for these four main exploited benthic resources were aggregated by
fishing cove and month (an individual harvester could report catch several times in a month), and
distinguished by their origin (i.e., inside or outside TURFs). Catches in OAAs (i.e., outside
TURFs) included catches gathered from artisanal boats or from the shore.
The number of active harvesters in 2016 per fishing cove was also obtained from
SERNAPESCA (most recent estimation, note that the number of fishers for 2015 was not
available). Individuals who have not operated for the last three successive years were removed
from the national registry. Chilean law distinguishes four categories of artisanal harvesters: 1)
Divers, who manually extract mollusks, crustaceans or echinoderms, or spearfish for reef fish,
usually operating from a boat; 2) Collectors, who harvest or collect seaweeds from the shore; 3)
Fishers, who are captains or crew members of an artisanal boat, from which they operate with nets,
including trammel nets, long lines, and hand lines; and 4) Ship owners, who are limited to one or
two artisanal boats, defined as 18 meters or less in length, and 50 tons or less. The different
categories are not mutually exclusive. Effort was estimated in terms of the number of divers (for
loco, limpet and sea urchin exploitation) or number of collectors (for kelp exploitation) registered
in a fishing cove and able to exploit the resource. Fishers’ organizations that are granted a TURF
can only be comprised of licensed artisanal harvesters. However, not all licensed artisanal
harvesters are part of a fishers’ organization. Therefore, effort “inside” TURFs only considered
licensed harvesters who were also registered in the corresponding fishers’ organization, while
effort “outside” TURFs considered all licensed harvesters registered in a particular fishing cove.
A small number of harvesters (about 10%) were licensed in one fishing cove but associated with
fishing organizations in different fishing coves. To avoid overestimating effort per fishing cove,
the contribution of an individual harvester to effort in a cove was calculated by equally dividing
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one unit of effort (i.e., one harvester) among the different fishing coves with which the harvester
was associated.
Fishing area estimates, for both TURFs and OAAs in each cove, were calculated using
different data and proxies. TURF areas were obtained through a Google Earth layer publicly
available on the SUBPESCA website for 2016. Total fishing ground polygons (comprising TURFs
and OAAs) were created per fishing cove based on sailing time and bathymetry (Appendix A2).
Buffer zones of 17 km (alongshore cutoff) around fishing coves were produced in ArcGIS to
represent total accessible fishing grounds for each cove. The 17-km cutoff was based on the
average distance from the fishing cove center to fishing grounds potentially visited as determined
by artisanal fisher survey results (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2017). These 17-km buffers were then
intersected with a bathymetric polygon consisting of the area between 0 and 20 m depth. The
offshore width of these polygons was based on a typical maximum harvest depth of 20 m
(González et al. 2006). These alongshore and offshore cutoffs are similar to those used by Castilla
(1994) and Aburto et al. (2009) which applied an offshore limit of 30 m and an alongshore cutoff
of 15 km based on travel distance with one full tank of gas. The 20-m isopleth was only available
for central Chile (from 27° to 36°, Figure 2.1) whereas a 100-m isopleth was available for the
whole Chilean coast (source GEBCO). Estimates for the areas of the 0-20 m fishing ground depth
range were derived from the areas of 0-100 m depth range using multiple linear regression (see
Appendix A2 for details). Finally, estimates of OAA areas were calculated as total area of fishing
grounds minus assigned TURFs areas.
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2.3.2 Catch rate comparisons between TURFs and OAAs in 2015
Annual catches divided by the number of active months (several species are only landed
during part of the year) of keyhole limpet, kelp, and red sea urchin were used to estimate CPUEs
and CPUAs per fishing cove for 2015 (most recent complete year for catch data at the time of the
study, SERNAPESCA). Loco’s estimates were not compared since its extraction is banned in
OAAs, and, therefore, only catches from inside TURFs were available. CPUEs and CPUAs were
differentiated by their origin, i.e., catches inside TURFs or in OAAs, and then compared to one
another to determine differences in fisheries productivity. CPUEs for each fishing cove were
calculated as the catches inside or outside TURFs divided by the adjusted number of divers (or
collectors) (i.e., after having adjusted this number to account for harvesters associated with
multiple fishing coves) inside or outside TURFs, respectively. The number of licensed harvesters
in 2016 was the best available effort proxy for estimating CPUEs in 2015 even though this is a
crude estimate as it is unknown how many trips each individual took. CPUAs for each fishing cove
were calculated as the catches inside or outside TURFs divided by the total assigned TURF area
(inside) or the estimated OAA area (outside). For each group of species, differences between
CPUEs and CPUAs inside and outside TURFs were tested for statistical significance using a
nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Reporting rates from TURFs and OAAs could differ
given higher enforcement capacity within TURFs (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2017). We therefore
calculated what catch in OAAs would have to be for catch rates in OAAs to equal those in TURFs
(assuming full reporting in TURFs), and then deduced the misreporting rate in OAAs it would
imply for each species and catch rate metric.
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2.3.3 Temporal analyses of CPUAs inside and outside TURFs
CPUAs of loco, keyhole limpet, kelp, and red sea urchin were analyzed over time to
investigate temporal performance of TURFs and OAAs over the last two decades. Fisheries data
was only available at the scale of an entire fishing cove, prohibiting differentiation between
multiple TURFs associated with a single fishing cove. Estimated OAA areas from 2016 were
adjusted over years according to implemented TURFs’ area for that year and fishing cove
(implementation year of TURFs were available from the SUBPESCA data). Complementary
temporal analysis of CPUE trends was not feasible as the annual number of fishers was not
available at the fishing cove scale. Changes in CPUA over time may reflect changes in biomass,
changes in fishing effort, or changes in spatial management. If biomass were improving inside
TURFs, CPUAs in these areas might be expected to increase over time. Conversely, if TURFs
displaced fishing effort into OAAs, CPUAs in OAAs might be expected to decrease due to
overfishing (but may increase initially as increased effort fishes down stocks). Additionally, a
fishing cove can have several TURFs (up to 15 managed areas, but on average three). If the initial
TURF implemented in a given fishing cove was located in the best habitat (Wilen et al. 2012), then
fishing coves with multiple TURFs might experience sequential reductions in CPUAs. Finally, as
catch depends on effort, it is also possible that changes in CPUA reflect changes in fishing effort
over time (e.g., CPUA reductions arising due to reduced fishing effort independent of any changes
in fish stocks).
A linear mixed effects model (i.e., model 1) was used to estimate the temporal trend and
the effect of the number of TURFs per fishing cove on CPUAs inside and outside TURFs:
𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑃𝑈𝐴𝑠,𝑖,𝑡,𝑎 ) = 𝛽1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐹 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑖,𝑡,𝑎
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(1)

In (1), the dependent variable is the log-transformed CPUA for species s, observed in the
fishing cove i, for year t, in area a (inside or outside TURFs). 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 are the unknown coefficients
of the fixed effects variables year (from 2000 to 2015) and NTURF, the number of functioning (i.e.,
operative or stand by) TURFs per fishing cove for each year, respectively. 𝛿𝑖 is a random effect
for fishing cove i, to control for heterogeneity across fishing coves and 𝜀𝑠,𝑖,𝑡,𝑎 is the error term.
To further disentangle the effects of time and number of TURFs per fishing cove on
CPUAs, an additional linear mixed effects model (i.e., model 2) was developed without the
variable NTURF. Model 2 included a subsample of 57 fishing coves (29% of the 196 coves
considered in this study) that have had a constant number of TURF(s) for at least 10 years.
Statistical estimation of coefficients was performed in R (R Core Team, 2018) with the
lme4 package (Bates et al. 2015). Marginal and conditional coefficients of determination, r2m and
r2c, respectively, were estimated with the MuMIn package (Nakagawa and Schielzeth 2013).

2.3.4 Elastic net regression model
The catches of keyhole limpet, kelp and red sea urchin from OAAs in 2015 were examined
to assess the impact of adjacent TURF characteristics and activity. Chile is divided into 15
administrative regions; fisheries for each of the species groups considered in this analysis generally
occur in only a subset of these regions (Appendix A3). As the great majority of limpet and kelp
catch occurred in the northern regions of Chile (specifically regions II, III, IV and V) and the great
majority of sea urchin catch occurred in the southern region (specifically, regions VIII, IX, XIV,
X and XI), data for species-specific analyses were limited to these northern and southern zones
(see Section 3.1 for details regarding the basis for selecting these zones).
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A regularized linear regression model, the elastic net regression (Zou and Hastie 2005, see
Appendix A4 for model development), was developed to explain catch per cove in OAAs,
including explanatory variables either related to proximal TURFs’ characteristics and activity, or
related to geospatial context (e.g., area and coastline length) and number of fishers targeting a
given species. This model uses a penalized maximum likelihood method that allows a large number
of variables to be included with relatively few observations and prevents over-fitting issues
prevalent in more common Ordinary Least Square (OLS) or stepwise regression methods
(Friedman et al. 2010, Morozova et al. 2015). The algorithm accomplishes variable selection by
constraining the sum of the magnitudes of normalized coefficients. A shrinkage penalty is included
in the objective function; it “shrinks” the effect of unimportant variables to select the simplest and
most accurate model. Two different values of the regularization parameter controlling the strength
of the shrinkage were considered; only results from the less restrictive regularization are shown
here (see Appendix A5 for results with the more restrictive regularization, i.e., a larger penalty that
leads to models with a smaller number of predictors with non-zero coefficients).
The response variables, i.e., catches in OAAs for limpet, kelp, and sea urchin, were logtransformed before centering. We considered catch as the dependent variable instead of CPUEs
and CPUAs because we preferred a model including both effort and area as explanatory variables
simultaneously.
Given that effort displacement and any resulting ecological and social impacts are dynamic
processes, TURFs established for longer periods might be expected to have more significant
effects on catches outside of TURFs. In order to assess these temporal effects, elastic net models
included the variables number of years since the implementation of a TURF (Age_TURF) and
number

of

years

since

the

establishment

of
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the

associated

fishers’

organization

(Age_Organization) (source SUBPESCA). In theory, a fisher’s organization is established before
a TURF is implemented, but in some instances (~30% of our fishing coves), the organization had
changed over time or several TURFs had merged or been split leading to the TURF being
implemented before the associated fishers’ organization. Since several fishers’ organizations can
operate in each cove and a fishing cove can have several TURFs, each associated with one fisher’s
organization, the average and maximum values were calculated for both Age_TURF and
Age_Organization. Spatial aspects of TURF use were captured by the variables N_TURF,
Area_Fraction and Area_OA which measured the number of functioning TURFs per fishing cove,
the fraction of the total estimated fishing ground managed as TURFs and the total area of open
access grounds, respectively. The potential effects of fishing effort displacement should be greater
in fishing grounds with more TURFs and/or proportionately larger TURFs or smaller OAAs.
Fishing effort was included through the variables Harvesters_All, Harvesters_per_OAA and
Harvesters_per_TURFs, respectively, the total number of divers (or collectors) in OAAs, the
number of divers (or collectors) in OAAs divided by the OAAs area, and the number of divers (or
collectors) inside TURFs divided by the TURFs area. The predictions are that catch in OAAs
should increase with the total number of divers (or collectors) and decrease with the number of
divers (or collectors) per unit of area. Finally, the number of fisher’s organizations per fishing
cove, N_ORG, was used as another proxy for local effort levels and fisheries involvement.
Data on additional geospatial variables related to the spatial extent and context of OAAs
were also obtained to include in analyses of catch for each species. Coastline length was calculated
for fishing grounds adjacent to a fishing cove to capture differences in coastal habitats (e.g.,
straight along beach and sinuous along cove leading to short and long coastline lengths,
respectively). Fractured coastlines with many small inlets are expected to be more favorable for

32

sea urchin productivity (Lawrence 2006) whereas linear beaches may represent regions of wide
continental shelf where unproductive sandy habitat is more common. As proximity to urban areas
might impact exploitation rates and other human pressures on benthic resources, a binary variable
was included to indicate if a fishing cove was within 50 km of one of the ten biggest cities of Chile
(source Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas). We also identified fishing coves close to fishing ports,
since increased market access could trigger higher effort and catches. Thus, if a fishing cove was
within 50 km of one of the forty major fishing ports of Chile, total landings by weight (comprising
algae, fish, mollusk, crustacean, other) from these proximal fishing ports were summed together
and associated with this cove; if no fishing ports were within 50 km, this variable was set to zero.
Finally, CPUEs for each species group (i.e., loco, keyhole limpet, kelp and sea urchin) within
TURFs were included as proxies for local abundance conditions. Abbreviations, definitions and
units for all variables included in the elastic net regression are given in Table 2.1.
Model parameters were estimated with the glmnet algorithm in R (Friedman et al. 2010, R
Development Core Team 2018). A bootstrapping process, randomly sampling the data with
replacement, was used to re-estimate the model 10,000 times. Coefficient means (𝛽̅ ), standard
errors (𝜎𝛽 ) and probabilities of inclusion for each regression coefficient were calculated following
bootstrap iterations. We considered “highly important” predictors to be those with coefficients
retained in at least 80% of the bootstrap iterations; “important” predictors to be coefficients
retained in 60 to 80 % of the iterations; and “moderately important” to be coefficients retained in
40 to 60% of the iterations. Elastic net log-linear regression coefficients were transformed into
percent changes in catch for a given change in the predictor variable using the following formula:
%∆𝑦 = 100 ∙ (𝑒 𝛽.∆𝑥 − 1).
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OLS models using either the full set of independent variables (OLS_all), using only TURF
related variables (OLS_TURF), using only geospatial context variables (OLS_Geo) or using only
variables selected by the elastic net model (OLS_elastic) were also run for comparison with the
elastic net outputs. P-values for the coefficients of each explanatory factor in the OLS models were
adjusted utilizing the Dunn-Šidák correction method for multiple statistical tests (Šidák 1967, Ury
1976). We considered the possibility of spatial heterogeneity in catch reporting by examining OLS
model residuals using Studentized Breusch-Pagan tests.

2.4. Results
2.4.1 Regional description of the system
We analyzed 196 fishing coves with a total of 478 functioning TURFs in this study.
Average TURF size was 1.5 km2 (ranging from 0.01 km2 to 39 km2). Average total TURF area per
fishing cove was 4 (±7.3) km2 while average OAA area per fishing cove was 82 (±29) km2. Limpet
and kelp catch in the northern regions (i.e., regions II, III, IV, V) accounted for 81.3% and 84.8%
of total national catch of each species group, respectively. Contrarily, 95.1% of sea urchin catch
and 77.6% of loco catch were landed in the southern regions (i.e., regions VIII, IX, XIV, X and
XI, Figure 2.1, Appendix A3). The contrasting landing patterns were accompanied by differences
in TURFs’ size. TURF average area per fishing cove was higher and more variable in southern
regions (4.9 ± 9.3 km2) than in the northern region (3.2 ± 3.1 km2), and OAA average sizes
associated with each fishing cove were larger in southern regions (90.5 ±29.2 km2) than in northern
regions (58.0 ±103.0 km2) (Table 2.2). The sizes of OAAs were consistently larger than those of
TURFs, however the ratio between OAA and TURF size was similar between the north and the
south. In terms of effort, the number of divers (or collectors) that could fish in OAAs was higher
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than the number that could fish in TURFs, with this difference being larger for fishing coves in the
south (Table 2.2).

2.4.2 Catch rate comparisons between TURFs and OAAs
CPUE and CPUA values for 2015 for each fishing cove were compared by their origin, i.e.
inside or outside TURFs (Figure 2.2). CPUEs for limpet were observed to be higher inside TURFs
(p=0.01). However, CPUEs were not significantly different between the two origins for kelp
(p=0.36) and sea urchin extraction (p=0.34), though their corresponding medians were higher
inside TURFs. For each of the three groups of species, CPUAs were significantly higher inside
TURFs (p=2.1 x 10-5 for limpet, p=5.4 x 10-6 for kelp, and p=1 x 10-3 for sea urchin). Overall,
median catch rates were at least 75% higher inside TURFs (Table 2.3). With regard to catch rate
values across species, limpet and red sea urchin were caught at similar rates in terms of metric
tonnes per month per unit effort/area, whereas kelp was caught at a much higher rate, and loco was
caught at an intermediate rate. Assuming perfect reporting within TURFs, equal catch rates
between TURFs and OAAs imply 70% to 99% of catch from OAAs would be unreported. Higher
catch rates observed in TURFs therefore appear to be robust to catch misreporting

2.4.3 Temporal mixed effects analysis of area catch rates
Linear mixed effects models revealed that CPUAs had decreased significantly over time
inside TURFs, with rates of decrease of 7.8%, 4%, and 4.8% per year for loco, limpet, and sea
urchin, respectively (p < 0.05, Table 2.4). For all species groups, CPUAs also significantly
decreased inside TURFs as the number of TURFs implemented in a fishing cove increased
(between 10 and 29% decrease in CPUA per additional TURF implemented, p<0.05, Table 2.4).
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Effects of the temporal driver Year were weaker in OAAs (Table 2.5). Only CPUAs for limpet
significantly decreased in OAAs over years (4.7% decrease in CPUA/year, p<0.05, Table 2.5).
Interestingly, CPUAs for kelp increased significantly outside of TURFs over time (3% increase
per year, p=0.02, Table 2.5) whereas there was no temporal trend inside TURFs. The number of
TURFs did not have any effect on CPUAs in OAAs for any of the species groups considered.
Predicted values of CPUAs inside TURFs from 2000 and 2015 were consistently higher than
predicted values of CPUAs within OAAs (Figure 2.3). When the models were restricted to just the
subset of fishing coves having a constant number of TURFs (i.e., model 2), CPUAs were found to
decrease significantly over time inside TURFs for loco (8.5% decrease per year), and outside
TURFs for limpet (2.5% decrease per year, p<0.05, Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Differences between
conditional r2c and marginal r2m show that 40% to 80% of variability is due to spatial heterogeneity
across fishing coves (Tables 2.4 and 2.5).

2.4.4 Elastic net regression of OAA catch
2.4.4.a OLS and elastic net regressions comparison
Catch of limpet, kelp, and sea urchin in OAAs were examined to resolve the effect of
TURFs on adjacent areas in 2015 (loco is not included in OLS and elastic net regressions since its
extraction is banned in OAAs). OLS models were inconclusive, yielding no significant predictors
of catches outside TURFs though a considerable proportion of the variances were explained
(adjusted r2 = 0.31 for limpet, 0.55 for kelp, and 0.34 for sea urchin, Table 2.6). Geospatial
variables were found to explain a greater amount of variance than TURF variables in OLS models
for all species. Elastic net regression models explained similar proportions of variance as the OLS
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models, but with fewer variables (adjusted r2 =0.31 for limpet, 0.55 for kelp, and 0.51 for sea
urchin, Table 2.6).

2.4.4.b Predictors selected by the elastic net regression of OAA catch
Contrasting results from the elastic net regression model were found for the three groups
of species, with different predictors selected by the penalized model in explaining OAA catches
(Table 2.7). All “highly important predictors” retained to explain catch in OAAs for the three
species groups were related to the geospatial context. The predictor Urban_Area was selected in
83.69% of the 10,000 bootstraps when modeling limpet catches and 99.73% of the bootstraps when
modeling kelp extraction, being the strongest identified driver of catch outside of TURFs in both
cases. This predictor exhibited a negative relationship with catches outside TURFs for both species
groups, with lower catches in the OAAs for limpet (33% decrease for coves within 50 km to urban
areas compared to those far from urban areas) and kelp (72% decrease) in fishing coves close to
urban areas. Additional predictors for catch of limpet outside TURFs included Area_OAA2
(selected in 60.35% of cases) and Area_fraction (selected in 41.86% of the bootstraps; definitions
of predictors in Table 2.1). There was a 0.08% reduction in limpet catch per 10 km2 of additional
OAA area and a 1.5% reduction per 1% increase in the fraction of the total area that is TURF.
Several variables were found to be important predictors of kelp catches in OAAs. Loco
CPUEs inside TURF (Loco_per_diver) was a highly important, positive predictor of outside
catches of kelp and was included in 91.11% of the bootstraps (42% increase of kelp catch in OAAs
for every additional 1 mt catch of loco per diver within the TURF, with the average loco catch
being 0.46 mt loco/diver). Similarly, higher catch rates of kelp inside TURFs were associated with
higher catches of kelp outside (1.4% increase of kelp catch outside a TURF for every additional 1

37

mt catch of kelp per collector within the TURF, with the average kelp catch being 8.6 mt
kelp/collector). Counterintuitively, lower catches of kelp outside of TURFs were associated with
fishing coves that had larger OAAs (11% decrease in catch for every additional 10 km2 of OAA
area; Area_OAA and Area_OAA2 were selected in at least 80% of bootstraps). Lower catches of
kelp outside of TURFs were associated with fishing coves that had older TURFs (e.g., for every
year increase in Age_TURF_max, there is a ~8% decrease in catch; Age_TURF_mean and
Age_TURF_max were included in 73.03% and 84.40% of the bootstraps) and fishing coves with a
higher fraction of fishing grounds managed as TURFs (0.8% decrease for every 1% increase in the
fraction of area designated as TURFs; Area_fraction was selected in 47.36% of models). Finally,
lower catches of kelp in OAAs were observed in fishing coves with several fishers’ organizations
(4.4% decrease for every additional organization). The model indicates that OAAs with higher
catches of kelp tended to be smaller, outside of urban centers, in areas with productive loco
fisheries, and have fewer, younger, and proportionately smaller proximate TURFs.
Higher catches of sea urchin in OAAs were associated with fishing coves that have longer
coastline lengths (13% increase in catch for every additional 10 km of coastline). This predictor
was highly important in explaining catch of sea urchin (selected in 98.98% of cases). A decrease
of sea urchin catch in OAAs was observed in fishing coves that had older TURFs (3% decrease in
catch for every additional year since TURF implementation). The related variables
Age_TURF_max and Age_TURF_mean were included in 47.3% and 47.0% of the bootstraps,
respectively.
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2.5 Discussion
We evaluated temporal and spatial trends in catch and catch rates for TURFs and OAAs in
Chile. This study is the first to consider fishing coves all along the Chilean coast to understand the
TURF system in its entirety (TURFs and their surrounding areas) over two decades. Though
increased CPUEs inside of TURFs compared to OAAs has been demonstrated in previous
literature (Castilla and Fernández 1998, Gelcich et al. 2012, Defeo et al. 2016), most studies have
focused on small-scale projects in specific regions of the country. The most spatially extensive
study was based on a systematic literature review of the effects of TURFs on ecosystem services
in Chile considering 268 study sites all along the Chilean coast (Gelcich et al. 2019). It showed
that TURFs sustain biodiversity and all typologies of ecosystem services (i.e., supporting,
provisioning, regulating and cultural services), but stressed a lack of studies addressing potential
negative or unpredicted consequences of TURFs and a need to better understand changes over time
(Gelcich et al. 2019). Our study expands the scale of previous analyses, focusing on the comparison
between TURFs and OAAs, and shows that median catch rates (CPUAs and CPUEs) of benthic
resources were at least 75% higher inside TURFs than in surrounding areas. To the extent that
these catch rates are indicators of biomass, this result points out that Chilean TURFs appear to
align with their main objectives in 2015, i.e. “ensure the sustainability of artisanal fishing through
the assignment of natural banks” and “maintain and increase the biological productivity of benthic
resources”. However, our study also indicates that catch rates have been steadily declining within
TURFs and that TURFs may impact catch levels in surrounding OAAs, both of which are potential
risks to system sustainability.
Three possible mechanisms could produce higher CPUAs and CPUEs in TURFs: 1)
recovered biomass could have built up and improved catch rates within TURFs over time, 2)
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TURFs could have been implemented in areas of better habitat and higher quality grounds, and/or
3) effort displacement following the implementation of TURFs could have degraded OAAs over
time. CPUAs and CPUEs of loco, keyhole limpet, kelp, and red sea urchin in TURFs and OAAs
were analyzed to investigate differences between areas and over time. Additionally, catch of
keyhole limpet, kelp, and red sea urchin in OAAs was investigated to resolve any impacts of
proximal TURFs. Our findings indicate that CPUAs and CPUEs are consistently larger inside
TURFs but that CPUAs have been decreasing in TURFs over time and also with the number of
TURFs implemented by fishing cove. Further, a weak negative impact of proximal TURFs on
catches in OAAs was also found. This evidence appears to provide the strongest support for the
hypothesis that TURFs were selectively implemented in the best fishing grounds since catch rates
are higher inside TURFs throughout our data, yet declining over time and with the addition of new
TURFs. Additionally, the small negative effect of proximal TURFs of OAA catches could result
from effort displacement and suggests management spillover. Declining catch rates over time
within TURFs does not appear to support the hypothesis that catch rates are improved in TURFs
due to a recovery of biomass. As we were only able to calculate CPUAs over time, this finding
could result from consistent reductions in effort. Nationally, however, the number of registered
divers has been constant while the number of collectors has increased over the last decade
(Appendix A6, Sernapesca 2015). It is not clear how average fishing effort by registered harvesters
(e.g., number of trips/harvester) may have changed over this period, and TURFs may now be used
less intensively. Interestingly, for some species, CPUAs were found to have been decreasing in
fishing coves that have had a constant number of TURF(s) for at least 10 years, indicating that the
observed temporal change in CPUA is not only due to selective implementation of TURFs, but
possibly due to changes in the local environment or the intensity of fishing effort.
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Exogenous geospatial factors (e.g., coastline, OAA areas, urban areas) were the main
drivers explaining variability of catches in OAAs across fishing coves for 2015 (based on selection
in elastic net regressions and the greater amount of variance explained in the OLS analyses
including just these variables, Table 2.5). Geospatial predictors always had a higher percentage of
inclusion when compared to TURF management-related predictors (Table 2.6). The negative
relationship between catches of limpet and kelp in OAAs and proximity to urban centers could be
due to higher historical fishing pressure and deteriorated environments in more populated urban
areas. Additionally, catch of kelp, a lower value product, in OAAs could also be higher in rural
areas where there are fewer economic opportunities and thus lower opportunity costs for fishers.
Fishing coves with longer coastline lengths seem to support higher catches of sea urchin,
suggesting environmental factors related to coastline complexity may be the principal drivers for
sea urchin abundance and availability. The effect of TURFs on catches in OAAs was especially
weak for limpet and sea urchin (TURF-related predictors selected for 40 to 50% of bootstraps).
However, when predictors related to TURFs’ characteristics and activity (i.e., time since TURF
registration or fisher organization implementation, and fraction of TURF area) were retained in
the models, they consistently displayed a negative relationship with OAA catches.
Several aspects of the Chilean TURF system and available data are worth mentioning to
provide additional context and inform interpretation of results. First, this study only considered
fishing coves with at least one functioning TURF (operative or stand by) in 2016. Gelcich et al.
(2017) revealed that about 40% of TURFs are inactive or currently abandoned in Chile. TURFs
that have been abandoned would have increased OAAs, inferring that CPUA values could be lower
in OAAs than actually observed (but possibly higher within TURFs). Second, it is possible that
temporal dynamics and interactions between TURFs and OAAs may have changed over time. Our
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analysis began in 2000, however TURF management commenced in the early 1990s and
approximately 18% of the TURFs considered here were initiated prior to 2000. Further analysis
and investigation are needed to determine temporal changes and management interactions during
the first decade of TURF management. Finally, TURFs are a management tool typically used to
achieve sustainable fisheries and resource extraction within their boundaries (Christy 1982,
Aceves-Bueno and Halpern 2018), though it is possible that some TURFs in Chile are maintained
today for non-extractive purposes. For example, Chilean TURFs have been argued to build
leadership and social cohesion among fishers (Rosas et al. 2014, Gelcich et al. 2019) and may offer
benefits for conservation or restoration of benthic habitats (Gelcich et al. 2008a, Blanco et al. 2017,
Fernández et al. 2017). Non-extractive social or ecological benefits arising from maintained
TURFs in Chile are not considered here but are important areas for future research.
While this analysis was able to discern broad temporal and spatial trends by evaluating
catch and catch rates across 196 fishing coves over two decades, the available data was generally
coarse and requires consideration for potential biases. Recent studies have shown that misreporting
can be a problem in officially reported catches (Oyanedel et al. 2017, Ruano-Chamorro et al.
2017), particularly with respect to locos (official catch is thought to only account for 14-30% of
total loco extraction in Chile). As this research was primarily focused on relative trends and
comparisons among catch and catch rates in OAAs and TURFs, misreporting was considered to
only be problematic if it were non-uniform over space or time or differing between TURFs and
OAAs. We examined the possibility of spatial heterogeneity in catch reporting by examining OLS
model residuals using Studentized Breusch-Pagan tests and found no evidence of heterogeneous
error variances across observations (p>0.05, Appendix A7). Additionally, higher catch rates
observed in TURFs appeared to be robust to catch misreporting. Estimation of OAAs and fishing
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effort were based on a number of assumptions regarding fishing behavior. The negative
relationship found between catches of kelp and limpet and OAA size appears counterintuitive:
higher catches outside of TURFs were observed in fishing coves with smaller OAAs. It is possible
that total fishing ground boundaries based on average travel distance (Ruano-Chamorro et al.
2017) and bathymetry were too liberal and thus OAA areas were over-estimated in some instances
(e.g., coastline complexity and wave exposure might limit sailing of small boats and the effective
fishing area). Future research could incorporate fishers’ mobility among proximal fishing coves in
fishing effort estimates, though it would require extensive field studies to determine the
appropriate spatial range of effort. Finally, though CPUE values were found to be lower in OAAs,
this metric relies on a crude estimate of effort as information on the number of trips or dive
durations was not available. Nevertheless, consistency between CPUE and CPUA measures
(metrics were found to be positively correlated in all areas) suggests that our CPUE values were a
reasonable reflection of catch rates around fishing coves.
Various factors related to local governance could further explain low CPUAs and CPUEs
observed in OAAs as well as the decrease of CPUAs observed over time. Such variables could
include leadership, organizations’ degree of cooperation, government support and governance
network structure. A social-ecological-system framework (Ostrom 2007) was found to be useful
for examining these variables and associated institutional regimes in Mexico and Costa Rica
(Basurto et al. 2013, García Lozano and Heinen 2016). This type of analysis would require
extensive fieldwork, and, therefore, the spatial scale of such analysis would likely be considerably
smaller than that used in this study. Nevertheless, application of such an approach to the Chilean
context represents an important avenue for future work that could enhance our understanding of
the interaction between institutional factors and successful TURFs-based fisheries management.
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Many countries are transitioning marine resource management from common property
systems towards rights-based approaches (e.g., individual transferable quotas, catch shares, or
TURFs), driven by concerns related to sustainability and resource stewardship (Orensanz et al.
2005, Quynh et al. 2017). Although the influence of MPAs on surrounding areas and fisheries
sustainability are now well known, enhancing biomass through larval export and adult spillover
(Gell and Roberts 2003, Harrison et al. 2012) or negatively impacting surrounding unprotected
waters through “fishery squeeze” and/or “fishing the line” behavior (Kellner et al. 2007, Caveen
et al. 2014, Abbott and Haynie 2012), the impacts of TURFs on surrounding areas have been
poorly documented. This study contributes to a better understanding of management spillover
between TURFs and OAAs. Whereas the impacts of TURFs appeared weak in this study, possibly
growing over time given the negative relationship with TURF age variables, CPUEs and CPUAs
were significantly lower in OAAs. This finding suggests that OAAs, whose total area is more than
50 times larger than grounds currently managed as TURFs, may be substantially degraded and
overfished. Several authors have suggested that resources in OAAs might be heavily exploited and
even depleted (González et al. 2006, Orensanz and Parma 2010, Andreu-Cazenave et al. 2017, de
Juan et al. 2017, Oyanedel et al. 2017, Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2017). Interestingly, our results do
not show significant temporal declines in OAA CPUAs, suggesting either shifts in effort over time
or that OAAs were depleted prior to 2000. The research presented here suggests that TURFs could
place additional burden on already heavily fished OAAs. The current fisheries management regime
in Chile includes limited assessment or monitoring of OAAs. It appears important that more
attention be focused on OAAs, and on the system as a whole. By knowing that TURFs affect
fisheries in OAAs, stocks outside managed areas may be more effectively controlled, provided
that existing harvest controls outside of TURFs (i.e., bans, minimum legal size) are better enforced.
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The Chilean TURF network is the largest worldwide, has been extensively studied and
may, therefore, provide useful guidance for countries or regions transitioning toward rights-based
approaches. For example, many Latin America countries have similar spatial management policies
for small-scale fisheries (Mexico, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Galapagos) and also share similar
capacities for enforcement, dependence on a few high-value benthic species, extended OAAs, and
co-management regimes (da Silva 2004, Beitl 2011, Defeo et al. 2016, Garcia Lozano and Heinen
2016). Determining whether or not unintended impacts of TURFs on OAAs, similar to those found
here, exist in these regions is an important area for future research.

2.6 Acknowledgments
The authors thank S. de Juan, B. Bularz, S. López and M. Andreu-Cazenave for their help
with the data collection. We thank the presidents and secretaries of the disparate fishing
organizations who met with us in the fishing coves of Algarrobo, Cascabelles, Chigualoco, El
Quisco, Horcon, Pichicuy and Quintay for their trust and commitment in sharing their knowledge
about the TURFs system in Chile. We also thank J. Shields and two anonymous reviewers for
constructive criticisms on preliminary versions of the paper. This work was supported by the
Iniciativa Científica Milenio from Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo de Chile (Project
Fondecyt: 1130976 to MFB), the Virginia Sea Grant Graduate Research Fellowship
(NA14OAR4170093 to JB), the Virginia Institute of Marine Science Foundation, and the W&M
Reves Center for international studies. This is contribution No. 3843 of the Virginia Institute of
Marine Science, William & Mary.

45

2.7 References
Abbott JK, Haynie AC. 2012. What are we protecting? Fisher behavior and the unintended
consequences of spatial closures as a fishery management tool. Ecological Applications 22:
762–777.
Aburto J, Gallardo G, Stotz W, Cerda C, Mondaca-Schachermayer C, Vera K. 2013. Territorial
user rights for artisanal fisheries in Chile – intended and unintended outcomes. Ocean &
Coastal Management 71: 284–295.
Aburto J, Stotz W. 2013. Learning about TURFs and natural variability: Failure of surf clam
management in Chile. Ocean & Coastal Management 71: 88–98.
Aburto J, Thiel M, Stotz W. 2009. Allocation of effort in artisanal fisheries: The importance of
migration and temporary fishing camps. Ocean & Coastal Management 52: 646–654.
Aburto JA, Stotz WB, Cundill G. 2014. Social-Ecological Collapse: TURF Governance in the
Context of Highly Variable Resources in Chile. Ecology and Society 19: 2.
Aceves-Bueno E, Halpern BS. 2018. Informing the design of territorial use rights in fisheries
from marine protected area theory. Marine Ecology Progress Series 596: 247–262.
Andreu-Cazenave M, Subida MD, Fernandez M. 2017. Exploitation rates of two benthic
resources across management regimes in central Chile: Evidence of illegal fishing in
artisanal fisheries operating in open access areas. PLOS ONE 12: e0180012.
Asche F, Gordon DV, Jensen CL. 2007. Individual Vessel Quotas and Increased Fishing Pressure
on Unregulated Species. Land Economics 83: 41–49.
Attwood CG, Bennett BA. 1995. Modelling the effect of marine reserves on the recreational
shore-fishery of the South-Western Cape, South Africa. South African Journal of Marine
Science 16: 227–240.
Basurto X, Gelcich S, Ostrom E. 2013. The social–ecological system framework as a knowledge
classificatory system for benthic small-scale fisheries. Global Environmental Change 23:
1366–1380.
Bates D, Mächler M, Bolker B, Walker S. 2015. Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using
lme4. Journal of Statistical Software 67: 1–48.
Beddington JR, Agnew DJ, Clark CW. 2007. Current Problems in the Management of Marine
Fisheries. Science 316: 1713–1716.
Beitl CM. 2011. Cockles in custody: the role of common property arrangements in the ecological
sustainability of mangrove fisheries on the Ecuadorian coast. International Journal of the
Commons 5, 485–512.
Bernal PA, Oliva D, Aliaga B, Morales C. 1999. New regulations in Chilean Fisheries and
Aquaculture: ITQ’s and Territorial Users Rights. Ocean & Coastal Management 42: 119–
142.
Biggs D, Amar F, Valdebenito A, Gelcich S. 2016. Potential Synergies between Nature-Based
Tourism and Sustainable Use of Marine Resources: Insights from Dive Tourism in
Territorial User Rights for Fisheries in Chile. PLoS ONE 11.

46

Blanco M, Ospina-Álvarez A, González C, Fernández M. 2017. Egg production patterns of two
invertebrate species in rocky subtidal areas under different fishing regimes along the coast
of central Chile. PLOS ONE 12: e0176758.
Bohnsack JA. 2000. A comparison of the short-term impact of no-take marine reserves and
minimum size limits. Bulletin of Marine Science 66: 635–650.
Branch TA. 2009. How do individual transferable quotas affect marine ecosystems? Fish and
Fisheries 10: 39–57.
Cancino JP. 2007. Collective Management and Territorial Use Rights: The Chilean Small-scale
Loco Fishery Case. ProQuest dissertation Available from:
https://search.proquest.com/docview/304901441
Castilla J. 1994. The Chilean Small-Scale Benthic Shellfisheries and the Institutionalization of
New Management Practices. Ecology International Bulletin 47–63.
Castilla JC, Espinosa J, Yamashiro C, Melo O, Gelcich S. 2016. Telecoupling Between Catch,
Farming, and International Trade for the Gastropods Concholepas concholepas (Loco) and
Haliotis spp. (Abalone). Journal of Shellfish Research 35: 499–506.
Castilla JC, Fernandez M. 1998. Small-scale benthic fisheries in chile: on co-management and
sustainable use of benthic invertebrates. Ecological Applications 8: S124–S132.
Caveen A, Polunin N, Gray T, Stead SM. 2014. The Controversy over Marine Protected Areas:
Science meets Policy. Springer. 174p.
Chavez C, Dresdner J, Quiroga M, Baquedano M, Gonzalez N, Castro R. 2010. Evaluacion
socio-economica de la pesquerıa del recurso loco asociada al regimen de areas de manejo,
como elemento de decision para la administracion pesquera. 414p.
Christy FT. 1982. Territorial use rights in marine fisheries: definitions and conditions. UN Food
& Agriculture Organization Fish. Tech. pap. 227: 10p.
Costello C, Gaines S, Lynham J. 2008. Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse? Science 321:
1678–1681.
Costello C, Ovando D, Hilborn R, Gaines SD, Deschenes O, Lester SE. 2012. Status and
Solutions for the World’s Unassessed Fisheries. Science 338: 517–520.
Davis KJ, Kragt ME, Gelcich S, Burton M, Schilizzi S, Pannell DJ. 2015. Why are Fishers not
Enforcing Their Marine User Rights? Environmental and Resource Economics 1–21.
Defeo O, Castilla JC. 2005. More than One Bag for the World Fishery Crisis and Keys for Comanagement Successes in Selected Artisanal Latin American Shellfisheries. Reviews in
Fish Biology and Fisheries 15: 265–283.
Defeo O, Castrejón M, Pérez-Castañeda R, Castilla JC, Gutiérrez NL, Essington TE, Folke C.
2016. Co-management in Latin American small-scale shellfisheries: assessment from longterm case studies. Fish and Fisheries 17: 176–192.
FAO. 2014. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2014. 243.
Fernández M, Blanco M, Ruano-Chamorro C, Subida MD. 2017. Reproductive output of two
benthic resources (Fissurella latimarginata and Loxechinus albus) under different

47

management regimes along the coast of central Chile. Latin American journal of aquatic
research 45: 391–402.
Friedman J, Hastie T, Tibshirani R. 2010. Regularization Paths for Generalized Linear Models
via Coordinate Descent. Journal of Statistical Software 33.
García Lozano AJ, Heinen JT. 2016. Identifying Drivers of Collective Action for the Comanagement of Coastal Marine Fisheries in the Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica. Environmental
Management 57: 759–769.
Gelcich S, Cinner J, Donlan CJ, Tapia-Lewin S, Godoy N, Castilla JC. 2017. Fishers’
perceptions on the Chilean coastal TURF system after two decades: problems, benefits, and
emerging needs. Bulletin of Marine Science 92.
Gelcich S, Fernández M, Godoy N, Canepa A, Prado L, Castilla JC. 2012. Territorial User Rights
for Fisheries as Ancillary Instruments for Marine Coastal Conservation in Chile.
Conservation Biology 26: 1005–1015.
Gelcich S, Godoy N, Castilla JC. 2009. Artisanal fishers’ perceptions regarding coastal comanagement policies in Chile and their potentials to scale-up marine biodiversity
conservation. Ocean & Coastal Management 52: 424–432.
Gelcich S, Godoy N, Prado L, Castilla JC. 2008a. Add-on conservation benefits of marine
territorial user rights fishery policies in central Chile. Ecological Applications 18: 273–281.
Gelcich S, Hughes TP, Olsson P, Folke C, Defeo O, Fernández M, Foale S, Gunderson LH,
Rodríguez-Sickert C, Scheffer M, others. 2010. Navigating transformations in governance
of Chilean marine coastal resources. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107:
16794–16799.
Gelcich S, Kaiser MJ, Castilla JC, Edwards-Jones G. 2008b. Engagement in co-management of
marine benthic resources influences environmental perceptions of artisanal fishers.
Environmental Conservation 35: 36–45.
Gelcich S, Martínez-Harms MJ, Tapia-Lewin S, Vasquez-Lavin F, Ruano-Chamorro C. 2019.
Co-management of small-scale fisheries and ecosystem services. Conservation Letters
e12637.
Gell FR, Roberts CM. 2003. Benefits beyond boundaries: the fishery effects of marine reserves.
Trends in Ecology & Evolution 18: 448–455.
González J, Stotz W, Garrido J, Orensanz JM, Parma AM, Tapia C, Zuleta A. 2006. The Chilean
TURF system: how is it performing in the case of the loco fishery? Bulletin of Marine
Science 78: 499–527.
Halpern BS, Gaines SD, Warner RR. 2004. Confounding effects of the export of production and
the displacement of fishing effort from marine reserves. Ecological Applications 14: 1248–
1256.
Harrison HB, Williamson DH, Evans RD, Almany GR, Thorrold SR, Russ GR, Feldheim KA,
van Herwerden L, Planes S, Srinivasan M, Berumen ML, Jones GP. 2012. Larval Export
from Marine Reserves and the Recruitment Benefit for Fish and Fisheries. Current Biology
22: 1023–1028.
48

Hilborn R, Stokes K, Maguire J-J, Smith T, Botsford LW, Mangel M, Orensanz J, Parma A, Rice
J, Bell J, Cochrane KL, Garcia S, Hall SJ, Kirkwood GP, Sainsbury K, Stefansson G,
Walters C. 2004. When can marine reserves improve fisheries management? Ocean &
Coastal Management 47: 197–205.
de Juan S, Gelcich S, Fernandez M. 2017. Integrating stakeholder perceptions and preferences on
ecosystem services in the management of coastal areas. Ocean & Coastal Management 136:
38–48.
Kellner JB, Tetreault I, Gaines SD, Nisbet RM. 2007. Fishing the line near marine reserves in
single and multispecies fisheries. Ecological Applications 17: 1039–1054.
Kratz B, Block WE. 2013. Privatize to Save the Fish. World Futures Review 5: 256–265.
Lawrence JM. 2006. Edible Sea Urchins: Biology and Ecology. Elsevier. 557p.
Lester SE, McDonald G, Clemence M, Dougherty DT, Szuwalski CS. 2017. Impacts of TURFs
and marine reserves on fisheries and conservation goals: theory, empirical evidence, and
modeling. Bulletin of Marine Science 93: 173–198.
Moreno A, Revenga C. 2014. The system of territorial use rights in fisheries in Chile. The Nature
Conservancy. Virginia, USA. 88p.
Morozova O, Levina O, Uusküla A, Heimer R. 2015. Comparison of subset selection methods in
linear regression in the context of health-related quality of life and substance abuse in
Russia. BMC Medical Research Methodology 15.
Murawski SA, Wigley SE, Fogarty MJ, Rago PJ, Mountain DG. 2005. Effort distribution and
catch patterns adjacent to temperate MPAs. ICES Journal of Marine Science: Journal du
Conseil 62: 1150–1167.
Nakagawa S, Schielzeth H. 2013. A general and simple method for obtaining R2 from
generalized linear mixed-effects models. Methods in Ecology and Evolution 4: 133–142.
Orensanz JM, Parma AM. 2010. Chile: territorial use rights successful experiment? 42e46. 42–
46.
Orensanz JM, Parma AM, Jerez G, Barahona N, Montecinos M, Elias I. 2005. What are the Key
Elements for the Sustainability of “S-Fisheries”? Insights from South America. Bulletin of
Marine Science 76: 527–556.
Ostrom E. 2007. A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 104: 15181–15187.
Oyanedel R, Keim A, Castilla JC, Gelcich S. 2017. Illegal fishing and territorial user rights in
Chile. Conservation Biology 32.
Quynh CNT, Schilizzi S, Hailu A, Iftekhar S. 2017. Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries
(TURFs): State of the art and the road ahead. Marine Policy 75: 41–52.
R Core Team. 2018. R: A language and environment for statistical computing. Vienna, Austria:
R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
Romero P, Grego E, Ariz L, Figueroa L. 2016. Contribución de las Áreas de Manejo de recursos
bentónicos al nivel socioeconómico de los pescadores artesanales de la macro zona centro
sur de Chile, Sudamérica. 13p.
49

Rosas J, Dresdner J, Chávez C, Quiroga M. 2014. Effect of social networks on the economic
performance of TURFs: The case of the artisanal fishermen organizations in Southern Chile.
Ocean & Coastal Management 88: 43–52.
Ruano-Chamorro C, Subida MD, Fernández M. 2017. Fishers’ perception: An alternative source
of information to assess the data-poor benthic small-scale artisanal fisheries of central Chile.
Ocean & Coastal Management 146: 67–76.
San Martín G, Parma AM, Orensanz JL. 2010. The Chilean experience with territorial use rights
in fisheries. Handbook of marine fisheries conservation and management 24: 324–337.
Šidák Z. 1967. Rectangular confidence regions for the means of multivariate normal
distributions. Journal of the American Statistical Association 62: 626–633.
da Silva PP. 2004. From common property to co-management: lessons from Brazil’s first
maritime extractive reserve. Marine Policy 28: 419–428.
Subpesca 2003. Documento de Difusión No. 1. Áreas de manejo y explotación de recursos
bentónicos. Departamento de Coordinación Pesquera y Departamento de Pesquerías de la
Subsecretaría de Pesca. Available from: http://www.subpesca.cl/publicaciones/606/articles9758_documento.pdf.
Ury HK. 1976. Comparison of four procedures for multiple comparisons among means (pairwise
contrasts) for arbitrary sample sizes. Technometrics 18: 89–97.
Van Holt T. 2012. Landscape influences on fisher success: adaptation strategies in closed and
open access fisheries in southern Chile. Ecology and Society 17.
Wilen JE, Cancino J, Uchida H. 2012. The economics of territorial use rights fisheries, or
TURFs. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 6: 237–257.
Zou H, Hastie T. 2005. Regularization and variable selection via the elastic net. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology) 67: 301–320.
Zúñiga S, Ramírez P, Valdebenito M. 2008. Situación socioeconómica de las áreas de manejo en
la región de Coquimbo, Chile. Latin American journal of aquatic research 36: 63–81.

50

2.8 Tables
Table 2.1 Response variable and predictor abbreviations and definitions for the elastic net model.
Variable
Y
Age_TURF_mean
Age_TURF_max
Age_Organization_mean
Age_Organization_max
N_TURF
N_ORG
Area_OAA
Area_OAA2
Area_Fraction
Harvesters_All
Harvesters_per_OAA
Harvesters_per_TURF
Limpet_per_diver
Kelp_per_collector
Urchin_per_diver
Loco_per_diver
Coastline_length
Landings_port
Urban_area
a

Definition
Log-transformed, centered catches for species s in OAA areas per fishing cove (mt)
Average time since the different TURFs implementation per fishing cove (yr)
Maximum time since the oldest TURF implemented per fishing cove (yr)
Average time since the different fishers' organizations implementation per fishing cove (yr)
Maximum time since the oldest fishers' organization implemented per fishing cove (yr)
Number of TURFs per fishing cove
Number of fishers’ organizations per fishing cove
Open access areas per fishing cove (km2)
Open access areas per fishing cove (km4)
TURF areas divided by total fishing ground (TURF areas + OAA areas) (%)
Outside effort, or all licensed divers (or collectors) per fishing cove (divers or collectors)
Outside effort divided by the OAA areas per fishing cove (km-2)
Inside effort divided by the TURF areas per fishing cove (km-2)
Catches of limpet inside TURF divided by inside effort (mt /diver)
Catches of kelp inside TURF divided by inside effort (mt /diver)
Catches of sea urchin inside TURF divided by inside effort (mt /diver)
Catches of loco inside TURF divided by inside effort (mt /collector)
Length of coast adjacent to the fishing cove (km)
Total landings (algae, fish, mollusk, crustacean, other) of fishing port(s) within 50 km, if any (mt)
Fishing cove is within 50km to one of the ten biggest cities a (1|0)

Antofogasta, Arica, Conception, Iquique, Puerto Montt, Punta Arenas, San Antonio, Serena, Valdivia, Valparaiso.
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Table 2.2 Average size of TURFs and OAAs with associated average harvesters effort for fishing
coves considered in each region. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. Northern
regions consist of regions II, III, IV, V while southern regions include regions VIII, IX, XIV, X
and XI. The number of fishing coves included for each region is given by N.
TURF
Region
Area (km2)
Northern N=63 3.2 (±3.1)
Southern N=114 4.9 (±9.3)

Effort (individual)
25.1 (±25.4)
37.0 (±57.1)
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OPEN ACCESS AREA
Area (km2)
Effort (individual)
60.8 (±16.5)
33.1 (±34.5)
90.5 (±29.2)
58.0 (±103.0)

Table 2.3 2015 median catch rates (i.e., catch per unit of effort and catch per unit of area) from
inside TURFs and OAAs (i.e., outside TURFs) for each of the four species groups. CPUE is
2

given in mt/month/harvester. CPUA is given in mt/month/km . % Diff. is the percentage
difference between median catch rates from the two areas.
Loco
Inside
CPUE 0.13
CPUA 1.09

Limpet
Inside Outside % Diff.
0.04 0.01
75.00
0.36 0.001 99.72

Kelp
Inside Outside % Diff.
0.66 0.16
75.75
12.85 0.39
96.96
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Sea urchin
Inside Outside % Diff.
0.07 0.01
85.71
0.49 0.01
97.96

Table 2.4 Results of the linear mixed effect models estimating log-transformed CPUAs for loco, limpet, kelp, and sea urchin inside
TURFs. Model 2 only considers a subsample of fishing coves that have a constant number of TURF(s) for at least ten years. Significance
is denoted by: p<0.001=‘***’, p<0.01=‘**’, p<0.05=‘*’, p<0.1=‘.’. Coefficients were transformed in the text into percent changes in
CPUA for a given change in the predictor variable using the following formula: %∆𝑦 = 100 ∙ (𝑒 𝛽∆𝑥 − 1). Marginal and conditional
2

coefficients of determination are respectively given by r

2

m

and r c. Number of observations and number of fishing coves included for

each model are respectively given by n and N.
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Table 2.5 Results of the linear mixed effect models estimating log-transformed CPUAs for limpet, kelp, and sea urchin outside TURFs
(OAAs). There is no result for loco as it is not exploited in OAAs. Model 2 only considers a subsample of fishing coves that have a
constant number of TURF(s) for at least ten years. Significance is denoted by: p<0.001=‘***’, p<0.01=‘**’, p<0.05=‘*’, p<0.1=‘.’.
Coefficients were transformed in the text into percent changes in CPUA for a given change in the predictor variable using the following
2

formula: %∆𝑦 = 100 ∙ (𝑒 𝛽∆𝑥 − 1). Marginal and conditional coefficients of determination are respectively given by r
of observations and number of fishing coves included for each model are respectively given by n and N.
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2
m and r c. Number

Table 2.6 Change in OLS variance explained with specific variables: OLS_all includes all initial
predictors, OLS_TURF includes only TURF related predictors, OLS_Geo includes only geospatial
context predictors and OLS_elastic includes only predictors selected by the elastic net model.

Limpet
Kelp
Sea Urchin

2

Adj.r
r2
Adj.r2
r2
Adj.r2
r2

OLS_all
0.31
0.54
0.55
0.71
0.34
0.70

OLS_TURF
0.12
0.28
0.26
0.40
0.33
0.52
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OLS_Geo
0.25
0.37
0.42
0.52
0.40
0.55

OLS_elastic
0.31
0.36
0.55
0.65
0.51
0.58

Table 2.7 Results of the elastic net regression model estimating catches for limpet, sea urchin and
kelp outside the TURFs according to λmin, the value that minimizes the cross-validation MSE
which yields the most accurate model. Only predictors that were selected for at least 40% of the
10,000 bootstraps are shown in this table and they are ranked according to their importance (i.e.,
higher percentage of inclusion in the model). Elastic net mean coefficients were returned on the
original scale here but they were transformed in the text into percent changes in catch for a given
change in the predictor variable using the following formula: %∆𝑦 = 100 ∙ (𝑒 𝛽∆𝑥 − 1). OLS
normalized coefficients are unitless. Number of observations for each model is given with n.

Limpet
n=54

Kelp
n=54

Sea
Urchin
n=36

Predictor

% inclusion Sign

Divers_All a
Urban_Area
Area_OAA2
Area_fraction
Collectors_All a
Urban_Area
Loco_per_diver
Area_OAA
Area_OAA2
Age_TURF_max
Kelp_per_collector
Age_TURF
Age_Organization_max
Area_fraction
N_ORG
Divers_All a
Coastline_length
Limpet_per_diver
Age_TURF_max
Age_TURF

100
83.69
60.35
41.86
100
99.73
91.11
90.48
84.77
84.40
78
73.03
59.74
47.36
41.80
100
99.67
62.45
47.34
46.96

+
+
+
+
+
+
-

a

Elastic net
coefficient
0.02
0.40
8.15E-5
0.02
0.002
1.28
0.35
0.01
1.03E-4
0.08
0.01
0.05
0.07
0.008
0.05
0.01
0.01
4.84 b
0.04
0.03

OLS normalized
coefficient
0.99
0.50
0.58
0.72
0.93
0.63
0.47
0.51
0.0021
0.16
0.29
0.33
0.16
0.18
0.48
1.37
1.86
0.48
0.56
0.02

The shrinkage penalty was set to 0 for the variable Divers_All and Collectors_All (instead of 1
for other variables), forcing this variable to be included in the model.
b
This large effect is driven by two outliers. Removing this predictor did not change qualitatively
the results.
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.1 Administrative regions of Chile. Fishing coves included in the comparison of 2015
catch rates and mixed effect models are represented with the black dots. The elastic net regressions
only consider fishing coves within the northern regions II, III, IV, V and within the southern
regions VIII, IX, XIV, X and XI (dotted rectangles). The 20 m isobaths layer was only available
from central Chile (dashed rectangle from 27° to 36°).
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Figure 2.2 Boxplots of 2015 CPUEs (A, B, C, D) and CPUAs (E, F, G, H) for the four species
loco (A,E) keyhole limpet (B, F), kelp (C, G), and red sea urchin (D, H) by fishing coves,
differentiated by catch origin inside or outside TURFs (i.e. OAA). Loco’s extraction is banned in
OAAs.
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Figure 2.3 Observed catch per unit of area (mt/ month/ km2) values for the four species loco (A),
keyhole limpet (B), kelp (C), and red sea urchin (D) used in the mixed effect models. Light grey
dots are CPUAs from inside TURFs, dark grey dots are CPUAs from OAAs. Predicted value and
standard errors for a given year is given by the straight line and shaded area.
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2.10 Appendix A
Appendix A1. TURFs status in Chile in 2017.
TURF status

Definition

Count

Designated
Assigned to a
with a public
fisher organization
decree in force

Operative and designated TURFs with a baseline study,
an approved management plan, a use agreement and a
TAC in place.

391

In stand-by TURF for which monitoring has not been
conducted by the due date. However, there was a quota
assigned in the last 4 years.

221

Rejected

TURFs without an assigned fishing association (include
a change in organizations and rejected application).

4

Available for
assignment

Designated TURFs that are not assigned to a fishing
organization yet or the organization has not complied
with necessary initial baseline studies.

Disaffected

TURFs that returned to an open access regime because
fishers organizations have not met the requirements
(reports, management plans).

1

In evaluation

TURFs without a public decree in force, in process of
consultation before the establishment of the availability
decree.

297

Rejected

TURFs that have followed the consultation process but
have been rejected for various reasons (economic or
environmental).

234

61

164

Appendix A2. A) Total fishing grounds (comprising TURFs and OAAs) were created per fishing
cove based on sailing time and bathymetry. The offshore width of these polygons was based on a
typical maximum harvest depth of 20 m (dashed line) extrapolated for the whole coast from a 100
m isobaths layer (dotted line, source GEBCO). Estimates of OAA areas were calculated as fishing
ground areas minus assigned TURFs areas (grey striped area). B) Fishing ground area based on
bathymetry 20 m in function of fishing ground area based on bathymetry 100 m according to the
relationship y = x +√𝑥 + 0 (red line) that fits better than the relationship y = x + 0 (green line).
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Appendix A3. Log catches (mt) per fishing coves as a function of latitude for each group of
species: loco (A), keyhole limpet (B), kelp (C), and red sea urchin (D) and differentiated by their
origin, i.e., catches inside TURFs (white dots) or from the OAA (black dots). Dashed lines
represent the delimitations of the 15 administrative regions of Chile. Black boxes represent
regional grouping of important regions for each fishery.
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Appendix A4. Elastic net model development.
Given a linear regression model with p predictors, the elastic net solves this regularization
problem:

𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝛽 0 ,𝛽

1

𝑁𝑠
𝑖=1(𝑦𝑖,𝑠

2

𝑇
− 𝛽0,𝑠 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑠
𝛽𝑝,𝑠 ) + λ𝑃𝛼 (𝛽𝑝,𝑠 ) ,

(1)

Where

𝑃𝛼 (𝛽𝑝,𝑠 ) =
1

1
2𝑁𝑠

1−𝛼
2

𝛽𝑝,𝑠

2
2

+ 𝛼 𝛽𝑝,𝑠

1

=

𝑝
𝑗 =1

1−𝛼
2

𝛽𝑗2 + 𝛼 𝛽𝑗 .

(2)

In (1), yi,s is the response, here catches of species s in the open access area at fishing cove i; Ns is
the number of fishing coves with catches from OAAs for species s; xi,s is explanatory data, a vector
of p values for species s at fishing cove i; βp,s is the for species s; λ is a positive regularization
parameter; and α is the elastic net penalty. The coefficient for each p predictor elastic net minimizes
the sum of squared differences between observed and predicted values subject to a constraint,
Pα(β), that penalizes for model complexity as well as for large absolute values of normalized
coefficients (Equations 1, 2). The form of the penalty is controlled by the parameter α. With α=0,
coefficients of correlated predictors shrink towards each other. With α=1, the most influential
correlated predictor is selected while others are discarded. The elastic net sets α to 0.5, which leads
to selection of groups of predictors that independently or jointly explain variance (Equation 2, Zou
and Hastie 2005, Friedman et al. 2010). Separate penalty factors can be applied to each coefficient
to allow different shrinkage. In our case, the penalty factors were considered equal for all variables
except for the variable Harvesters_all (representing the total number of harvesters), for which the
penalty was set to 0 so that this variable was always included in the model. The optimal value of
the regularization parameter λ, which controlled the strength of the penalty, was selected using a
10-fold cross-validation method. Two different values of λ were considered: the value that
minimized the cross-validation mean squared error (MSE) (λmin), and the maximum value within
one standard error of the λmin (λ1SE). The more restrictive regularization with λ1SE (i.e., the larger
penalty that leads to models with smaller or fewer parameter values) yields a simpler model while
maintaining a level of accuracy found to be close to that obtained when using λmin (Hastie et al.
2009). The cross-validation process, which randomly selects training data and returns new values
for λ1SE and λmin at each iteration, was repeated 1,000 times and the final model used average values
for λ1SE and λmin.
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Appendix A5. Elastic net model results with λ1SE
Results of the elastic net regression model estimating catches for limpet, sea urchin and kelp
outside the TURFs according to λ1SE, the maximum value within one standard error of the λmin
which yields the most restrictive model. Only predictors that were selected for at least 40% of the
10,000 bootstraps are shown in this table and they are ranked according to their importance (i.e.,
higher percentage of inclusion in the model). Elastic net mean coefficients were returned on the
original scale here but were transformed in the text into percent changes in catch for a given change
in the predictor variable using the following formula: %∆𝑦 = 100 ∙ (𝑒 𝛽∆𝑥 − 1). OLS normalized
coefficients are unitless.
Non-null predictor
a

Limpet

Divers_All
Urban_Area

Kelp

Collectors_All
Urban_Area
Area_OAA

a

2

Area_OAA
Age_TURF_mean
Age_TURF_max
Sea
Urchin

a

Divers_All
Coastline_length

Elastic net
coefficient

OLS normalized
coefficient

+
-

0.021
0.100

0.661
0.644

100
99.49
86.25

+
-

0.002
0.976
0.006

0.448
0.860
0.435

85.89
67.20
51.78

-

7.68E-5
0.031
0.025

0.025
0.181
0.324

100
98.98

+
+

0.011
0.006

1.231
2.087

% inclusion

Sign

100
41.43

a

The shrinkage penalty was set to 0 for the variable Divers_All and Collectors_All (instead of 1
for other variables), forcing this variable to be included in the model.
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Appendix A5. (Continued) Elastic net model results with λ1SE
For the most restrictive models using the regularization parameter λ1SE, most of the
predictors retained to explain catch in OAAs were related to the geospatial context. The predictor
Urban_Area was selected in 41.30% of the 10,000 bootstraps when modeling limpet catches and
99.49% of the bootstraps when modeling kelp extraction, being the strongest identified driver of
catch outside of TURFs in both cases. This predictor exhibited a negative relationship with catches
outside TURFs for both species groups, with lower catches in OAAs for limpet (10% decrease)
and kelp (165% decrease) close to urban areas.
No other predictors were selected for limpet, whereas several predictors related to OAA
and time since TURF implementation were selected for kelp. Lower catches of kelp outside of
TURFs were counterintuitively associated with fishing coves that had larger OAA areas (6%
decrease in catch for every additional 10 km2 of OAA area). Area_OAA and Area_OAA2 were
selected in at least 80% of bootstraps and were considered to be highly important drivers for kelp
catch outside of TURFs. Moderately lower catches of kelp outside of TURFs (3% decrease) were
associated with fishing coves that had older TURFs. The related variables Age_TURF_mean and
Age_TURF_max were included in 67.2% and 51.78% of the bootstraps, respectively.
Higher catches of sea urchin in OAAs were associated with fishing coves that have longer
coastline lengths (6% increase in catch for every additional 10 km of coastline). This predictor was
the only additional factor selected for explaining sea urchin catches in OAAs (selected in 98.98%
of cases).
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Appendix A6. A) Number of active licensed harvesters over time according to the different
categories with the solid line representing number of divers for loco, limpet and sea urchin
exploitation and the dotted line representing the number of collectors mainly for kelp extraction.
The different categories are not mutually exclusive. Licensed harvesters can exploit the openaccess area but are not necessarily granted TURF access. B) Total number of licensed harvesters
per regions and per year.

Appendix A7. Test of heteroscedasticity using the Studentized Breusch-Pagan test from the OLS
output considering all initial predictors. P-values < 0.05 indicate heteroscedasticity of the OLS
residuals.
Species

All predictors

Limpet

p=0.35

Kelp

p=0.83

Sea urchin

p=0.97
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– Chapter 3 –
Barriers to eastern oyster aquaculture expansion in Virginia

3.1 Abstract
The eastern oyster once provided major societal and ecosystem benefits, but these benefits
have been threatened in recent decades by major declines in oyster harvests. In many areas,
recovery of oyster aquaculture faces significant societal opposition and spatial constraints limiting
its ability to meet expectations regarding future food needs and provision of ecosystem services.
In Virginia, oyster aquaculture has begun to expand, concurrent with an increase in subaqueous
leased areas (over 130,000 acres of grounds are currently leased). Though private leases must in
theory be used for oyster production, in practice, they can be held for other reasons, such as
speculation or intentional exclusion of others. These factors have led to large variation over time
and space in the use of leases in lower Chesapeake Bay; and privately leased grounds are now
thought to be underutilized for oyster production. This research examined potential barriers to
expansion of oyster aquaculture in Virginia. We first evaluated if a lack of space was limiting
industry expansion and quantified temporal and spatial trends in the use and productivity of leases.
Then, differences in used and non-used leases were investigated in relation to variables thought to
be related to “not in my backyard” attitudes, congestion, speculation, local economic and
environmental conditions. Finally, the performance of the Virginia leasing system was compared
with those in other states along the U.S. East and Gulf Coasts. We found limited evidence for
spatial constraints on aquaculture leasing, but strong evidence for social and regulatory
inefficiencies. Although rates of lease use increased from 2006 to 2016, only 33% of leases were
ever used for oyster production and about 63% of leaseholders reported no commercial harvests.
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Non-used leases tended to be smaller, and were found in more populated, high-income regions,
consistent with both speculative and exclusionary uses. Virginia had the second lowest levels of
total production of cultured oysters per leased acre among the states of the eastern U.S. These
results indicate that there is room for oyster aquaculture expansion in Virginia if societal,
regulatory, and economic barriers can be reduced or if existing leased areas are used more
efficiently.

3.2 Introduction
As of 2018, aquaculture continues to be the fastest growing food production method
worldwide and now represents more than half of global human seafood consumption (Duarte 2009;
FAO 2018). Though not all forms of aquaculture are beneficial for the environment (Naylor et al.
1998), marine bivalve aquaculture, especially oysters, has been recognized as a win-win for society
and marine ecosystems as it provides ecosystem services such as water filtration and provision of
habitat while also producing low greenhouse gas emissions and efficiently utilizing primary
production (Coen et al. 2007, Duarte et al. 2009, Grabowski and Peterson 2007, Alleway et al.
2019, Ray et al. 2019). As delicacies, marine bivalves constitute today about 60% of marine and
coastal aquaculture production (SAPEA 2017; FAO 2018). However, increases in seafood demand
and improvements in technology used for shellfish aquaculture are expected to further intensify
pressure on already crowded near-shore coastal environments in coming years (Halpern et al. 2008,
Shumway 2011). Although the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) identifies the United
States as one of the most prominent nations for marine aquaculture development in terms of
coastline length and exclusive economic zone area (Kapetsky et al. 2013), its contribution to
domestic demand is believed to be far below its potential (Knapp and Rubino 2016). One identified
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reason is that coastal aquaculture faces significant social opposition and space competition (Knapp
2012, Froehlich et al. 2017). Aquaculture intensification in crowded areas may be perceived as a
threat to recreational and amenity services (Gibbs 2009) and exacerbate spatial conflicts between
stakeholders (Whitmarsh and Palmieri 2008). Gibbs (2009) suggests that social carrying capacity,
which refers to the space dedicated to aquaculture that the local community is willing to accept
(Inglis et al. 2000), may become the main constraint to aquaculture industry growth in
industrialized countries such as the US. This paper looks at recent trends and drivers of growth in
oyster aquaculture to identify possible societal, management or spatial limits to expansion of the
sector in Virginia, as well as more broadly.
Commercial fisheries for the eastern oyster (Crassostrea virginica) have existed in the U.S.
since the 1600’s (Ingersoll 1881), and have historically played a major cultural and economic role
in communities bordering coastal estuaries of the U.S. seaboard (Kirby 2004; Keiner 2009,
Kennedy 2018). Nowhere is this more apparent than in Chesapeake Bay, where aquaculture
production of oysters in Virginia in the 1950’s averaged ~16 million lbs/year (Haven et al. 1978;
Figure 3.1). Nevertheless, oyster production in the Chesapeake and elsewhere has experienced a
dramatic decline over the last several decades due to a combination of overfishing, habitat
destruction and disease (Rothschild et al. 1994, Kirby 2004, Beck et al. 2011). Harvests in Virginia
during the early 2000’s represented only ~2.5% of the 1950’s average (maximum of 0.4 million
lbs/year from 1995 to 2005) (Figure 3.1). The consequences of this decline on local watermen
(colloquial term for fishers) and fishing communities have been severe, and growth in oyster
production has the potential to yield substantial economic, environmental and cultural benefits
(Keiner 2009, Paolisso and Dery 2010). Oyster production has begun to rebound since the mid
2000’s, reaching ~2.5 million lbs in 2016. This growth is due to an increased demand on newly
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developed, disease-resistant, hatchery-raised oyster strains, and the expansion of intensive oyster
aquaculture (Bosch et al. 2010, Frank-Lawale et al. 2014, Murray and Hudson 2015). In Virginia,
oyster harvests are divided between two types of grounds: 1) public grounds, consisting of the
most productive oyster beds evaluated by the Baylor survey in 1896 and designated for the public
use (242,905 ac1 or 983 km2 statewide), and 2) private grounds, where leased areas are granted to
an individual or a company for their exclusive use for shellfish collection and propagation, for a
period of at least 10 years (Santopietro and Shabman 1992). Though both areas are defined and
permitted by the Virginia Marine Resource Commission (VMRC), that agency only carries out
significant resource management in public grounds. Private leases have long been advocated as an
effective tool for increasing oyster yields (Alford 1973, Agnello and Donnelley 1975) while also
incentivizing sustainable practices (Beck et al. 2004). There has been a considerable increase in
privately leased area from 81,545 ac (330 km2) in the 2000’s (Mason 2008) to 139,120 ac (563
km2) in 2017 (Figure 3.2). Despite the large amount of area leased to date, production remains
historically low.
Chesapeake Bay (Figure 3.2) is the largest estuary in the United States and is used by a
diverse group of stakeholders for recreational, commercial and government activities (e.g.,
boating, fishing, swimming, military training and security). About 18 million people live within
the Bay’s watershed and the population is expected to reach 20 million by 2030 (Chesapeake Bay
Program 2017). The Hampton Roads region of Virginia, which boarders the southern extent of
Chesapeake Bay, is particularly densely populated, with a population of 1.7 million that includes
the cities of Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Hampton, Newport News, and Portsmouth. Conflict with
oyster aquaculturists is common in heavily populated areas in the region such as in the Lynnhaven

1

The authors chose to primarily use acres instead of squared kilometers given the ubiquity of this unit of measure in
U.S. aquaculture management and industry.
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River, where aquaculture infrastructure (e.g., cages) has been argued to be unsightly and
potentially dangerous for recreational activities. Other coastal property owners worry about the
industry’s effect on property access and value (Knapp and Rubino, 2016; Evans et al., 2017). Many
think that availability for lease space now constrains the expansion of oyster aquaculture in lower
Chesapeake Bay (Mason 2008, B. Stagg, VMRC, pers. comm.).
Although privately leased areas in Virginia waters of Chesapeake Bay represent an
important part of overall oyster harvests (60%), there are a number of reasons to believe that
harvests could potentially be far greater. In theory, commercial leases larger than 1/2 acre must be
used for “planting or propagating [of] oysters” as stated in the Virginia Code, Chapter 6, 28.2-603.
However, privately leased grounds are now thought to be significantly underutilized for oyster
production (Mason 2008, Bosch et al. 2010). It is widely hypothesized - but poorly demonstrated
- that factors other than potential oyster production are important drivers of the recent increase in
leased area. With the lowest annual lease rate in the U.S. ($1.50/acre/year), there is little cost to
holding a lease and individuals may apply for a lease without the intention of using it for oyster
culture in the immediate future (Mason 2008). Lease acquisition in Virginia may be driven by the
desire of waterfront landowners for esthetic purposes or to impede development of oyster farming
“in their backyard” (“Not in my backyard” attitude is hereafter referred to as NIMBY after Dear
1992). Speculative leasing of areas with the intent of future resale at a profit, without productive
use, is also suspected to contribute to the increase in leases (Mason 2008). Increased aquaculture
development in Virginia might therefore face limitations related to social factors rather than the
biophysical environment. Despite the positive trend in production recently observed, these
challenges could be key constraints to further industry expansion, and although considered to be
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underutilized, the scope, spatial scale, and temporal trends in recent oyster lease use and
productivity have not been investigated.
The primary goals of this study are to quantify temporal and spatial trends in the use and
productivity of private oyster ground leases in the lower Chesapeake Bay and explore potential
impacts of environmental, social, and management contexts. Specifically, we first examined if lack
of space was limiting industry expansion. To do so, we analyzed temporal and spatial saturation
levels with respect to leased grounds in the main river systems of the Chesapeake Bay. Second,
temporal and spatial trends of lease productivity (i.e., pounds of oysters per leased acreage) and
lease use were examined. Then, we investigated how used and non-used leases differed across
variables thought to be related to NIMBY attitudes, spatial congestion, speculation, local economic
and environmental conditions. Finally, we compared average productivity of leased grounds for
2017 across states on the East Coast and Gulf Coast of the U.S. This comprehensive analysis of
temporal and spatial trends in oyster lease use, drivers behind this use, and leasing system
performance, is needed to fully understand current trends, predict future patterns and identify
impediments to growth in oyster production in the Chesapeake Bay as well as more broadly.

3.3 Material and Methods
3.3.1 Study area
Virginia waters of the Chesapeake Bay have a total surface area of 1,976,843 ac (8,000
km2) and are classified by VMRC into seven systems: the James River, York River, Rappahannock
River, Potomac River, the main bay, miscellaneous tributaries (i.e., smaller tributaries found along
the bay) and the Atlantic coast of Eastern Shore (Figure 3.2).
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3.3.2 Available data
Statistical analyses of spatial saturation, trends and drivers of lease use and productivity,
and comparisons of used and non-used leases were carried out using a combination of data from
VIMS, VMRC, Virginia Department of Health (VDH), NOAA/ NOS estuarine bathymetry digital
elevation model, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Table 3.1). Data on oyster leases,
harvests, environmental conditions and surrounding socio-economic conditions were stored in a
spatially-explicit PostgreSQL/PostGIS database (PostgreSQL10.9, PostGIS 2.4.4).

3.3.2.a Leases and corresponding harvest data
Polygons of leased grounds in Virginia active during the period 2006-2016 (Figure 3.3)
were

available

publicly

through

the

VMRC’s

Chesapeake

(https://webapps.mrc.virginia.gov/public/maps/chesapeakebay_map.php,

Bay

Map

accessed

on

2017/06/30; archived maps also available). Information on individual leases include the type of
lease (e.g., commercial or not), its assignment and termination dates, and the leaseholder’s name
and mailing address (i.we., physical address or PO Box). Leaseholders are required to submit
annual reports on commercial harvest. Time series of annual oyster harvest per lease from 2006 to
2016 were provided by VMRC, which collects this data for management and monitoring purposes.
Harvest data were separated by lease identification number, gear and year.

3.3.2.b Environmental data
In order to assess the availability by major river system and year of remaining areas that
could potentially be leased, several habitat, environmental, and management variables were
combined to define suitable and not-suitable areas for oyster production. Not-suitable areas
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included Baylor grounds, i.e., natural oyster beds reserved for the public use, and public clamming
grounds, for which GIS polygons were available publicly through the VMRC’s Chesapeake Bay
Map. Shellfish condemnation zones not-suitable for oyster growth, nor for human consumption,
were provided by VDH and comprised zones where no harvesting at any time is allowed, zones
where harvest is restricted from April to October (marina-based restriction), and zones
corresponding to upstream tidal waters where salinities are too low to sustain continuous annual
oyster growth. Deep waters were also considered not-suitable areas for oyster production because
deeper waters can have low dissolved oxygen concentrations in the summer (Theuerkauf and
Lipcius, 2016) and involve higher risk, access, and technical costs for oyster culture. Bathymetric
data of the Chesapeake Bay was obtained from a NOAA/ NOS estuarine bathymetry digital
elevation model, with a resolution of 10 m (National Centers for Environmental Information,
2017). VMRC does not allow leasing of grounds covered by submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV
beds) and typically considers the past five years of SAV distribution when reviewing lease
applications. SAV beds provide important ecological services for the Bay, such as structured
habitat and food, improvements to water quality, and stabilization of bottom sediments (Thayer et
al., 1975); however, SAV competes for shallow habitat with cultured oysters (Wagner et al., 2012).
The GIS polygons of all densities of SAV coverage (i.e., very sparse to dense coverage) from 2003
to 2016 were provided by VIMS (D. Wilcox, VIMS, pers. comm.).
Because salinity can affect oyster growth, spring bottom salinity from 2003 to 20142
(March to June) were derived from an estuarine biogeochemical model, ChesROMS-ECB,
developed for the Chesapeake Bay and having an average grid resolution of 1.7 km (Feng et al.,

2

ChesROMS-ECB data was only available for the 2003 to 2014 period.
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2015). We compared lease use according to salinity: higher salinity allows higher oyster growth
and reproductive rates, but is also a surrogate for increased disease prevalence (Shumway, 2011).

3.3.2.c Socio-economic data
Previous studies in British Columbia found that those opposed to aquaculture industry
expansion tended to be wealthy and lived near the waterfront (Shafer et al. 2010, D’Anna and
Murray 2015). Therefore, we expected leases in more populated areas with higher incomes to be
used less, plausibly obtained to exclude oyster aquaculture. Total adjusted gross income, number
of tax returns and number of tax exemptions were used to create proxies for per household income,
household and local population size. These data were available by ZIP code from individual
income tax statistics provided by the U.S. IRS (https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-statsindividual-income-tax-statistics-zip-code-data-soi).

3.3.3 Data processing
3.3.3.a Not-suitable areas for leasing and saturation index
Not-suitable areas for leasing comprised Baylor grounds, clam grounds, condemned zones,
and deep waters. A cutoff of 8 m was used from the bathymetric data to exclude deeper water areas
(i.e., 99th percentile of maximum depth observed per lease, consistent with Carlozo’s (2014) for
which a depth of 7.62 m was used). Not-suitable areas were removed from each system to calculate
a constant leasable area per system, leasable_areasys (Figure 3.4). SAV grounds for the four years
preceding and up to a given year were considered as not leasable for the given year per system and
were defined as SAV_areay,sys. An annual saturation rate per system, sy,sys, was calculated as the

76

sum of leased area (including all leases, i.e., riparian3 leases and commercial leases),
leased_areay,sys, and union of SAV grounds for a given year divided by leasable area:
sy,sys

leased_area y,sys + ⋃𝑡𝑡−4 SAV_area y,sys
=
leasable_areasys

(1)

This saturation index, bounded between 0 and 1, was used to examine space limitation for oyster
industry expansion as a function of time.

3.3.3.b Lease exploitation indices
We categorized oysters harvests into intensive or extensive aquaculture based on the
utilized gear. Extensive, on-bottom, aquaculture refers to the deposition, or planting, of oyster
shells or live seed oysters (spat on shell, or cultch) on the bottom for later harvest. Extensive
aquaculture gear includes scrapes, patent tongs, dredges, picks and bull rakes4. Intensive, offbottom, aquaculture refers to the production of high density, high value, cultch-free oysters over a
small area. Intensive aquaculture gear includes bottom cages, implanted racks, bags, water column
cages, net pens, and floats. The harvest dataset was combined with the lease dataset to create two
indices of lease exploitation: 1) use, ui,y, which was a binary variable, equal to 1 if any harvest was
reported on lease i in year y and equal to 0 otherwise, and 2) productivity, prodi,y,t, which was the
oyster harvest reported for a lease i in year y and aquaculture type t (extensive or intensive), divided
by lease i’s area (in acres).

3
4

Leases less than 1/2 acre for non-commercial oyster gardening.
Oysters collected by hand were also considered extensive aquaculture.
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3.3.3.c Selection of lease areas for analysis
As further analyses were focused on lease use and productivity, certain zones or leases
were not considered to be available for production, such as shellfish condemnation zones and
riparian leases. As commercial oyster production in these areas is either banned, unlikely, or highly
variable, they were eliminated before carrying out further analyses (Figure 3.3). Furthermore, since
oysters may require 2 to 3 years to reach market size (76 mm shell length) (Harding 2007) and
leaseholders often need time to build financial capital and production infrastructure (B. Stagg,
VMRC, pers. comm.), lease use and production might not be expected during the initial years of a
lease. Therefore, all data from the initial 3 years after a lease was granted were removed from
analyses on use and productivity (e.g., data from a lease created in 2005 was excluded for analyses
for the years 2006 and 2007). Finally, leases on the Atlantic coast of the Eastern Shore, typically
used for clam aquaculture (Figure 3.1), were excluded from our dataset.

3.3.3.d Indexes for comparisons of used and non-used leases
Differences in used and non-used leases, defined here as used (or not) once over 2006 to
2016, were investigated in relation to variables thought to be related to “not in my backyard”
attitudes, congestion, speculation, local economic and environmental conditions. Variables were
aggregated or averaged per lease for the full study period of 2006 to 2016. Mean bathymetry of
each lease was calculated from the NOAA bathymetry layer, and mean salinity was derived from
the ChesROMS model. If a lease was not covered by the ChesROMS grid (i.e., in upstream areas
of small tributaries), we extrapolated the salinity value from the nearest ChesROMS grid cell
within 1.7 km of that lease (size of one grid cell). If a lease overlapped with several grid cells, we
assigned the weighted sum of the value of those grid cells to the lease. Finally, mean distance to
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the nearest SAV grounds from 2003 to 2016 was calculated for each lease. As indicated above, the
VMRC does not allow leasing of grounds with SAV beds considering the past five years of SAV
distribution. Higher salinity and shallower bathymetry were expected to be key factors in the use
of a lease. Proximity to SAV grounds was expected to have a negative impact on the use of a lease,
as SAV beds are thought to be expanding in leasable areas and VMRC requires growers to remove
intensive gears from areas covered by SAV (Wagner et al. 2012, Patrick and Weller 2015, B.
Stagg, VMRC, pers. comm.).
Proxies for NIMBY attitudes were assessed using IRS socio-economic data as well as
proximities of leases to leaseholder addresses (Dear 1992) and to the shore. Population density
was calculated as the population for a given ZIP code (number of tax exemptions) divided by its
area. Per household income was calculated as total adjusted gross income divided by number of
returns and was adjusted for inflation. Average income, household and population density by ZIP
code were averaged for the 2006-2016 period. We then assigned to each lease the value from the
nearest ZIP code area. Only 52% of leaseholder addresses in our dataset corresponded to an
identifiable physical address as determined by a geolocation rating score less than or equal to 10
(recommended cutoff value, https://postgis.net/docs/Geocode.html). Unidentifiable addresses
were mostly PO Boxes. Therefore, distances to leaseholder ZIP code area’s centroids were
calculated for every lease as a proxy for proximity to leaseholder’s home (i.e., we assumed that
the ZIP code of PO Boxes corresponded to the ZIP code of the leaseholder’s physical address).
We expected leases in more populated and higher-income areas, nearby leaseholder homes (i.e.,
smaller distances), and closer to the shore to be less intensively used due to some leases being kept
to impede oyster aquaculture activities (i.e., resulting from NIMBY behaviors). A binary variable
named “only_one_lease” was created and equal to 1 if a leaseholder had only one lease in the
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studied period, or equal to 0 if she/he had more than one lease. Leaseholders owning only one
small lease were thought to potentially be those obtaining leases to exclude others.
Speculation, i.e., acquisition of a lease for future use or future resale at a higher price, has
been suggested as another social behavior that could affect oyster lease use and result in lower
efficiency of the leasing system (Mason 2008). Given the observed increase in leased area in recent
years (indicative of increased demand for leases), one might expect that leaseholders would buy
more leases than needed, with those obtained later being more likely to be bought for investment
purposes instead of immediate use in oyster production. We assessed this possibility with two
variables. First, leases owned by a leaseholder from 2006 to 2016, were ranked according to their
date of establishment. Rank values were then divided by the total number of leases owned. Second,
leased areas held by a leaseholder were cumulatively summed according to their establishment
date, and this sum was divided by the total leased area owned by the leaseholder. Both variables
were therefore bounded between 0 and 1, with lower values representing leases or leased area
obtained earlier on and higher values representing leases or leased area bought later.
Finally, an additional local feature, congestion of the area around a lease, was developed
to potentially observe differences between used and non-used leases. One might think that multiple
leases surrounding a productive lease, all owned by a single leaseholder, could be utilized as a
buffer against poachers or other aquaculturists (B. Stagg, VMRC, pers. comm.); this central lease
would then be more likely to be used. Furthermore, if a lease is surrounded by leases from different
leaseholders, it might be expected that this lease will be more intensively used (e.g., due to peer
pressure, fear of encroachment, network effects). Potential congestion or agglomeration effects
were examined through four variables: within a 1 km buffer around each examined lease, we
counted per year the number of other leases and fraction of leased acreage owned by the same

80

leaseholder, and the number of other leases and fraction of leased acreage owned by different
leaseholders. Those four variables were then averaged for the full study period of 2006 to 2016.

3.3.4 Statistical analyses
3.3.4.a Beta regression for saturation analysis
A beta regression model (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto 2004) was used to evaluate the
saturation of Virginia waters of the Chesapeake Bay by leased areas over time and systems:
𝑔(𝜇𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑦 ) = 𝜷1 . 𝑿1 +𝜀𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑦

(2)

In (2), the response variable was saturation, ssys,y, defined in 3.3.3.a as the proportion of a
given system leasable area saturated with leased areas or SAV, for year y. The dependent variable
was continuous, restricted to the unit interval (0,1), and beta-distributed, ssys,y ~B (µsys,y,ɸ) with
µsys,y its mean and ɸ, a constant precision parameter; the link function used, g(.), was logit. X1 was
a (k x 1) vector of observations on k covariates consisting of: year, year2 (its quadratic
transformation to test for non-linear trends), system intercepts, and the interactions terms year x
system and year2 x system. β1 was a (1 x k) vector of regression coefficients to be estimated. 𝜺𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑦
was the error term. Parameter estimation was performed by maximum likelihood in R (R Core
Team 2018) with the betareg package (Cribari-Neto and Zeileis 2010). Pseudo-R2 and precision
parameter, ɸ, were calculated by the betareg package. Beta regression parameter estimates
correspond to the change in log-odds of the response variable, which here was system saturation.
Differences between consecutive year predictions were used in the text to inform percent changes
in saturation rate for a given year.
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3.3.4.b Hurdle-style model for trends in lease use and productivity
A two part regression model, similar to a Hurdle model (Mullahy 1986), was used to
estimate temporal and spatial trends of lease use and productivity, the impact of lease age on use
and productivity, and the impact of aquaculture practices (extensive, intensive) on productivity:
𝑙𝑛

𝑝 𝑢𝑖,𝑦 = 1
1 − 𝑝 𝑢𝑖,𝑦 = 1

= 𝜷2 . 𝑿2 + 𝛿𝑢,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑦,𝑡

𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖,𝑦,𝑡 = 𝜷3 . 𝑿3 + 𝛿𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑦,𝑡

(3)

(4)

In (3), we specified the probability lease i would be used in year y to be a function of X2, a
(m x 1) vector of observations on l covariates: year, lease age, system intercepts, and interactions
between year and system. β2 was a (1 x m) vector of unknown regression coefficients. In (4), the
dependent variable was the log-transformed productivity per lease i with non-zero harvest,
observed for year y, with gear from aquaculture type t. The set of covariates for (4) was the same
as for (3) with the addition of the covariate aquaculture type, specifying whether the harvest was
from intensive or extensive aquaculture. We controlled for heterogeneity across leases in the
estimations of (3) and (4) by including a random effect for lease i, 𝜹𝑢,𝑖 and 𝜹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑,𝑖 . 𝜺𝑖,𝑦 and 𝜺𝑖,𝑦,𝑡
were the error terms. We also ran these two models with random effects for leases nested within
leaseholder to evaluate the amount of unexplained variance in lease use and productivity
attributable to individual leaseholders. Coefficient estimation was performed by restricted
maximum likelihood with the lme4 package (functions glmer and lmer, Bates et al. 2015). Marginal
coefficient of determination, R2m, and conditional coefficient of determination, R2c, describing
proportion of variance explained by fixed factors only and by the entire model, including random
factors, respectively, were estimated for the mixed effects models with the MuMIn package
(Nakagawa and Schielzeth 2013). Coefficients were transformed in the text into percent changes
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in use probability for a given change in the predictor variable using the following formula: %∆𝑦 =
𝑒 𝛽.∆𝑥

100 ∙ 1+𝑒 𝛽.∆𝑥 − 0.5, or into percent changes in productivity for a given change in the predictor
variable using the following formula: %∆𝑦 = 100 ∙ (𝑒 𝛽.∆𝑥 − 1).

3.3.4.c Comparisons of used and non-used leases
Comparison of used and non-used leases’ characteristics (i.e., proxy variables related to
either NIMBY, congestion, speculation, economic or environmental conditions) over the period
2006-2016, were performed with the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Mann and Whitney,
1947) and Ansari-Bradley dispersion test (Ansari and Bradley, 1960). The Wilcoxon rank-sum test
is used for comparing the central tendencies of two independent samples, whereas the AnsariBradley test evaluates equivalence of dispersions. A Pearson’s chi-square test was used to assess
the independence between lease use and the binary variable “Only_one_lease” to determine if nonused leases were most often observed for leaseholders who had only one lease.

3.3.5 Lease productivity across U.S. East and Gulf Coast states
As oyster aquaculture management and historical contexts differ along the Eastern and
Gulf Coasts of the U.S., private leasing systems and aquaculture production were examined among
states to evaluate the performance of Virginia’s lease system. Data on total aquaculture production
for oysters, farm gate value, leased acreage and number of leases for 2017 from U.S. East and Gulf
Coast states with significant oyster aquaculture industries were obtained from disparate state
agency administrators and industry annual reports (detailed source data found in Table 3.5). Lease
productivity for 2017 was calculated as total production in oyster pieces divided by total leased
area. When production was provided in bushels or sacks, we used the following conversions: 300
83

oysters per bushel for Maryland and North Carolina; 400 oysters per bushel for Virginia; and 250
oysters per sack for Texas (see Table 3.5, conversions provided by the individual state
management authorities).

3.4 Results
3.4.1 Private oyster leases in Virginia
In the last decade, Virginia has seen a significant increase in subaqueous leased area of
~70%, leading to what is currently the largest amount of area leased since the system began more
than 100 years ago. The total number of leases (including riparian leases) in 2017 was 5,592 with
a total acreage of 139,120 ac (563 km2, held by 2,523 leaseholders), exceeding the previous
historical maximum of 133,931 ac (542 km2) achieved in 1966 (Figure 3.1). The number of leases
analyzed in our study from 2006 to 2016 is, however, lower since we have excluded leases in
shellfish condemnation zones and from the Atlantic coast system, riparian leases, and leases less
than 3 years old, as oyster production in these areas was unlikely (Figure 3.3). We therefore
analyzed 3,340 leases covering 68,942 ac (279 km2), which were held by 1,276 leaseholders.
Average lease size was 24.7 ac (0.1 km2), ranging from 0.1 ac (397 m2) to 1,927 ac (7.8 km2). Over
the studied decade, ~40% of leaseholders had only one lease, while 17% had more than five leases.

3.4.2 System saturation analysis
The annual saturation of Chesapeake Bay’s leasable systems by leased areas were analyzed
over time (Figure 3.5) and assessed with beta regression (Table 3.2). In 2016, 40% to 67% of
leasable space was occupied by either oyster leases or SAV (with the exception of the main
Chesapeake Bay, in which only 10% of the leasable area was leased) (Figure 3.5). Changes in
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leased area drove changes in saturation rates as SAV occupied a relatively small and constant
fraction of non-leased but leasable ground (7.0 ± 0.4%). High values for the pseudo-R2 (0.98) and
precision parameter ɸ (463.4) of the model indicated that the fit to the data was strong (Table 3.2;
Cribari-Neto and Zeileis 2010). Every system had an increasing saturation rate over time but rates
differed by system. Leased area in the miscellaneous tributaries (base level), the Rappahannock
River and the Chesapeake Bay increased at similar rates of approximately 3.5% per year (estimated
as

𝑒 0.14
1+𝑒 0.14

− 0.5 ∗ 100 as interactions between year and system were not significant, p>0.05).

Significant quadratic interaction terms indicated that the rate of increase in saturation was itself
increasing over the time period of the study in the more populated James River (ranging from 1.3%
from 2006 to 2007, to 5.8% from 2015 to 2016) and York River (from 0.7% to 3.9%). However,
saturation was increasing at a lower rate in the Potomac River ranging from 5.6% to -2.9% for
2006 and 2016, respectively.

3.4.3 Lease use analysis
Actively used private leases were defined as those leases with at least one oyster harvest
reported for a given year. Active leaseholders were defined as those leaseholders with an actively
used lease in a given year. Percentages of active leases, leased areas, and leaseholders were
calculated per year over all systems (Figure 3.6). In 2006, only 3.5% of individual leases, 9.7% of
all leased areas, and 4.7% of leaseholders were active. Active lease proportions increased over
time but were still low in 2016, when 19.1% of leases, 31.9% of leased areas and 26.9% of
leaseholders were active (Figure 3.6). Over the entire decade, 33.4% of leases, 44.3% of leased
area, and 36.8% of leaseholders were active for at least one year.
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3.4.4 Hurdle-style model for use and productivity
Results from the linear mixed effects model of lease use indicated that system, year and
some interactions between system and year had significant effects on the probability of a lease
being actively used. There was an overall increase of use over time in every system (Table 3.3).
The probability of a lease being actively used increased on average by 8.42% per year in the
Potomac River (p<0.05), by 6.76% in the Rappahannock River, York River, miscellaneous
tributaries and Chesapeake Bay (interactions were not significant, p>0.05), and by 3.15% in the
James River (p<0.05, Table 3.3). Though the rate of increasing lease use in the James River was
less than half that in other systems, use rates in this system were initially higher in 2006 as
indicated by its intercept value (coefficient -2.89, the highest of all systems; Appendix B1.A).
Interestingly, recent leases were more likely to be used and the probability of a lease being used
decreased by 0.5% per additional year of lease age (note the small magnitude for this estimate
compared to that for year, suggesting its minor effect).
Average productivity per year, defined as the sum of oyster pounds harvested per unit area,
fluctuated over time between 143.9 and 295.2 lbs / ac (Appendix B1.B). Results from the linear
mixed effects model of lease productivity indicated that system, year and some interactions
between year and system had significant effects on productivity in used leases. There was an
increase of productivity of 5.44% per year in miscellaneous tributaries as well as the
Rappahannock and York rivers (interactions between system and year were not significant,
p>0.05; Table 3.3). The Potomac and James rivers, as well as the mainstem of the Bay, had
increases of productivity per year at rates three-fold higher (~15.37%, 17.23%, 14.00%,
respectively, p<0.05; note the large range of starting productivity values, Appendix B1.B).
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Counterintuitively, lease age did not significantly affect productivity, nor did the type of
aquaculture utilized for the harvest (Table 3.3).
Differences between conditional R2c and marginal R2m showed that 46% of variability in
lease use, and 52% of variability in productivity, resulted from heterogeneity across leases (Table
3.3). When the same models were run with random effects for leases nested within leaseholders,
similar results were observed in terms of coefficient estimates and their significance (results from
this supplementary model are available upon request). The difference between conditional R2c and
marginal R2m was slightly higher (e.g., 53.8% of variability in lease use, Appendix B2), indicating
that adding a leaseholder random effect only had a minor impact on unexplained variance (not
particularly surprising as 40% of leaseholders only had one lease).

3.4.5 Comparison of used and non-used leases
We investigated how several proxies for local economic, social, and environmental
conditions differed between used and non-used leases (over the entire period 2006-2016).
Interestingly, non-used leases tended to be smaller (Table 3.4 and Figure 3.7) and leaseholders
with non-used leases tended to have fewer, or only one, lease (p-values<0.05). Surprisingly, there
was no difference in the distance to shore for used and non-used leases, though there was a
significant difference between the variances of each group (variance was lower for non-used
leases) (Table 3.4). Used leases tended to be slightly closer to leaseholder ZIP code (though the
effect was not significant; p-value=0.09) but there was greater variance in ZIP code distance for
non-used leases. Non-used leases were more common, however, in more populated, high-income
regions (p-values <0.05; Table 3.4 and Figure 3.7). Variables related to speculation behavior
exhibited significant and expected negative relationships with lease use; i.e., non-used leases
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tended to be obtained later or contributed to a higher cumulative leased area (p-values<0.05, Table
3.4 and Figure 3.7). Thus, in light of this result, non-used leases tended to be older (p-value<0.05).
Used leases were observed more in congested waters, or closer to Baylor grounds. Finally,
environmental variables were also significantly different between used and non-used leases.
Surprisingly, lower salinities and greater depths were associated with higher rates of lease use
(meaning that non-used leases tended to be in shallower and more saline waters). Lastly, non-used
leases were found in close proximity to SAV. In summary, non-used leases were smaller, in less
congested areas, obtained later on, and in more populated, high-income regions.

3.4.6 Lease productivity across U.S. East and Gulf Coast states
The number of leases and productivity (oysters pieces/acre) were highly variable between
states of the U.S. East Coast and Gulf of Mexico (i.e., spanning two orders of magnitude, Table
3.5). Virginia was the third largest producer of oysters from private leases in 2017 (38,900,000
oysters) and had the second largest leased area (125,928 ac). However, the state recorded the
second lowest productivity (309 oysters/ac, incorporating non-used leases; Table 3.5).
Massachusetts had the highest production (47,849,698 oysters) and productivity (36,836 oyster/ac)
while Louisiana and Connecticut, similarly to Virginia, were characterized by high production
levels but low productivity per acre. The top-three states that recorded the highest level of
productivity per acre had on average smaller leases (mean lease size of 5 ac) than the remaining
states with lower productivities per acre (mean lease size of 24 ac).
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3.5. Discussion
This research analyzed the trends and drivers in the burgeoning growth of oyster
aquaculture in Virginia on privately leased grounds of Chesapeake Bay. We sought to identify
possible societal, regulatory, and spatial constraints on harvests of cultured oyster. This study is
the first to examine spatial saturation levels with respect to leased oyster grounds in the lower
Chesapeake Bay, analyze recent trends in lease use and productivity, to contrast used and nonused leases, to compare coast-wide lease productivity, and to compile a unique dataset combining
lease information, oyster production, socio-economic and environment variables.
Despite the significant increase in leased area observed since the mid-2000’s, we found
weak evidence of spatial constraints on industry growth. Saturation of leasable areas with leases
was not a major limitation, because leased areas continue to increase in most areas of the bay, with
the notable exception of the relatively small portion of Virginia waters in the Potomac River. In
2016, 40% to 67% of theoretically leasable areas per system were occupied by oyster leases, which
was 58% of overall leasable area across systems. These estimates are likely conservative as some
areas may not be optimal for certain types of aquaculture according to bottom type and current
velocity. For example, though large areas of the main stem of the Chesapeake Bay theoretically
remain available for leasing (only about 10% of leasable areas in the main stem are occupied by
leases), those areas are generally far from shore, relatively deep and heavily used for boat traffic,
making them less attractive for leasing due to the added costs of dealing with these factors. This
suggests that economic, as opposed to spatial, factors may be the primary limitation for expansion
of oyster aquaculture into the mainstem of the bay. If this is the case, then reductions in costs
associated with oyster aquaculture practices or increases in market demand could lead industry to
expand into areas that are currently not economically viable.
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From 2006 to 2016, only 33.38% of leases ever reported oyster production. Leaseholders
owning multiple leases often operated in a rotational manner. This could partially explain low
annual utilization rates, though this is unlikely to explain why a majority of leases remained notused for the entire 11-year study period. Furthermore, we found only 36.83% of individual
leaseholders were active during the same time period, indicating that other factors primarily drive
lease non-use. It is possible that our estimate of the number of unique leaseholders is high given
that multiple individual leaseholders may be associated with the same business entity, but it is
difficult to imagine this would explain the >60% of leases not reporting any harvest over an entire
decade. Some leases that are not used for commercial production may be actively managed and
yield benefits for oyster propagation or Bay conservation. Such beneficial use could include
planting of shell for restoration purposes, water quality improvements, and shoreline protection.
Our estimates did not consider these types of beneficial uses; however, state resource managers
are currently working to refine their definition of use to include non-commercial activities (Office
of the Secretary of Natural Resources 2018).
Although the numbers of used leases per year were low, the probability of lease use and
productivity per lease increased over years. The increased rate of use in the James River was lower
than in other systems, likely due to higher use rates in earlier years of the analysis (~21% of leases
were used in the James in 2006, whereas less than 4% of leases were used in all other systems,
Appendix B1.A). The James River has historically supported, and continues to support, large
public and private oyster fisheries, including public “seed beds” for collection of seed by private
planters (Haven et al. 1981, Schulte 2017). In the Potomac River, results from the saturation model
suggest viable space for leasing has become scarce, which might have incentivized increased use
of existing leases (which are smaller in this system, ~16.8 ac, compared to ~40 ac in the James or
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York Rivers). Interestingly, lease age significantly negatively affected the probability of lease use
(older leases tended to be used slightly less) but did not affect lease productivity. The majority of
variance explained in the mixed effects models of lease use and productivity was not related to
broad spatial or temporal variables, but rather indicates considerable heterogeneity across leases
and leaseholders. Therefore, lease use decisions and productivity appeared to be driven by local
conditions.
The type of aquaculture (intensive or extensive) did not significantly affect productivity.
Intensive aquaculture practices (cages, rack and bags, and floats) are used to raise a high density
of oysters in small area, and so it was expected that this type of aquaculture would exhibit higher
productivity (lbs/ac) when compared to extensive, on-bottom practices. Productivity differences
were observed according to aquaculture practices across states; e.g., it was generally lower in states
with extensive culture (LA) and higher in states with more intensive culture (MA), but not within
VA, which has substantial levels of both (VA). Negligible differences in productivity across
aquaculture types may be due to smaller portions of leases being used for intensive oyster
production in an effort to reduce competition via a buffer zone.
There were clear differences between used and non-used leases in the central tendencies of
nearly all economic, social, and environmental variables, though variances were generally similar.
Variables related to speculation behavior, such as rank of establishment, were found to differ
significantly between used and non-used leases. This is consistent with leaseholders frequently
buying more leased area than needed, perhaps due to the low cost of holding a lease. Leaseholders
with only one small lease tended not to use it; these may be speculators or property owners. With
the present data, the relationship between the age of a lease and its use was not obvious. Contrary
to expectations, and similarly to what was found in the mixed model on lease use, non-used leases
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tended to be older. We further explored this effect by adding a dummy variable to the model that
was 1 if the lease had any extensive harvest when the lease was younger than 3 years old. This
variable had a negative impact on use (Appendix B3), suggesting that some leaseholders may
harvest those oysters present on the bottom at the time of lease establishment, only to later abandon
production when these resources have been fully exploited. When a lease was surrounded by
multiple leases from different leaseholders and/or closer to Baylor (public) grounds, they tended
to be used more, suggesting that peer pressure, fear of encroachment, positive agglomeration
effects, or possibly theft (from nearby leased or public grounds) could drive lease use.
Alternatively, this could be an indication of good growing areas for oysters. Together, these
findings indicate that differences were systematic and that individual motivations and interactions
could affect lease use.
Though evidence supporting potential impacts of NIMBY attitudes was limited at the lease
scale, it was more obvious at the community scale. Proximity to the shore and proximity to
leaseholder home ZIP code were not significantly different between used and non-used leases. We
used centroids of leaseholder ZIP codes as a proxy for distance, due to the high frequency of PO
boxes in leaseholder addresses, which may have limited our ability to detect differences between
used and non-used leases. There may also be compounding factors that prevented us seeing the
NIMBY effect occurring at small scales, such as the desire of harvesters to be close to their leases
to facilitate surveillance against poaching and harvesting itself. Non-used leases were found to be
in shallower areas, or nearby to SAV, possibly indicating close proximity to the shore (even though
this variable was not significantly different between used and non-used leases). Despite limited
evidence of NIMBY at the lease scale, non-used leases were found in more populated, high-income
regions. We demonstrated weak evidence of possible NIMBY behavior, as correlated with factors
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others have suggested influences these attitudes (primarily income; Dear 1992). NIMBY attitude,
or public opposition, has been often associated with fish farming that can cause negative impacts
on the environment (e.g., fish waste products, water eutrophication, Katranidis et al. 2003,
Whitmarsh and Palmieri 2009). A few studies have documented public opposition toward shellfish
aquaculture development through perception surveys of coastal homeowners (Shafer et al. 2010,
D’Anna and Murray 2015, Knapp and Rubino 2016, Ryan et al. 2017). Negative esthetic features
such as buoys, cages and lease boundary markers, pollution with gear debris, noise nuisance,
hazards for recreational uses, and restriction of public access have all been recurring perceptions
of shellfish aquaculture that could explain potential NIMBY attitudes in Virginia. One may fear
that shellfish aquaculture externalities would diminish property values; however, such negative
impacts are not evident (Evans et al. 2017, Ryan et al. 2017).
Community and stakeholder preferences could be evaluated in Virginia to better
understand speculation and NIMBY attitudes (see D’Anna and Murray 2015, Dalton et al. 2017,
Ryan et al. 2017 for studies of preferences in other systems) and the positive benefits from shellfish
aquaculture should be effectively communicated to increase social acceptance (Bricknell and
Langston 2013). Acceptance of sea-bream and sea bass aquaculture activities in Greece was
greater when socioeconomic benefits were perceived by the community (Katranidis et al. 2003).
Thus, it may be necessary to better communicate to Virginia’s local communities the annual
economic impacts from oyster aquaculture, such as the creation of hundreds of jobs, and the farm
gate value of $15.9 million generated in 2017 (Hudson 2018). Additionally, by diminishing excess
anthropogenic nutrients, shellfish aquaculture can reduce eutrophication and it was found that the
total nitrogen load in the Potomac River would be removed if 40% of the river was used for oyster
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production (Bricker et al. 2014). For this blue economy5 sector to grow, environmental and socioeconomic benefits need to be better communicated to local communities through, for example, the
extension of local farmer markets (D’Anna and Murray 2015) or the recently created Virginia
Oyster Trail (http://virginiaoystertrail.com). Acceptance can also be greater if stakeholders are
more involved and their preferences incorporated in decision-making (Byron et al. 2011).
Virginia has the lowest lease rate in the country at $1.50/acre/year, unchanged since 1960.
As of 2017, Virginia was the third largest producer of aquacultured oysters from private grounds
on the East and Gulf Coast and had the largest total leased area on the East Coast. Nonetheless,
when comparing across states, Virginia exhibited the second lowest spatial productivity. The larger
leased area compared to other states possibly leads to increased conflicts and inefficiencies.
Tensions between the industry and the public have increased substantially over the last few years,
resulting in increased rates of lease protest (a lease may be protested during the application phase)
(B. Stagg, VMRC, pers. comm.). Significant effects of NIMBY variables at the community level
are concordant with recent public discussions of oyster leasing in Virginia. These disputes were
perhaps most pronounced in the Lynnhaven River, where high-end real estate lines the shores of
historically fertile oyster grounds. This conflict led a state senator from Lynnhaven to put forth a
bill to increase the leasing rate from $1.50/acre/year to $5,000/acre/year. Though this proposal was
ultimately withdrawn, it led to ongoing discussions between managers, industry, and the public
regarding potential reforms to the leasing system to decrease underutilization by strengthening
lease use enforcement or increasing leasing fees (e.g., by making it too costly to hold leases purely
for speculation or esthetic reasons).

Blue economy is “the sustainable use of the ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods and jobs
while preserving health of ocean ecosystem” (Silver et al. 2015)
5
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Half of the states compared in our study (CT, MA, ME, MS, NJ, VA) have subjective use,
or substantial use, requirements (e.g., “State requires substantial use” in MA) for oyster
production, while three (NC, MD, FL) have quantitative use requirements either in terms of annual
planting or production (e.g., “Plant 25 bushels seed or 50 bushels cultch per acre; produce 10
bushels per acre” in NC, B. Stagg, VMRC, pers. comm.). In Virginia, the leaseholder has to
provide an Oyster Lease Use Plan when applying for a new lease, then report monthly harvest to
the Commission (Chapter 4 VAC 20-610-60). Although Virginia’s leases are technically “use it or
lose it”, with a subjective use requirement, in practice fairly minimal evidence is required to
demonstrate use, and enforcement mechanisms are largely absent (Beck et al. 2004). Historically,
use has been hard to verify (Mason 2008), especially given that leaseholders can claim the
prevalence of the pathogens MSX and Dermo on their sites, impeding production, without having
to provide proof of their presence. Maryland has, in recent years, implemented a strict “use it or
lose it” policy that returned unproductive leases to the state, some of which were later leased by
productive growers (Green and Tracy 2013). Shellfish production in Maryland has since increased
from about 5,000 bushels/year in 2009 to about 75,000 bushels/year by 2017. Virginia would likely
benefit from a stricter “use it or lose it” policy or by setting annual quantitative production or
investment requirements, such as a minimum number of bushels per leased acre or evidence of
seed purchase by leaseholders. A newly formed sub-committee at VMRC, the Aquaculture
Management Advisory Committee, is currently discussing stricter use requirements, while VMRC
staff have begun using a standard of 1 bushel/acre/year as a minimum requirement. The
Commission has also recently (2019) established a renewal fee ($150 per lease per 10 years,
Chapter 4 VAC 20-1350-10 ET SEQ.), increased application and transfer fees (from $300 to
$1,000 per lease, depending on lease size), and now has the authority to deny a transfer. These
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changes in fees should help ensure that leaseholders are committed to fully utilizing leased acreage.
The commission also requested that oyster leases and active work areas be better defined and
marked (Chapter 4 VAC 20-290-10 ET SEQ., 2016).
There is an urgent need for coastal spatial planning to ensure sustainable aquaculture
development in the region (Sanchez-Jerez et al. 2016). Given evidence for the continuing
expansion of leased areas, in combination with only ~32% of leases being used for oyster
production, and indications of NIMBY behavior at the community level, better zoning would
balance working waterfronts, recreational areas, places of residence, and aquaculture spaces,
thereby minimizing conflicting interactions between users and avoiding negative externalities
(Aguilar-Manjarrez et al. 2017, Lombard et al. 2019). As part of this process, physical, ecological
and socio-economic criteria should be considered (Sanchez-Jerez et al. 2016, Evans et al. 2017).
Despite the development of tools evaluating environmental and production carrying capacity, the
use of these models combined with social-economic variables has been modest (Smaal and van
Duren 2019). In New Zealand, aquaculture can only be developed in Aquaculture Management
Areas (AMAs; Shafer et al. 2010). There, Longdill et al. (2008) suggested, among many other
suitability criteria, a 5 km buffer from the coast to reduce the potential for coastal homeowners to
view aquaculture structures. The Aquaculture Vulnerability Model (AVM; CCRM 2015) was
developed to assist shellfish growers in identifying locations where current conditions could
support aquaculture operations in Virginia. However, this model uses only physical, biological,
and landscape (dominant land use) attributes to evaluate area suitability and does not presently
include socio-economic criteria. The model could be extended to accommodate potential social
interactions and user conflicts (e.g., based on local population, lease congestion, and length of
coastline adjacent to aquaculture activities). Coastal Spatial Planning processes in Virginia could
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follow a participatory approach to include local communities in addition to industry
representatives, and could be supported by hearings to consider potential reforms to the leasing
system (Byron et al. 2011, Sanchez-Jerez et al. 2016). The existing AVM is a unique tool used to
assess biological suitability that was developed in a relatively data-rich environment. Use of
aquaculture siting tools that incorporate both biological and socio-economic information should
be considered in Virginia as well as other areas with expanding aquaculture sectors, especially
where such data is readily available.

3.6. Conclusion
Given increasing populations, increasing seafood consumption per capita, and limited
ability of wild stocks to produce substantially more, aquaculture production is expected to continue
expanding (Duarte 2009, SAPEA 2017, Wijsman et al. 2019). Demographic shifts leading to
increased wealthy non-working (retired) individuals or vacationers in already crowded coastal
regions will heighten barriers for coastal aquaculture development in the U.S. and elsewhere
(Halpern et al. 2008, Gibbs 2009). In Virginia, it is apparent from this study that there are numerous
social inefficiencies and spatial conflicts regarding oyster private lease use. Whether they are due
to NIMBY attitudes, speculation, or creation of buffer zones, these social attitudes and economic
conditions have contributed to important inefficiencies associated with the oyster aquaculture
sector. Use rates and lease productivity are low in Virginia, both in absolute terms and relative to
other states. With the lowest lease rates in the country, lengthy leasing periods, and poor
enforcement, there is little cost to holding a lease and it is not surprising that 67% of leases went
unused over the entire decade. This study is the first to quantitatively evaluate recent lease use and
underutilization, including potential modulators of this behavior. Our findings recognize that social
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and institutional constraints may slow growth and exacerbate stakeholder conflicts while
confirming that incentives matter in lease use decisions. There is potential room for growth in the
oyster aquaculture industry if social constraints are reduced, existing leased areas are used more
efficiently, and production expands into regions with low conflict and higher operational costs;
e.g., the main stem of Chesapeake Bay. To achieve this, utilization requirements should be
enforced and strictly monitored, and zoning for aquaculture activity should be developed.
Virginia’s long history of oyster production and mature leasing system may provide useful
guidance to states in more nascent stages of development. For example, Rhode Island’s system is
relatively new and Maryland has made several changes to its leasing system based on Virginia’s
program (Green and Tracy 2013). It is important that lessons are learnt from this system so that
similar challenges and conflicts are reduced in Virginia and avoided in other regions.
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1 Variables used in the analysis, their spatial and temporal coverage, and data sources by type.
Data type

Variables

Lease
Fisheries
Environmental

Leased ground polygons
Annual oyster harvests
Shellfish condemnation zones
Baylor grounds
Public clamming grounds
Bathymetry

Temporal
coverage
1950-2017
2006-2016
2017
2017
2017
2017

Submerged Aquatic Vegetation
Salinity
Total adjusted gross income
Number of tax returns
Number of tax exemptions

2003-2016
2000-2014
2006-2016
2006-2016
2006-2016

Socioeconomic

Source
Virginia Marine Resource Commission
Virginia Marine Resource Commission (by leased ground)
Virginia Department of Health
Virginia Marine Resource Commission
Virginia Marine Resource Commission
NOAA/NOS estuarine bathymetry digital elevation model
(raster, resolution 10m)
Virginia Institute of Marine Science
VIMS, ChesROMS-ECB model (mean resolution 1.7 km)
U.S. Internal Revenue Services (by ZIP codes)
U.S. Internal Revenue Services (by ZIP codes)
U.S. Internal Revenue Services (by ZIP codes)
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Table 3.2 Results of the beta regression model estimating saturation rates per year and system.
Reference level of system for interaction terms is miscellaneous tributaries. Beta estimates are the
additional increase (or decrease if estimate is negative) in the log-odds of the response saturation.
Differences between consecutive year predictions were used in the text to inform percent changes
in saturation rate for a given year. Significance is denoted by: p<0.001=‘***’, p<0.01=‘**’,
p<0.05=‘*’, p<0.1=‘.’. ɸ is a constant precision parameter. Pseudo-R2 represents the goodness of
fit test for the regression. System intercept parameters are not presented but are available upon
request.
Factor

Estimate

Std. Error p-value

Year

0.140

0.034

3.16E-5 ***

Year x Potomac

0.121

0.048

0.011

Year x Rappahannock

0.006

0.050

0.897

Year x York

-0.120

0.047

0.011

*

Year x James

-0.111

0.048

0.021

*

Year x Ches. Bay

0.047

0.073

0.517

Year2

-0.004

0.003

0.255

Year2 x Potomac

-0.016

0.005

4.24E-4 ***

Year2 x Rappahannock -0.003

0.005

0.489

Year2 x York

0.012

0.005

0.010

*

Year2 x James

0.015

0.005

0.001

**

Year2 x Ches. Bay

-0.009

0.007

0.199

ɸ

463.39

80.61

8.99E-9 ***

Pseudo-R2

0.9826
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Signif.

*

Table 3.3 Annual lease use and productivity per systems with leases as a random effect in a mixed
effect model. Base level of system for interaction terms is miscellaneous tributaries. Logit link was
utilized, therefore, estimates are the additional increase or decrease in the log-odds of the response
use (1 or 0). Coefficients were transformed in the text into percent changes in use probability for
𝑒 𝛽.∆𝑥

a given change in the predictor variable using the following formula: %∆𝑦 = 100 ∙ 1+𝑒 𝛽.∆𝑥 − 0.5,
or into percent changes in productivity for a given change in the predictor variable using the
following formula: %∆𝑦 = 100 ∙ (𝑒 𝛽.∆𝑥 − 1). Significance is denoted by: p<0.001=‘***’,
p<0.01=‘**’, p<0.05=‘*’, p<0.1=‘.’. Marginal and conditional coefficients of determination are
respectively given by R2m and R2c. Delta-method approximation was used for the observation-level
variance.

Fixed effects

Y= use (1|0)
Std. Error p-value
0.017 < 2E-16
0.005 2.50E-5
0.156 < 2E-16
0.256 < 2E-16
0.262 < 2E-16
0.381 < 2E-16
0.236 < 2E-16
0.230 < 2E-16
0.032
0.031
0.034
0.585
0.049
0.659
0.031 2.66E-6
0.031
0.083

Estimate
Year
0.272
Lease age
-0.022
Misc. Tribs
-4.417
Potomac
-4.194
Rappahannock
-4.215
York
-4.860
James
-2.887
Ches. Bay
-3.882
Year x Potomac
0.068
Year x Rappahannock
-0.018
Year x York
0.021
Year x James
-0.146
Year x Ches. Bay
-0.054
Aquaculture type
Random effects
Variance Std. Dev.
Lease
6.002
2.450
2

R

m

2

R

c

Observations
Individual leases

Signif.
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
*

***
.

Y=ln(productivity)
Estimate Std. Error p-value Signif.
0.053
0.020
0.007 **
-0.002
0.005
0.631
3.704
0.172
0.000 ***
3.827
0.263
0.000 ***
3.232
0.290
0.000 ***
3.232
0.290 < 2E-14 ***
4.575
0.491
0.000 ***
2.639
0.221
0.000 ***
0.090
0.036
0.013 *
-0.030
0.039
0.450
-0.091
0.061
0.137
0.106
0.032
0.001 ***
0.078
0.035
0.026 *
2.183
0.242
0.992
Variance Std. Dev.
1.974
1.405

0.064

0.099

0.522

0.617

23,426
3,340

2,663
994
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Table 3.4 Comparisons between used and non-used leases according to proxy variables related to
either “Not in my backyard” attitude (NIMBY), economic, speculation, congestion, or
environment conditions. The Wilcoxon test compared independent samples of used leases and
non-used leases’ central tendencies while the Ansari-Bradley test compared the equivalence of
their variances. Variance trends are indicated for non-used leases. Significance is denoted by:
p<0.001=‘***’, p<0.01=‘**’, p<0.05=‘*’, p<0.1=‘.’. +/- indicate differences of used as compared
to non-used leases. Parentheses around sign indicate trend for non-significant relationship.
Proxies

Variables

Wilcoxon test
p-value

Production
scale

Lease size
Number of leases from leaseholder
Total leased area from leaseholder
1

NIMBY
Economic

Speculation

Congestion

Only one lease
Proximity to shore
Proximity to leaseholder ZIP code
Average income
Population density
Household density
Rank of establishment
Cumulative area
Lease age

Fraction of leased area other leasehold
Lease number from other leaseholder
Fraction of leased area same leasehold
Lease number from same leaseholder
Proximity to Baylor grounds
Environment Salinity
Depth
Proximity to SAV

Lease
Signif. use

A. Bradley test
p-value

Signif.

< 2.2e-16
< 2.2e-16
< 2.2e-16
1.1e-8

***
***
***
***

+
+
+
-

0.11
0.51
0.65

NS
NS
NS

0.12
0.09
7.9e-7
1.6e-5
2.1e-6
9.3e-13
4.2e-16
0.0005

NS
.
***
***
***
***
***
***

(-)
+
-

0.0003
0.002
0.04
0.04
0.19
0.0006
1.1e-9
0.04

***
**
*
*
NS
***
***
*

0.81
0.53
0.33
0.01
0.01
1.5e-5
0.35
0.05

NS
NS
NS
*
*
***
NS
.

0.15 NS
0.03 *
0.003 **
0.01 *
< 2.2e-16 ***
0.002 **
5.6e-15 ***
0.003 **

a

(+)
+
+
+
+
+
-

1

A Pearson’s chi-squared test was used to assess the independence between lease use and variable
“Only_one_lease”.
a

Relationship between lease use and lease age was positive when all leases were considered for the
analysis (including less than 3 year old leases).
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Table 3.5 Oyster production, farm gate value, leased area and number of leases for U.S East and
Gulf coast states with significant oyster aquaculture industries. Data is for 2017, ordered by
descending productivity. Aquacultured species on leases could be oyster (O), clam (C), mussel
(M), quahog (Q), urchin (U), or scallop (S).
State

Production
(oyster pieces)

Farm gate
value ($)

Leased area
(acre)

Massachusetts

47,849,698

27,015,107

1,299

Rhode Island

8,434,541

5,771,436

Maine

10,716,197

7,193,925

296
676

Texas

35,969,750

5,216,507

North Carolina

23,274,000

2,400,000

New Hampshire

329,156

246,441

a

b

2,321
1,837
56

Lease
Productivity Aquacultured
number (oysters/acre)
species
390

36,836

O, C, M, S, Q

73
82

a

28,495

O, C, M

15,852

O, C, M, U, S

b

15,498

O

12,670

O, C

5,878

O

3,266

O, C

1,409
565

O, C
--

43
278

a

25

a
c

Maryland

22,219,800

6,000,000

6,803

Florida
Louisiana

2,193,107
227,737,226

---

1,556
403,383

420
1,384
8,028

Connecticut

31,128,300

16,306,096

60,000

1,590

519

O, C

4,694

d

309

O, C

1,742

54

--

Virginia
New Jersey

c

38,900,000

15,900,000

125,928

e

e

37,368

2,029,500

1,370,060

d

-- Data unavailable
a
Not exclusive leases (can be used for many other use in RI; by different leaseholders in NH).
b
Certificates of location; Location holders plant cultch onto their locations and manage the growth of
oysters that naturally recruit to this substrate.
c
Data for 2018.
d
Does not include riparian leases.
e
Data for 2016.
Sources: MA Division of Marine Fisheries 2017 Annual Report; D. Beutel, RI Coastal Resources
Management Council; M. Nelson, ME Department of Marine Resources, Aquaculture Division;
L. Robinson, TX Parks and wildlife Department, Coastal Fisheries Division; C. Weirich, NC Sea Grant,
Marine Aquaculture; C. Nash, NH Department of Environmental Services and R. Atwood, NH Fish and
Game Department; K. Roscher, MD Department of Natural Resources, Fishing and Boating Services and
MD Aquaculture Coordinating Council annual report for 2018; C. Culpepper, FL Department of
Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Aquaculture. 2019. Internal Data; J. Tomko, NJ
Department of Environmental Protection; C. Bourque, LA Department of Wildlife and Fisheries; D. Carey,
CT Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Aquaculture; B. Stagg, VA Marine Resource Commission
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3.10 Figures

Figure 3.1 Commercial oyster production on private leases (plain dark line) and area held in
private leases (dashed red line) in Virginia. Data from 1930 to 1974 was extracted from Haven,
1978; data from 1974 to 2016 was provided by VMRC. Data for total leased area are not readily
available for the period 1975-2006, but values are known to be low due to high disease prevalence
and low harvests in the region.
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Figure 3.2 Study area with each system in lower Chesapeake Bay indicated. Only the Virginia
waters of the Potomac River are shown (in dark grey). Private leases on the Atlantic coast of
Eastern Shore (dotted pattern) were excluded from analyses.
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Figure 3.3 Leases analyzed during the period 2006-2016 (in green). Other leases excluded from
the dataset (in red) included riparian leases, leases on the Atlantic coast of the Eastern Shore, those
in condemned zones (hatched red areas), and those that were never more than 2 years old.
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Figure 3.4 Areas that were not suitable for oyster production were comprised of Baylor grounds
(A), clams grounds (B), shellfish condemnation zones (C), and deep waters (D). These were
subtracted from the mainstem area of Chesapeake Bay to produce leasable area (E). Leasable area
was considered constant from 2006 to 2016 while SAV grounds (F) changed over time, but all
years beds are plotted here.
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Figure 3.5 Saturation of systems’ waters by leased areas over year (grey lines) and overall
saturation (bold line). Saturation for the mainstem of Chesapeake Bay saturation was removed
from total calculation as this area is distinctly dissimilar to other systems considered.
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Figure 3.6 Percentages of used leases, used leased area and active leaseholder per year over all
systems.
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Figure 3.7 Used lease percentages according to lease size bins (A); Differences between used
leases and non-used leases in averaged standardized rank of establishment (B), per household
income (C), and proximity to SAV (D).
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3.11 Appendix B
Appendix B1. Percentage of leases used (A) and mean productivity (B) per system over time.

Appendix B2. Results of the mixed effects model estimating annual lease use and productivity per
systems with random effects for leases nested within leaseholder. Marginal and conditional
coefficients of determination are respectively given by R2m and R2c.
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Appendix B3. Results of the mixed effects model estimating annual lease use and productivity per
systems including two new dummy variables to represent harvest in the first three years of a lease.
Base level of system for interaction terms is miscellaneous tributaries. Significance is denoted by:
p<0.001=‘***’, p<0.01=‘**’, p<0.05=‘*’, p<0.1=‘.’.
Fixed effects

Year

Y= use (1|0)

Y=ln(productivity)

Estimate Std. Error p-value Signif.

Estimate Std. Error p-value Signif.

0.242

Lease age
lease_with_harvest_less3yr
lease_with_Extensive_harvest_less3yr

-6.3E-4
3.402

0.017 < 2E-16 ***
0.005

0.902

0.340 <2E-16 ***

0.056

0.020

0.005

**

-0.004
-0.535

0.005
0.239

0.428
0.025

*

-1.269

0.389

0.001

**

0.573

0.275 0.0368

*

0.069

0.032

0.028

*

0.091

0.036

0.012

*

-0.014

0.033

0.680

-0.030

0.039

0.450

Year x York

0.038

0.048

0.429

-0.092

0.061

0.131

Year x James

-0.143

0.031 4.03E-6 ***

0.103

0.032

0.001

**

Year x Ches. Bay

-0.059

0.031

0.076

0.035

0.029

*

0.057

0.096

0.552

Year x Potomac
Year x Rappahannock

0.059

Aquaculture type

.

Appendix B4. Average population density and total adjusted gross income per ZIP code for the
2006-2016 period.
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– Chapter 4 –
Lease use efficiency in Virginia’s eastern oyster aquaculture industry
accounting for environmental and socioeconomic drivers

4.1 Abstract
Recently, oyster aquaculture has rebounded in the Virginia waters of Chesapeake Bay and
has been associated with an increase in subaqueous leased areas. However, production levels are
still far below historical levels and many leases are now thought to be underutilized, i.e., producing
fewer oysters than the maximum feasible amount. As leased area continues to expand, it is timely
to look at production efficiency to identify drivers and constraints of aquaculture development. In
this study, production analyses quantified inefficiencies in intensive oyster aquaculture arising
from lease, demographic, and socioeconomic variables, considering environmental conditions and
lease size as controlling potential production. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models estimated lease use efficiencies (LUE) for oyster production
from 2007 to 2016. Both models revealed significant inefficiencies in intensive aquaculture
practices in Virginia. On average, an active lease had an efficiency of 36% (DEA) or 23% (SFA),
suggesting that if leaseholders used their space and the existing environment in a fully efficient
manner, production could increase by at least 64% per lease. Lease size, oxygen level and
temperature were the main positive drivers of oyster production. The number of leases held per
leaseholder was found to increase use efficiency, while leases in more populated areas were less
efficiently used. These results highlight potential externalities and tradeoffs associated with
aquaculture development.
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4.2 Introduction
Oyster aquaculture is a globally important and increasing part of the blue economy that
provides economic benefits, as well as multiple ecosystem services, including water filtration and
habitat creation (Duarte 2009, Alleway et al. 2019, Theuerkauf et al. 2019). Oysters were the
highest volume and value marine shellfish produced via aquaculture in the United States in 2016,
with over 36.6 million lbs harvested and an estimated value of $192.2 million (National Marine
Fisheries Service 2018). Continued growth of oyster aquaculture is anticipated, given increasing
populations, increasing seafood consumption per capita, and limited potential for increased
exploitation of wild stocks (Duarte 2009, SAPEA 2017, Wijsman et al. 2019). Competition for
space between oyster producers and other stakeholders, as well as social opposition, have been
identified as key barriers for coastal aquaculture expansion in areas where different recreational,
esthetic, residential, and commercial uses or activities occur (Knapp 2012, Froehlich et al. 2017,
Beckensteiner et al. in review). Knapp and Rubino (2016) argue that U.S. marine aquaculture
activity is well below its potential level and Gibbs (2009) suggests that social carrying capacity,
which refers to the space dedicated to aquaculture that the local community is willing to accept
(Inglis et al. 2000), may be the main constraint to aquaculture industry growth. This research
evaluates oyster production potential on privately leased grounds in Virginia as related to the
physical, biological and social environment, in order to identify factors that enhance or constrain
oyster aquaculture development in the Virginia waters of Chesapeake Bay.
In Virginia, wild populations of eastern oyster (Crassostrea virginica) have experienced
dramatic declines due to disease, water quality, habitat destruction and overfishing over the last
two centuries (Rothschild et al. 1994, Schulte 2017, Kennedy 2018). The area once supported a
dynamic public fishery (~ 3 million lbs/yr in the 1950’s), where fishers harvested natural oyster

119

beds (defined by the Baylor Survey in 1896, Schulte 2017), and also a large “extensive
aquaculture” industry, whereby fishers deposited oyster shells and potentially live seed oysters on
the bottom for later harvest (~16 million lb./year in the 1950’s, Haven et al. 1978). Though both
of these fisheries continue, average annual aquaculture levels from 1995 to 2005 were only 0.4
million lbs, 2.5% of the 1950’s average. In recent years, oyster aquaculture has begun to rebound,
reaching ~2.5 million lbs in 2016. Major contributors to this growth include the increasing
cultivation of disease-resistant, hatchery-raised oyster strains, pioneering work on triploid oysters,
and reliance on intensive (i.e., enclosed via the use of oyster cages or bags) aquaculture practices
(Bosch et al. 2010, Murray and Hudson 2015, Hudson 2018). Concurrent with the observed
production rebound has been an increase in privately leased grounds. Today, the total amount of
leased area is the largest it has ever been in Virginia with about 140,000 acres currently leased. In
Virginia, private leases have long been advocated as an effective tool for increasing oyster yields
while also incentivizing sustainable practices (Alford 1973, Agnello and Donnelley 1975,
Santopietro and Shabman 1992, Beck et al. 2004); they provide the lessee exclusive and
transferable rights to cultivate shellfish in the area for at least 10 years.
Despite recent growth in oyster landings and leased area in Virginia, production levels are
still far below historical amounts, and Beckensteiner et al. (in review) found that, from 2006 to
2016, only 33% of leases were ever used for oyster production. Though in theory leases are for the
“planting or propagating [of] oysters” (Virginia Code, Chapter 6, 28.2-603), in practice, minimal
evidence is required to demonstrate use, and enforcement mechanisms are limited, leading to
leases potentially being obtained for a variety of non-aquaculture uses (Beckensteiner et al. in
review). Due to the low annual lease fees in Virginia (i.e., the lowest in the US, $1.50/acre/year),
individuals may apply for a lease without the intention of using it for oyster culture in the
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immediate future (Mason 2008). Some leaseholders are thought to be motivated by speculative
leasing (with the intent of future resale at a profit, Mason 2008) and/or driven by the desire to
impede development of oyster farming “in their backyard” (“Not in my backyard” attitude, Dear
1992). Previous research observed non-used leases in more populated, high-incomes regions, and
these leases tended to be purchased later on by leaseholders possessing multiple leases, consistent
with both speculative and exclusionary utilization (Beckensteiner et al. in review).
Surrounding socioeconomic conditions that are correlated with the non-use of leases in
Virginia may also influence production efficiency, i.e., observed production as compared to
maximum feasible production given available resources (assuming that aquaculturists aim to
maximize profit). Though underutilization and non-use are two different phenomena, they may
have similar underlying drivers and it is reasonable to expect that lease use efficiency could be
affected by the surrounding socioeconomic environment (e.g., reduced efficiency in higher
density, higher income, or nearshore areas where user-conflicts might be more prevalent).
Quantifying potential inefficiencies and their drivers are important so that economic performance
can be improved, growers can be more productive, tradeoffs with aquaculture development can be
evaluated, and Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) can be more (economically and socially) efficient.
Empirical production frontier models have been widely used to examine the efficiency of
aquaculture industries, as well as numerous other economic activities. These models use
observations of production together with associated inputs to construct the efficient production
frontier—the maximum amount of output producible for a given input level (Farrell 1957). Two
popular econometric approaches include Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA, Aigner et al. 1977)
and the non-stochastic Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA, Charnes et al. 1978). Production frontier
analyses have been extensively used for estimating technical efficiency (TE, i.e., the difference
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between observed production and efficient production) in the aquaculture industry (see Iliyasu et
al. 2016, and Sharma and Leung 2003 for reviews of 41 aquaculture production frontier models).
These studies have often focused on freshwater finfish aquaculture production in developing
countries (e.g., production of tilapia or carp in Malaysia, Iliyasu et al. 2016). A few economic
studies though have looked at bivalve aquaculture production efficiency. Theodoridis et al. (2017)
showed through a DEA that socio-demographic variables, such as farmer’s age, experience in
aquaculture, vocational training, and level of education, could partly explain technical efficiencies
in mussel farm in Greece. Larger farms were also found to be more efficient than small ones. In
coastal New England, a significant amount of inefficiency in oyster production was quantified
through a SFA, with average efficiency between 2013 and 2015 estimated to be ~49% and driven
by farm location and species diversification (growers who have diversified their aquaculture
production were less efficient; Scuderi and Chen 2019). In Moreton Bay, Australia, a study
considered whether personal characteristics of oyster farmers or environmental conditions related
to water quality limited the oyster industry in this region (Schrobback et al. 2014). Both
demographic and environmental conditions affected technical efficiencies, controlling for the
production inputs of labor (leaseholder full-time equivalent) and farm size.
Most existing econometric studies have examined aquaculture production inefficiency
using inputs related to area, feed, seed, labor (e.g., number of hours fished), technology (e.g. boat
size, fuel), and/or effort intensity (crew number), while inefficiencies have been investigated as
related to farmer’s skills, education, experience, and/or social network (Sharma and Leung 2003,
Schrobback et al. 2014, Iliyasu et al. 2016, Theodoridis et al. 2017, Scuderi and Chen 2019).
Environmental production inputs have rarely been explicitly incorporated in those econometric
models. In this paper, production analyses will quantify inefficiencies in oyster aquaculture arising
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from lease, demographic, and socioeconomic variables, considering environmental conditions and
lease size as production inputs. Therefore, inefficiency will not correspond to the production
process per se (i.e., how farm-controlled inputs are transformed into outputs) but is rather related
to the utilization of space given the underlying environment; consequently, we will use the term
Lease Use Efficiency (LUE) instead of TE. Environmental inputs will include those used in
physical and production carrying-capacity models such as in Farm Aquaculture Resource
Management (FARM) and ShellGIS models (Ferreira et al. 2007, Newell et al. 2013). Those
production carrying-capacity models typically do not use empirical data or measure efficiency.
Our approach represents a unique use of production frontier models for assessing the impacts of
environmental and socioeconomic factors on observed production levels and efficiency.
The primary goal of this study is to answer the question: “By how much can oyster
production in Virginia waters be proportionally expanded for a given environment and leased
area?” To evaluate efficient use of oyster leases and investigate how leaseholder characteristics
and socioeconomic variables affect oyster production, empirical production frontier models are
developed and compared. LUEs for oyster production were estimated from 2007 to 2016 using
both SFA and DEA models. Efficiency scores were compared between the two methods, and
consistencies (or inconsistencies) identified. Model outputs were used to 1) estimate the extent to
which leased areas are not at full production (i.e., inefficient), and 2) determine lease use
inefficiency drivers (e.g., economic conditions that might correspond with user-conflict and/or
leaseholder characteristics such as proximity to leaseholder home). Application of such models is
essential to improved Marine Spatial Planning that promotes efficient utilization of space, reduces
user-conflicts, and addresses socioeconomic tradeoffs in aquaculture development.
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4.3 Methods
4.3.1 Production frontier models
We developed and compared two common production frontier models that measure
efficiency, the SFA (Aigner et al. 1977) and the non-stochastic DEA (Charnes et al. 1978). Both
empirical methods consider the observations of current production relative to the corresponding
maximum output feasible, i.e., the efficient production frontier for a given set of inputs (Farrell
1957). Annual Lease Use Efficiency (LUE, equivalent of TE) scores were computed for each lease
during every year of oyster production. LUE could range from 0 to 1. If LUE is equal to one, the
lease lies on the frontier and its use is efficient, i.e., it is producing as much as possible given lease
size and environmental conditions. If LUE is less than one, the lease is not achieving maximum
production given the set of inputs and is therefore inefficient.

4.3.1.a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
The composite error term of the SFA allows simultaneous estimation of inefficiencies and
noise (Aigner et al. 1977). The output-oriented log-linear Cobb-Douglas stochastic production
frontier model can be written as:
𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ln 𝑿𝒊,𝒕 . 𝜷 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 .

(1)

In (1), the response variable 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is log-transformed output for the ith observation at the
tth time. 𝑿𝒊,𝒕 is a (1 x k) vector of inputs of production associated with the ith observation at the tth
time. β is a (k x 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 are the random errors,
independently and identically distributed with mean of zero and variance σ2v (𝑣𝑖,𝑡 ~ N(0, σ2v)). 𝑢𝑖,𝑡
are the non-negative random deviations associated with production inefficiencies, independently
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and identically distributed and assuming a normal distribution truncated at zero, with mean µi,t and
variance σ2u (𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ~N+(µi,t, σ2u), Aigner et al. 1977).
The lease use inefficiency model is specified following Battese and Coelli (1995) as:
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 = 𝒁𝒊,𝒕 . 𝜹𝑺𝑭𝑨 + 𝜖,

(2)

where 𝒁𝒊,𝒕 is a (1 x m) vector of explanatory variables possibly explaining lease use inefficiencies
for oyster production, and 𝜹𝑺𝑭𝑨 is a (m x 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. 𝜖 are
the random errors with a half-normal distribution (i.e., to ensure 𝑢>0).
SFA lease use efficiencies for the ith observation at the tth time are calculated as:
𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆𝐹𝐴

𝑖,𝑡

=

𝑦𝑖,𝑡
′
𝑦𝑖,𝑡

=

𝑿 .𝜷+𝑣𝑖,𝑡 −𝑢𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 𝒊,𝒕
𝑿 .𝜷+𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 𝒊,𝒕

= 𝑒 −𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ,

(3)

which defines LUE as the ratio of observed output to the maximum feasible output when it is
affected by random shocks only.
Production frontier and inefficiency model parameters were estimated simultaneously by
maximum likelihood in R (R Core Team 2018) with the frontier package (Coelli and Henningsen
2017). Marginal effects of inefficiency variables were calculated in the frontier package following
the formula derived in Olsen and Henningsen (2011). We performed a likelihood ratio test to
evaluate whether inclusion of the inefficiency term, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 , significantly improved model fit (HA:
σ2u≠0), i.e., the null hypothesis was that variation in production simply reflects noise (H0: σ2u=0)
and the model reduces to a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Relative importance
of the inefficiency term was represented by γ, the ratio of σ2u/σ2, where σ2 is the sum of the noise
and inefficiency variances.
In order to test for time-varying efficiency, an alternative SFA, the Error Component
Frontier (ECF), was specified based on Battese and Coelli (1992) in which LUEs may vary over
time, though exogenous inefficiency variables are ignored (results in Appendix C1).
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4.3.1.b Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
DEA is a linear programing (LP) method, first introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) and
used to assess efficiency of a specific observation against the empirical efficient frontier defined
by the most efficient observations of a group. Banker et al. (1984) extended the model to allow
variable return to scale (VRS) to account for variability in the relationship between inputs and
outputs across different levels of production. Given Jt leases at time t, each producing a single
output with K different inputs, the output-oriented VRS DEA model for the ith lease in the tth time
can be formulated as:
max 𝜃𝑖,𝑡

(4.1)

∑ 𝜆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 . 𝑦𝑗,𝑡 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 . 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0

(4.2)

𝜃𝑖,𝑡 ,𝜆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡

such that:
𝑗
𝑗 𝜆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 . 𝑥𝑗,𝑘,𝑡

− 𝑥𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 ≤ 0,

𝑗 𝜆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡

= 1,

k=1,…, K

j=1,…, Jt

𝜆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ≥ 0.

(4.3)
(4.4)
(4.5)

In (4.1-4.5), the ith lease produces 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 oysters at the tth time using 𝑥𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 units of the kth input
(e.g., lease size and environmental data). In this LP, the objective is to maximize 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 , the
proportional increase (i.e., scalar multiplier) in output (i.e., oyster production) possible for the ith
lease at the tth time (4.1) while remaining within the production possibility set. 1/𝜃𝑖,𝑡 defines an
efficiency score between 0 and 1. Each lease’s efficiency score is calculated relative to an
efficiency frontier where observations from the most efficient leases (largest production for a given
input level) serve as benchmarks to inefficient leases. 𝜆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is a non-negative scalar that places
positive weight on observations that define the efficient frontier which is constructed as a linear
combination of efficient observations for each lease i at each time t. If 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 equals 1 and 𝜆𝑗,𝑡 equals
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0 for all j ≠ i, then lease i is efficient and lies on the frontier. Four constraints have to be considered
to ensure the projected point does not lie outside the feasible set. First, observations of outputs and
inputs by leases on the production frontier described by (𝜆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 . 𝑥𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 , 𝜆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 . 𝑦𝑗,𝑡 ) have to be greater
than or equal to (for output) or less than or equal to (for inputs) output and input levels for lease i
at time t (4.2-4.3). Constraints (4.4) and (4.5) introduce restrictions related to returns to scale and
ensure convexity. These constraints require that the sum of non-negative weights over all leases
for a given lease i at time t equal one, such that lease i is only benchmarked against observations
of similar scale. The LP problem needs to be solved

𝑇
𝑡=1 𝐽𝑡

times, once for each lease i, for each

time period t (i.e., for each production observation). DEA lease use efficiencies for the ith lease at
the tth time are calculated as:
𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴
By construction, 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴

𝑖,𝑡

𝑖,𝑡

=

𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑦̂
𝑖,𝑡

=

𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 .𝜃𝑖,𝑡

1

=𝜃 .

(5)

𝑖,𝑡

are biased upward (Simar and Wilson 1998) and need to be

corrected. This can be done through a smoothed bootstrap procedure (i.e., repeated sampling from
a smoothed version of the empirical (discrete) distribution, using kernel densities; Simar and
Wilson 2008, Bogetoft and Otto 2011) that allows the construction of confidence intervals around
∗
efficiency scores and estimation of bias-corrected efficiency, i.e., 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴
∗
Given bias-corrected estimates of efficiency, 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴

𝑖,𝑡 .

𝑖,𝑡 , we used a linear regression model

to explain potential drivers of efficiency (Banker and Natarajan 2008):
∗
𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴

𝑖,𝑡

= 𝒁𝒊,𝒕 . 𝜹𝑫𝑬𝑨 + 𝜀,

(6)

with 𝒁𝒊,𝒕 a (1 x m) vector of explanatory variables possibly explaining lease use efficiencies, 𝜹𝑫𝑬𝑨
a (m x 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and 𝜀 the normally distributed random
errors. As DEA coefficients are in terms of efficiencies, one would expect them to have the
opposite sign of the inefficiencies obtained from the SFA model. Therefore, when reporting DEA
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results (Table 4.5) we have inverted the sign of the coefficients obtained from (Eq. 6) so that
reported signs of DEA coefficients are expected to be the same as those for SFA coefficients.
DEA calculations (bootstrapped 2,000 times) were performed by minimal extrapolation
(i.e., the smallest production possibility set containing all observations and fulfilling model
assumptions) in R (R Core Team 2018) with the benchmarking package (Bogetoft and Otto 2011).

4.3.1.c Conceptual and methodological differences between the two approaches
The SFA and DEA techniques differ by a number of characteristics (summarized in Table
4.1). First, while the DEA attributes all deviations from the frontier to inefficiencies, the stochastic
SFA assumes two unobserved error terms related to inefficiency and statistical noise or
measurement error. Although the deterministic nature of DEA can be argued to be a limitation, in
that it does not account for random variations in output, it might also be viewed as a strength, in
that no pre-defined functional relationship between inputs and output is required. Since SFA is a
parametric approach, it requires an a priori functional form to be specified, such as the log-linear
Cobb-Douglas production function, and assumes specific distributions for the two error terms.
Time effects were ignored in the SFA, which estimated one frontier for all observations, whereas
DEA frontiers were calculated considering only observations from the same time period (an ECF
specification of the SFA was used to evaluate potential changes in efficiency over time, however).
An advantage of the SFA is that it simultaneously estimates parameters of the stochastic
production frontier and parameters of the inefficiency model (Battese and Coelli 1995), whereas
DEA requires a two-step procedure: first estimates of efficiency scores are produced, and then
those estimates are regressed against variables thought to influence inefficiency. Rank-based
∗
correlation between 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴

𝑖,𝑡

and 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆𝐹𝐴

𝑖,𝑡

scores was assessed with a Spearman test.
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4.3.2 Data collection and processing
We analyzed leased grounds active during the period 2007-2016 in the Virginia waters of
the Chesapeake Bay (Figure 4.1). Data considered for the models defined above consisted of a set
of lease, oyster harvest, environmental, and socio-economic data collected from the Virginia
Institute of Marine Science (VIMS), the Virginia Marine Resource Commission (VMRC), the
Virginia Department of Health (VDH), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). These data were
combined together in a spatially-explicit PostgreSQL/PostGIS database (see Beckensteiner et al.
in review, for a complete description of data collection and processing).

4.3.2.a Annual oyster production per lease
Lease polygons were available publicly through the VMRC’s Chesapeake Bay Map
(https://webapps.mrc.virginia.gov/public/maps/chesapeakebay_map.php), which also included
leaseholder names and mailing addresses. We analyzed commercial leases with intensive oyster
production reported between 2007 and 2016. Time series of annual oyster harvest per lease were
provided by VMRC. Harvest data were separated by lease identification number, gear and year.
Intensive oyster production consists of production from bottom cages, rack and bags, water column
cages, net pins, and floats. Leases in shellfish condemnation zones (provided by VDH 2017) were
not considered in our analyses since production is unlikely in upstream tidal waters (i.e., waters
too fresh for optimal oyster growth) or polluted waters. Leased grounds on the Atlantic coast of
the Eastern Shore (Figure 4.1) were omitted because they are mostly utilized for clam production
and our environmental variables also did not adequately cover this region.
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4.3.2.b Environmental inputs
The production frontier models used lease size and environmental variables as inputs.
Information about environmental conditions in the Chesapeake Bay were derived from an
estuarine biogeochemical model, ChesROMS-ECB, which has an average grid resolution of 1.7
km (Feng et al. 2015). Values from the nearest ChesROMS grid cell within 1.7 km were
extrapolated to leases not covered by the ChesROMS grid (i.e., in upstream areas of small
tributaries, Figure 4.1, darker gray cells). When several grid cells overlapped with a lease, the
weighted sum of each environmental variables’ value of those grid cells was assigned to the lease.
Impacts of environmental factors on oyster growth and survival might be observed in production
data for up to three years as oysters can require two to three years to reach market size (76 mm
shell length, Harding 2007). Therefore, we calculated spring averages (March to June, peak of
growing season) over the two years preceding and up to the given year of an oyster production
observation. Model results from ChesROMS-ECB were only available from 2003 to 2014,
therefore, values for 2015 were based on the average between 2013 and 2014 observations, while
values for 2016 were solely approximated by the 2014 value (it was not thought this would
significantly impact production estimates since temporal variability was generally one order of
magnitude smaller than spatial variability for most environmental variables). Input variables
included were those typically used in FARM models (Ferreira et al. 2007), i.e., water temperature,
salinity, chlorophyll a concentration, current velocity, dissolved oxygen (DO), particulate organic
carbon (POC), and dissolved inorganic nitrogen (DIN) at the bottom. These variables impact many
fundamental biological processes of oysters, such as respiration, growth and mortality, as well as
reflecting ambient water quality. For example, eastern oyster filtration capacity depends on water
temperature and is optimal between 15 ºC and 25 ºC (Loosanoff 1958). Eastern oysters can tolerate
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a broad range of salinity (5-40 psu, tolerance depending on life stage), but prefer upper mesohaline
to polyhaline salinities (15-30 psu, Barnes et al. 2007). Although higher salinity could boost oyster
growth, it is also associated with increased prevalence of the pathogens MSX (caused by
Haplosporidium nelsoni) and Dermo (caused by Perkinsus marinus) (Haven et al. 1981, Shumway
2011). Chlorophyll a, POC, and DIN were used as proxies for food availability (optimal
concentrations ≥15 mg-chl-a / m3, Tenore and Dunstan 1973, Kellogg et al. 2013). O2 level was a
surrogate for anoxic and hypoxic conditions (oyster metabolism is significantly affected at O2
concentrations lower than 3ppm, Wallace 2001, Seitz et al. 2009). Current velocity controlled for
turbidity and food circulation (stagnant waters and/or heavy waves could be detrimental for oyster
growth, Livingston et al. 1997, North et al. 2008). Summarized statistics of each environmental
input used in our analyses are given in Table 4.2.

4.3.2.c Leaseholder and socioeconomic variables
For the analyses of potential inefficiencies of lease use for oyster production, we included
a set of variables related to the leaseholder, local spatial context and socioeconomic conditions.
The number of leases held per leaseholder per year was considered as potentially influencing
efficiency (note that this number can comprise leases not included in this analysis, such as leases
used with extensive gears, leases not used and/or leases in polluted zones). Leaseholders owning
several leases were thought to be larger operations and, therefore, potentially more efficient (e.g.,
due to economies of scale that reduce the average cost of production). Lease age was also included
to account for experience level and temporal change (with older leases expected to be more
efficient, i.e., the learning-by-doing hypothesis, Sheshinski 1967). This was reasonable because
all leases in our dataset were continuously held by the same leaseholder during the study period
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2007-2016 (i.e., no instances of lease turnover). A dummy variable “both practices” was included
to capture if a leaseholder was simultaneously producing oysters from both intensive and extensive
practices from the same lease, in a given year (diversification of production methods was expected
to decrease efficiency as it may involve increased infrastructure and costs). In prior research, nonused leases were found to be in close proximity to Submerged Aquatic Vegetation (SAV)
(Beckensteiner et al. in review). SAV grounds compete for shallow space with cultured oysters, as
current management does not allow aquaculture in areas occupied by SAV (Wagner et al. 2012).
The presence of SAV was therefore expected to have a negative impact on lease use efficiency for
oyster production. A dummy variable “SAV present” was equal to one if the distance between a
lease and a SAV ground was null during the tth year, meaning that the lease was touching or
partially covered by SAV grounds (annual SAV polygons provided by VIMS). Productive leases
were also previously observed to be in close proximity to natural oyster beds, which are reserved
for the public use, and/or in congested areas with many other leases (Beckensteiner et al. in
review). An additional dummy variable “adjacent to Baylor” was included to assess if proximity
to public Baylor grounds was a driver of lease use efficiency. Baylor grounds polygons were
available publicly through the VMRC’s Chesapeake Bay Map. The fraction of leased acreage from
different leaseholders within a 1 km buffer of a lease was used as a proxy for local congestion or
agglomeration effects. Speculative leasing behavior has been found to be associated with lease
non-use (Beckensteiner et al. in review). We assessed the effects of speculative leasing on lease
use efficiency through the variable “proportional rank of purchase”, which was the ratio of the
rank of lease acquisition divided by the number of leases owned by the same leaseholder in a given
year. Leases bought later on (i.e., more speculative, with values closer to 1) were expected to be
less efficiently used for oyster production. Distance between a lease and its leaseholder’s home
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ZIP code centroid (though leaseholder addresses were available, most were PO Boxes;
Beckensteiner et al. in review) was also included. Close proximity to a leaseholder’s home ZIP
code is thought to enhance lease use via better access and surveillance of grounds. A dummy
variable “adjacent to the shore”, equal to 1 when the distance between a lease and the shore was
zero, was included since user-conflict is thought to be more common in nearshore areas. Finally,
local socioeconomic conditions were represented by population density, approximated as the total
number of personal and dependent tax exemptions for a ZIP code (i.e., number of exemptions is
considered to be a proxy for number of people) divided by ZIP code area, and per household
income, estimated as the total adjusted gross income for a ZIP code (adjusted for inflation) divided
by the number of returns. These data were available annually from 2007 to 2016 from individual
income tax statistics (IRS 2017) and the values from the nearest ZIP code area were assigned to
each lease. Lease use efficiency was expected to be lower in higher density and higher income
regions, where user-conflicts might be more prevalent (Beckensteiner et al. in review).

4.3.3 Model specifications summary
Annual oyster production per lease from intensive practices constituted outputs for the SFA
and DEA models, with log-transformed production used in the SFA. Associated inputs to construct
efficient lease use frontiers in both approaches included lease size, temperature, salinity,
chlorophyll a, current velocity, DO, POC, and DIN (all variables were log-transformed for the
SFA). Positive monotonic relationships between oyster production and environmental variables
were expected, allowing their inclusion in the DEA under an assumption of free disposability (i.e.,
that increases in inputs should not decrease output). Factors potentially explaining lease use
inefficiencies included the number of leases held by the leaseholder, lease age, diversified
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production practices, proportional rank of lease purchase, the fraction of nearby leased acreage
from other leaseholders, distance to leaseholder ZIP code, being adjacent to shore, SAV presence,
being adjacent to Baylor, population density, and average income (Table 4.3). There were 831
annual production observations from 301 leases and 202 leaseholders over 10 years (2007 to 2016).

4.4 Results
4.4.1 SFA
4.4.1.a SFA production frontier
We first specified a SFA with time-varying lease effects, ignoring exogenous inefficiency
variables (i.e., the ECF specification), in order to test for time-varying efficiency. Efficiencies were
found to not change significantly over years (p-value = 0.48, Appendix C1). We then ran the timeinvariant SFA model including the 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 vector of exogenous variables to examine the drivers of
inefficiencies. While an alternative, more flexible, production function was run (i.e., partial
translog function, Appendix C2), results of interest (efficiency scores and Z variable coefficients)
were not substantially affected (spearman correlation between LUE scores ρ=0.98, p-value <0.05);
therefore, we chose to present results from the Cobb-Douglas specification to be more comparable
with the DEA specification. With this log-linear function, the estimated coefficients of the input
variables can be interpreted as output elasticities (e.g., the percentage change in output
corresponding to a 1% increase in an individual input). Lease size, temperature, salinity, O2, and
DIN were found to significantly affect oyster production (Table 4.4). Lease size had a significant
and positive influence on production of oysters: for every 1% increase in lease size (in m2) a 0.38%
increase in oyster production (pounds) was observed, suggesting decreasing returns to scale. For
O2, temperature, salinity and DIN, 1% increases (from their means and within the range of our
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observations) were associated with 9.7%, 3.0%, 1.3% and 0.6% increases in oyster production,
respectively (Table 4.4).

4.4.1.b SFA lease use efficiency
A likelihood ratio test was used to verify whether adding the inefficiency term 𝑢𝑖,𝑡
significantly improved the fit of the model. The null hypothesis (H0: σ2u=0, i.e., no inefficiency,
only noise) was rejected (p-value <0.001), indicating that the fit of the SFA model was
significantly better than the fit of the corresponding OLS model, and that significant lease use
inefficiency existed. Relative importance of inefficiency in oyster production as compared to noise
(γ) was equal to 0.80 (significant at 5% level, Table 4.4), indicating that inefficiency was the
primary factor explaining deviations from the production frontier. Predicted 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆𝐹𝐴

𝑖,𝑡

observations from 2007 to 2016 ranged from ~0.001 to 0.78, with a mean 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆𝐹𝐴

across all

𝑖,𝑡

of 0.23

(±0.19) (Figure 4.2A). This finding suggests that if leaseholders used their space and the existing
environment in a fully efficient manner, output could increase by 77% per lease, on average.

4.4.1.c Causes of inefficiency from the SFA
Since the dependent variable of the inefficiency model (Eq. 2) was defined in terms of
inefficiency, a negative coefficient of an exogenous variable in this model indicated that the
variable reduced inefficiency, whereas a positive value indicated an increase in inefficiency. The
number of leases per leaseholder was found to decrease lease use inefficiency (p-value <0.001),
with every 1% increase in the number of leases per leaseholder producing an increase of 1.9% in
LUE on average. On the other hand, distance to leaseholder’s home ZIP code, population density
and average income were found to significantly increase inefficiency (p-values equal to 0.001,
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0.031 and 0.002, respectively; 0.8%, 0.5%, and 3.9% decreases in LUE for every 1% increase in
distance to leaseholder’s home ZIP code, population density and average income, respectively)
(Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3).

4.4.2 DEA
4.4.2.a DEA lease use efficiency
∗
DEA estimated bias-corrected lease use efficiency (𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴

𝑖,𝑡 )

measures were produced

for the same number of observations (lease/year combinations) using the same output and input
∗
variables as for the SFA. The estimated mean 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴

𝑖,𝑡

was 0.36 (±0.27), while estimates ranged

from 3.2e-5 to 0.88 (Figure 4.2B, Table 4.5). 43.8% of observations had non-bias-corrected
𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴

𝑖,𝑡

equal to 1 (Appendix C3), i.e., the efficient frontier observations. The frontier

smoothing bootstrap placed most of these observations at an efficiency level near 0.6 (Figure
∗
4.2B). Rank-based correlation between 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴

𝑖,𝑡

and 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆𝐹𝐴

𝑖,𝑡

scores was significantly positive

(ρ=0.49, p-value <0.05, Appendix C4).

4.4.2.c Causes of inefficiency from the DEA/OLS
Table 4.5 shows the determinants of lease use inefficiency with the DEA / OLS procedure.
Coefficients of the number of leases per leaseholder and proximity to Baylor grounds were found
to be negative and statistically significant (Table 4.5; e.g., there was an increase of 0.037% in LUE
for every 1% increase in the number of leases held by a leaseholder). This implies that lease use
for oyster production by leaseholders with more leases (larger production scale), and from leases
adjacent to public grounds, was more efficient (Figure 4.3B). Conversely, coefficients of the
presence of SAV and population density had a positive sign and were statistically significant,
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indicating that leases with SAV grounds present and/or in more populated areas were less
efficiently used (Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3C; e.g., there was a decrease of 0.045% in LUE for every
1% increase in population density).

4.5 Discussion
This study evaluated lease use efficiency for intensive oyster production in Virginia from
2007 to 2016 and the impacts of environmental and socioeconomic factors on observed production.
As Beckensteiner et al. (in review) revealed substantial non-use of leases in the oyster aquaculture
sector in Virginia, correlated with socioeconomic and regulatory factors, we attempted to assess
here the performance of used leases and estimate potential inefficiency, or underutilization.
Drivers of lease underutilization were expected to be similar to those of lease non-use identified
by Beckensteiner et al. (in review). To our knowledge, no study has analyzed performance of
private oyster leases for intensive aquaculture in Virginia. We introduced in this paper the concept
of “Lease Use Efficiency”, which is similar to Technical Efficiency but considers available space
and environmental conditions as production inputs in constructing output frontiers. This is a novel
utilization of traditional econometric production frontier methods for aquaculture performance
assessment where environmental conditions are typically not well integrated in the analyses
(Sharma and Leung 2003, Iliyasu et al. 2016).
The production frontier models utilized in this study were either defined through an
assumed a priori functional form (SFA) or composed of the best performers (DEA), and were
characterized by different underlying assumptions and constraints (e.g., error distributional
assumptions for the SFA; convexity and variable returns to scale constraints for the DEA). Though
different, both models revealed significant inefficiencies in intensive aquaculture practices in the
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Virginia waters of the Chesapeake Bay. On average, an active lease had an efficient level of 0.36
±0.27 (DEA result) or 0.23 ±0.19 (SFA result), meaning that the industry was operating on average
64% (77% with the SFA) below the maximum potential production, given the environment and
lease size (note the large standard deviations however). These low average levels of efficiency
mean that leased grounds were not at full production from 2007 to 2016. It is believed that
producers often only use a small fraction of their lease for oyster production (Beckensteiner et al.
in review, B. Stagg, VMRC, pers. comm.). Whether it is for the allocation of buffer zones against
other aquaculturists or poachers, or due to a lack of knowledge of where suitable grounds are when
applying for a lease, producers tend to lease much more area than what they need, incentivized by
the low ground rental cost. This behavior has probably contributed considerably to observed low
levels of LUE. It is worth mentioning that fully efficient use may not be achievable (at least in the
immediate future) due to constraints on seed availability (dependent on hatchery capacity and
technology, Schulte 2017), potential triploid mortality events (Guévélou et al. 2019) and the
presence of unsuitable substrate (sand and hard bottom are preferred for cages, B. Stagg, pers.
comm.). Other leaseholder-specific financial and/or technical factors may also constrain this
expansion (e.g., available labor, capital, time). Nevertheless, overall, significant opportunity exists
for improvement in lease use efficiency for oyster production.
Though there were some contrasting results between the two different approaches (e.g., in
terms of the relative impact of different explanatory variables on the magnitude of inefficiency),
overall the models yielded similar conclusions. Most LUE scores were less than 0.5, revealing
∗
substantial lease use inefficiency. Though 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴

correlated, 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆𝐹𝐴

𝑖,𝑡

𝑖,𝑡

∗
tended to be lower than 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴

and 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆𝐹𝐴
𝑖,𝑡

𝑖,𝑡

scores were significantly

(Figures 4.2 and 4.3). One might expect

the opposite trend since DEA does not accommodate any random noise, but other studies have
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found differences similar to those seen here (see Theodoridis and Anwar 2011 for several
comparisons of TE scores between the two approaches, and Odeck and Bråthen 2012 for a metaanalysis of DEA and SFA studies). Odeck and Bråthen (2012) observed that TE scores were often
higher for DEA and for panel data (however those studies used non-bias corrected scores).
Differences in scores could be due to whether the frontier was estimated yearly, such as the DEA,
or estimated without a time effect such as our SFA (Hjalmarsson et al. 1996). Furthermore, the
fact that a large proportion of observations were found to be more efficient with the DEA (peak
near 0.6, due to 43.8% of observations having non-bias corrected 𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐴

𝑖,𝑡

equal to 1) is likely

due to the large number of environmental inputs considered and their variability, which reduced
the set of comparable leases for each production observation.
Potential increases in LUE (and hence production) depend on drivers of inefficiency. We
found that the number of leases per leaseholder and population density of areas surrounding a lease
were common factors influencing LUE between the two approaches. Larger producers (in terms
of total production and number of leases, Figure 4.3 A and B) were the most efficient. The number
of leases could be seen as a proxy for unobservable variables related to the scale of operation such
as access to hatchery seed and organizational infrastructure. Leaseholders with several leases can
also operate in a rotational manner to exploit different habitats. Although lease size had a positive
effect on oyster production, this variable’s coefficient indicated decreasing returns to scale (at the
individual lease level). These combined results for possible returns to scale at the organizational
but not lease levels, imply that more and smaller leases held by fewer leaseholders could bring
considerable economically and socially efficiency gains in their utilization of space. This is not
entirely surprising given prior research has frequently found scale efficiencies in aquaculture
production (Alam and Murshed-e-Jahan 2008, Schrobback et al. 2014). Nevertheless, tradeoffs
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between industry consolidation, average lease size, and production efficiencies are important
policy considerations for resource managers and stakeholders.
LUE was found to decrease significantly in more populated, high-income regions and/or
for leases adjacent or partially covered by SAV. These results are similar to those for differences
between used and non-used leases in Virginia (Beckensteiner et al. in review), suggesting that
factors driving non-use may also lead to significant production inefficiencies, i.e., in areas where
non-used leases are more prevalent, productive leases are also less efficiently used. In more
populated, and potentially more heavily congested areas, leaseholders may tend to lease more area
than needed to secure their activity, hence lowering their production per unit area. In contrast,
leases closer to their leaseholder’s ZIP code were more efficiently used, plausibly due to better
access, control and monitoring for these leases. Finally, LUE increased for leases adjacent to the
Baylor grounds. It is possible that leases in close proximity to natural oyster reefs are characterized
by harder bottom or better water quality, improving production efficiency.
Surprisingly, lease age did not have an effect on efficiency for any of the models, and
efficiency did not change significantly over time in the SFA ECF specification. Increased
experience thus does not appear to increase efficiency, and this is contrary to what was observed
by Sharma and Leung (2000) and Theodoridis et al. (2017). Our finding may indicate that
leaseholders were not learning or improving from their past experiences, or were not incorporating
the newest available technology (e.g., improvement of seed quality, gear developments), and
suggests a potential need for enhanced training opportunities and knowledge transfer.
Additionally, there was no effect of the speculation proxy on LUE. Lease acquisition may be
driven by investment intentions, with non-used leases frequently being purchased last
(Beckensteiner et al. in review), but efficiency of use does not appear to be related to the
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proportional rank of purchase. Finally, LUEs were not significantly different between oyster
growers who had and had not diversified their aquaculture practices, even though diversification
has been found to reduce efficiencies in other studies (e.g., Asche and Roll 2013, Scuderi and Chen
2019); however, diversification in those studies was in terms of harvested species and not used
gears.
The novelty of our approach lies in the inclusion of environmental variables as inputs for
the production frontier models. Oyster survival and growth depend on many variables, including
water quality (e.g. salinity, temperature, turbidity, etc.) and minimal algal bloom occurrences
(Shumway 2011). We observed significant increases in oyster production with increases in O2,
temperature, salinity and DIN. Oxygen level was an important predictor for oyster production
which is not surprising since well-oxygenated waters impede hypoxic stress and could be seen
here as a surrogate for shallower depth (i.e, nearshore production) (Seitz et al. 2009). Oyster
production was found to be higher in more saline and/or warmer waters, where growth, survival
and filtration rates are usually enhanced (Shumway 1996). Despite the potential prevalence of the
pathogens MSX and Dermo in those waters, growers may commonly use disease-resistant strains,
which would reduce lost due to diseases (Harding 2007).
There are a number of potential improvements to the models used in our analysis that could
be explored in future work. The log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function (Eq. 1) does not take
into account non-monotonic responses of oysters to environmental conditions, hence quadratic
specifications of the log-transformed environmental variables were tested through a semi-translog
production function (presented in Appendix C2). Non-quadratic and quadratic terms were
significant for chlorophyll a, velocity and POC, suggesting existence of thresholds for these
variables. The effect of such thresholds on estimates of inefficiency should be considered in future
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studies. Interactions between temperature and salinity or the combined effect between DIN and
chlorophyll a, were not considered, but they are plausible, and may affect oysters (Lowe et al.
2017). These interactions could be explored by coupling hydrodynamic models (generally
resolving salinity, temperature and flow) with density-dependent population dynamic models to
mechanistically assess relationships between environmental variables and oyster recruitment,
growth and survival (Ferreira et al. 2007, 2008, North et al. 2010, Lowe et al. 2017, Snyder et al.
2017, Powell et al. 2018); however, such approaches are beyond the scope of this study. Similarly,
production carrying capacity models (Bacher et al. 1997, Ferreira et al. 2007), determined by the
availability of food and suitable habitat, could also be used for site selection and optimization of
culture practices by producing growth rate, harvestable biomass, and expected profits, while also
assessing eutrophication impacts. However, these models do not include demographic, social or
management variables, and do not utilize observations of actual farm production.
Although this research was able to discern lease use inefficiency and its potential drivers
in Virginia, a few aspects of the data and methods deserve further consideration. It is possible the
variable “number of leases per leaseholder” is endogenously related to frontier efficiency
(endogeneity occurs when there is correlation between model inputs and the error term, and can
bias parameter estimates; e.g., leaseholders may obtain additional leases because they are more
efficient). However, it is unlikely that efficiency in a given year would drive lease purchase in the
same year, given the lengthy leasing process (B. Stagg, VMRC, pers. comm.). Furthermore, this
variable (“number of leases”) included all leases that a leaseholder held in a given year, not only
those leases actively used for intensive production. The SFA specification reported in this paper
did not account for time effects and considered each observation as independent in constructing
the frontier. While there was no evidence of non-independence of errors across time with the ECF

142

specification, unobservable factors might be correlated by lease or leaseholder. Existing SFA
model formulations do not provide a simple way to account for this autocorrelation. It was,
however, thought that these correlations would be captured through lease and leaseholder variables
included in Z (inefficiency variables; e.g., lease age, proportional rank of purchase, distance to
leaseholder ZIP code). Expected positive monotonic relationships between inputs and output in
the DEA model could be limiting and caution should be applied when selecting inputs that might
have different directional effects. In our study, the environmental data were thought to increase
oyster production. However, in cases with undesirable inputs (i.e., inputs that decrease
production), or where free input disposability does not hold, data transformation, such as the
translation approach (f(U) = -U+ β, Ali and Seiford 1990) or the multiplicative inverse approach
(f(U)=1/U, Lovell et al. 1995), can be used. Furthermore, approaches exist to simultaneously
incorporate desirable inputs and detrimental inputs by adding a fifth constraint to (LP 4). For
example, Reinhard et al. (2000) developed a DEA given conventional inputs and environmentally
detrimental inputs to control for the effects of nitrogen surplus on dairy farms. Future work could
use this extended DEA formulation to incorporate environmental variables thought to decrease
oyster production, or variables for which positive monotonic responses may not hold.

4.6 Conclusion
With increased pressures and uses on coastal areas (and consequently increased
competition for space), it is important that commercial aquaculture activities are managed as
efficiently as possible. Results of this study suggest that oyster production in Virginia could
increase by at least 64% per lease, on average. It may be possible to reduce inefficiencies through
lease consolidation (i.e., more leases per leaseholder), or better use of leased grounds in densely
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populated areas (e.g., reducing area not utilized). Stricter management tools should be
implemented to provide incentives for more efficient use of leases (e.g., production requirement
per unit of area). Research and management efforts could be directed to assess causes and solutions
for user-conflicts, such as activity zoning. The influence of lease-level and organizational
production inputs that were not considered here, e.g., seed, number of cages/other gear, labor,
could be assessed in future studies to evaluate technical efficiency and capacity utilization. This
would, however, require extensive leaseholder surveys and data collection, and some of this
information is currently collected by the VIMS Marine Advisory Services (Hudson 2018).
Our results have significant value for 1) oyster industry participants who want to evaluate
possible influences of environmental conditions and lease size on production, 2) policymakers
currently trying to develop new requirements that increase oyster cultivation on leased grounds,
and 3) scientists who wish to understand externalities that could drive the future of sustainable
aquaculture. Although this study concerns Virginia intensive oyster aquaculture, a number of other
states in the U.S. using leased grounds for shellfish aquaculture may have similar issues; e.g., New
Jersey and Connecticut also potentially have low levels of lease utilization (Beckensteiner et al. in
review). Applications of the approaches developed here to these regions are likely to be similarly
informative for understanding and enhancing oyster aquaculture.
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4.9 Tables
Table 4.1 DEA and SFA characteristics. Adapted from Bogetoft and Otto (2011).
Approach

Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA)

Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA)

Data generation process

Deterministic

Parametric

Deviation source

Inefficiency, 𝑢

Noise 𝑣, and inefficiency, 𝑢

Multiplicative specification

y=f(x, β).e

Estimation principle

Minimal extrapolation

Maximum likelihood

Time effect

Yes

Ignored

Inefficiency factors
estimation

Two-steps

One-step

(-𝑢)

(-𝑣)

y=f(x, β).e

.e

(-𝑢)

*

*Time effects are currently not implemented within the frontier R package for SFA
estimation with Z variables.
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics of input variables used in the frontier analyses. Spring averages
(March to June from 2005 to 2014) of environmental variables were calculated for the two years
preceding and up to the given year of the oyster production observation.
th

Variable

th

5 percentile

Median

Mean

95 percentile

0.83

4.86

11.86

39.71

14.43

16.96

16.97

19.45

8.09

17.05

16.61

22.56

3.73

9.03

9.32

15.30

3

93.70

156.34

153.02

208.09

O2 (mmol-O2 / m )

276.45

300.70

301.50

328.36

3

0.37

2.67

7.90

25.67

0.009

0.026

0.034

0.074

Lease size (ha)
Temperature (ºC)
Salinity (psu)
3

Chlorophyll a (mg-chl a / m )
POC (mmol-C / m )
3

DIN (mmol-N / m )
Velocity (m/s)
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Table 4.3 SFA and DEA specification summary.
Output

Input

Inefficiency variables

Oyster production (lbs)

Lease size (ha)

Number of leases

Temperature (ºC)

Lease age (yr)

Salinity (psu)

Both aquaculture (dummy)
3

Chlorophyll a (mg-chl a / m )
3

Proportional rank of purchase
Fraction leased area by others

POC (mmol-C / m )
3

Distance to leaseholder ZIP code (m)

O2 (mmol-O2 / m )
3

Adjacent to shore (dummy)

DIN (mmol-N / m )
Velocity (m/s)

SAV present (dummy)
Adjacent to Baylor (dummy)
Population density (ind./km2)
Average income (1,000$/household)
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Table 4.4 SFA production frontier and inefficiency model results. Significance is denoted by:
p<0.001=‘***’, p<0.01=‘**’, p<0.05=‘*’, p<0.1=‘.’.
Variables
Production frontier
Intercept
Ln lease size
Ln temperature
Ln salinity
Ln chlorophyll-a
Ln velocity
Ln O2
Ln DIN
Ln POC
Inefficiency model
Intercept
Ln number of leases
Lease age
Both aquaculture (dummy)
Proportional rank of purchase
Fraction leased area by others
Ln distance to leaseholder ZIP code
Adjacent to shore (dummy)
SAV present (dummy)
Adjacent to Baylor (dummy)
Ln population density
Ln average income
Variance parameters
2
2
2
σ (= σ u +σ v )
2

2

γ (= σ u / σ )
Log-likelihood
Mean efficiency

Estimate Std. Error

P-value

Signif. Marg. Effect

-58.745
0.380
2.968
1.288
-1.344
-0.065
9.740
0.594
-0.450

16.194
0.058
1.194
0.177
0.774
0.114
2.238
0.155
0.742

2.86E-04
4.64E-11
0.013
3.79E-13
0.083
0.568
1.34E-05
1.34E-04
0.544

***
***
*
***
.

-15.730
-0.694
-0.012
0.000
-0.156
0.650
0.302
-0.295
-0.147
-0.369
0.193
1.407

5.119
0.140
0.011
1.000
0.369
0.753
0.093
0.186
0.217
0.236
0.089
0.449

0.002
6.99E-07
0.301
1.000
0.672
0.389
0.001
0.112
0.499
0.117
0.031
0.002

**
***

3.683

0.514

7.71E-13

***

0.047 < 2.2eE16

***

0.802
-1552.307
0.23
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***
***

**

*
**

1.934
0.033
-0.847
0.475
-1.584
-0.836
0.776
0.368
1.069
-0.515
-3.901

Table 4.5 DEA / OLS regression results. Significance is denoted by: p<0.001=‘***’, p<0.01=‘**’,
p<0.05=‘*’, p<0.1=‘.’. Sign of the coefficients obtained from (Eq. 6) have been inverted so that
reported signs of DEA coefficients are expected to be the same as those for SFA coefficients.
Variables
Inefficiency model
Intercept
Ln number of leases
Lease age
Both aquaculture (dummy)
Proportional rank of purchase
Fraction leased area by others
Ln distance to leaseholder ZIP code
Adjacent to shore (dummy)
SAV present (dummy)
Adjacent to Baylor (dummy)
Ln population density
Ln average income
2
r
Mean efficiency

Estimate Std. Error
-0.549
-0.037
0.001
-0.015
-0.030
0.012
0.011
-0.008
0.062
-0.083
0.045
7.60E-5
0.115
0.358
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0.385
0.009
0.001
0.032
0.036
0.074
0.009
0.019
0.020
0.021
0.009
0.037

P-value
0.154
8.49E-05
0.336
0.653
0.401
0.867
0.213
0.654
0.002
6.29E-05
5.46E-07
0.998

Signif.

***

**
***
***

4.10 Figures
Figure 4.1 Leases analyzed during the period 2007-2016 (in green). Other leases excluded from
the dataset (in red) included leases with no intensive oyster production, leases not covered by the
ChesROMS grid (darker grey grids), riparian leases, leases on the Atlantic coast of the Eastern
Shore, and those in condemned zones.
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Figure 4.2 Frequency distributions of lease use efficiency estimates from the stochastic frontier
SFA (A) and DEA (B) models. Dashed red lines represent mean LUEs and grey dashed lines
represent standard deviations.
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Figure 4.3 Mean efficiency per leaseholder over the 10 years of observations as related to their
total production (A), the mean number of leases they owned (B), and the mean population density
of the ZIP codes closest to their leases (C). Low (high) production are values below (above) mean
production of 10,086 pounds; low (high) number of leases are values below (above) mean number
of 6.09; while low (high) population density are values below (above) mean population density of
137.37 individuals per squared km.
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4.11 Appendix C
Appendix C1. Error Components Frontier results (ignoring Z variables). Significance is denoted
by: p<0.001=‘***’, p<0.01=‘**’, p<0.05=‘*’, p<0.1=‘.’.
Variables
Production frontier
Intercept
Ln lease size
Ln temp
Ln salinity
Ln chlorophyll a
Ln velocity
Ln O2
Ln DIN
Ln POC
Variance parameters
2
2
2
σ (= σ u +σ v )
2

2

γ (= σ u / σ )
Time
Log likelihood
Mean efficiency

Estimate

Std. Error

-4.394
0.394
-0.606
0.850
0.857
-0.242
2.719
0.253
-1.988

0.991
0.073
0.835
0.196
0.692
0.140
0.589
0.167
0.732

9.20E-06
5.72E-08
0.468
1.51E-05
0.215
0.084
0.000
0.129
0.007

***
***

3.088

0.367

< 2.2e-16

***

0.619

0.036

< 2.2e-16

***

0.010
-1474.862
0.14

0.014

0.477
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P-value Signif.

***
.
***
**

Appendix C2. SFA production frontier and inefficiency model according to a partial translog
production function.
Variables
Production frontier
Intercept
Ln lease size
Ln temperature
2
(Ln temperature)
Ln salinity
2
(Ln salinity)
Ln chlorophyll a
(Ln chlorophyll a)
Ln velocity
2
(Ln velocity)
Ln O2
2

Estimate Std. Error

2

(Ln O2)
Ln DIN
2
(Ln DIN)
Ln POC
2
(Ln POC)
Inefficiency model
Intercept
Ln number of leases
Lease age
Both aquaculture (dummy)
Proportional rank of purchase
Fraction leased area by others
Ln distance to leaseholder ZIP code
Adjacent to shore (dummy)
SAV present (dummy)
Adjacent to Baylor (dummy)
Ln population density
Ln average income
Variance parameters
2
2
2
σ (= σ u +σ v )
2

2

γ (= σ u / σ )
Log-likelihood
Mean efficiency

P-value

Signif.

-411.320
0.378
68.362
-11.295
0.486
0.361
-7.267

544.980
0.052
37.572
6.645
0.344
0.116
2.521

0.450
5.09e-13
0.069
0.089
0.158
0.002
0.004

1.281
-1.963
-0.265
80.304

0.618
0.884
0.126
190.630

0.038
0.026
0.035
0.674

-5.935
0.783

16.676
0.286

0.722
0.006

**

-1.03e-4
19.595
-1.962

0.082
9.190
0.932

0.999
0.033
0.035

*
*

-15.275
-0.775
-0.011
0.000
-0.208
0.989
0.340
-0.351
-0.009
-0.554
0.152
1.327

5.319
0.152
0.012
1.000
0.430
0.832
0.098
0.217
0.238
0.279
0.105
0.479

0.004
3.34e-07
0.348
1.000
0.630
0.235
0.001
0.106
0.969
0.047
0.147
0.006

**
***

4.058

0.537

4.13e-14

***

0.036 < 2.2e-16

***

0.848
-1539.023
0.246
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***
.
.
**
**
*
*
*

***

*
**

Appendix C3. Frequency distributions of non-bias corrected lease use efficiency from the DEA
model.

Appendix C4. Correlations between lease use efficiency estimates from the stochastic frontier and
from the DEA (A) and between estimates from the stochastic frontier and bias-corrected lease use
efficiency estimates from the DEA (B).
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Appendix C5. Correlations between environmental variables
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– Chapter 5 –
Conclusion

This dissertation used quantitative and multidisciplinary approaches to identify drivers of
TURF use in Chile and Virginia and evaluate their efficacy for fisheries and aquaculture
management. In both locations, spatial property rights are being used to restore and/or improve
depleted fisheries (loco and oyster, respectively). Today, the number and extent of spatially
managed areas are the highest they have ever been in both systems, and significant, specific
benefits have been associated with this high use. In Chile, previous work has shown that TURFs
are associated with higher biodiversity and at least in the initial, more limited, implementation
phase were associated with increased revenues for fishers (Gelcich et al. 2012, Van Holt 2012).
This research indicates that median catch per unit effort (CPUE) and catch per unit area (CPUA)
of limpet, sea urchin and kelp were at least 75% higher inside TURFs (Chapter 2). To the extent
that these metrics are indicators of biomass, Chilean TURFs appear to maintain the biological
productivity of benthic resources at higher levels than in open access areas (OAAs), though our
results suggest that this high productivity may be partially a cause of TURF implementation, not
an effect. Similarly, oyster production in Virginia from private leases continues to increase since
2005. The aquaculture industry is rebounding, the area of privately leased grounds has exceeded
its historical maximum, and probabilities of lease use and productivity per lease are increasing
over years (Chapter 3).
Although these results suggest positive outcomes from TURF implementation, each system
is currently facing a number of challenges. Analyzing CPUAs over time inside and outside TURFs
for 196 fishing coves in Chile, I was able to show that catch rates have been steadily declining
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within TURFs and that TURFs may impact catch levels in surrounding OAAs (Chapter 2). Both
results suggest potential risks to system sustainability. Recovery of biomass within TURFs has not
occurred since implementation. Further, there was evidence that TURFs were selectively
implemented in the best fishing grounds, partially or entirely explaining the observed differences
in catch rates inside and outside TURFs mentioned above. There was also some indication that
TURFs are now less intensively used as half of the officially designated TURFs in Chile are
currently non-operative and not granted a quota (Chapter 2, Appendix A1). Decreased interest in
TURF maintenance for benthic extraction is thought to be due to increases in costs associated with
assessment, enforcement and surveillance (Gelcich et al. 2009, 2017, Davis et al. 2015, Chávez et
al. 2018), which may outweigh benefits afforded through exclusive access. Fishing effort may also
be increasingly displaced into OAAs since reductions in TURF profitability could provide
increased incentives for TURF users to increase fishing effort in OAAs. This management
spillover, from TURFs to OAAs, may grow over time and is an important concern, especially for
already depleted OAAs (Andreu-Cazenave et al. 2017). TURF management should be
accompanied by stricter, or better enforced, harvest controls in OAAs. Although, in theory,
enforcement should be performed collectively by the Chilean Navy, fishing organizations and
SERNAPESCA, it often falls entirely on fishing organizations because of the long coast to survey
and limited government resources (Chávez et al. 2019). A possible avenue for better enforcement
capacity in Chile would be a nested organizational framework, similar to the structure of fishery
management organizations in Japan (Uchida and Makino 2008) or the FEDECOOP in Mexico
(i.e., cooperatives part of a larger federation, McCay et al. 2014). Vertically-oriented institutional
arrangements are still predominant in Chile (i.e., management mainly across levels of
organizations instead of across space). Increasing coordination between fishing organizations
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would favor a network of actors who could coordinate their enforcement and monitoring actions,
and share local knowledge about stocks and environmental conditions (Berkes 2002, Andrachuk
et al. 2019). Opportunity exists for coordinated network development within administrative
regions having similar market access and environmental conditions, which might help TURFs
better fulfill their economic, fisheries and social objectives.
Results from Chapter 3 provide strong evidence of socioeconomic and regulatory
constraints on the development of oyster aquaculture in Virginia. This research indicated that only
33.38% of leases ever reported oyster production from 2006 to 2016 and only 36.83% of individual
leaseholders were active during the same time period. Low annual utilization rates were potentially
correlated with speculative and exclusionary behaviors since non-used leases were observed in
more populated and high-income regions, tended to be smaller, and were purchased last by
leaseholders holding several leases. Furthermore, low levels of lease use can be attributed to
limited enforcement of the Oyster Lease Use Plan and the absence of annual quantitative
production requirements. There was limited evidence of spatial constraints on industry growth,
however this study considered all legally leasable areas, not necessarily those that were most
suitable for oyster production (though SAV, condemnation zones and deep-water areas were
excluded). Opportunities to expand aquaculture primarily exist in low conflict, high cost areas;
e.g., remote areas or areas that are relatively deep for aquaculture. Specifically, reductions in costs
associated with aquaculture practices or increases in market demand could lead industry to expand
into areas that are economically not viable, such as in the mainstem of Chesapeake Bay.
In 2017, Virginia was the third largest producer of oysters from private leases and had the
second largest leased area across states along the U.S. East Coast and Gulf of Mexico (Chapter 3).
However, the state recorded the second lowest productivity (i.e., oysters pieces per acre),
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confirming significant limitations associated with the system as it presently exists. To that end,
Chapter 4 brings valuable insights into lease use efficiency and factors that affect the performance
of leases used for intensive oyster production. Novel utilization of economic production frontier
models enabled quantification of lease use efficiency (i.e., utilization of space given the underlying
environment) for oyster production from 2007 to 2016. The models suggest that there is room for
substantial improvements in lease use efficiency and leaseholders could increase oyster production
by at least 64% per lease, on average, given the size of the leased area and existing environment.
The number of leases held per leaseholder was found to increase use efficiency, while leases in
more populated areas were less efficiently used, possibly due to the prevalence of user-conflicts.
Overall, underlying drivers for lease non-use and underutilization were similar (Chapters 3 and
4). Low levels of use efficiency imply that leaseholders tend to lease much more area than needed,
likely due to the low annual lease costs and the absence of production requirements.
Results of Chapters 3 and 4 cannot be viewed without reference to ongoing discussion
regarding Baylor grounds, which are natural oyster beds reserved for the public fishery. It has been
preliminarily shown that 78% of the Baylor grounds are currently unproductive (M. Berman,
VIMS, pers. comm.). There is now a debate about redefining Baylor grounds and modifying the
types of use allowed in existing public grounds to facilitate aquaculture expansion. Because Baylor
grounds are generally farther from shore, their use in the lease program could reduce user-conflict.
Given the large area that is currently leased but not producing oysters, it is unclear if increasing
access to Baylor grounds would significantly increase production without major changes to other
aspects of the private and public management regimes (e.g., minimum production requirements
for leases).
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Enforcement is a common challenge in both the Chilean TURF system and the Virginia
oyster lease system, to limit poaching and overexploitation in the former and to ensure effective
use of private leases in the latter. As Christie et al. (2009) observed, “institutional and time
capacity, and enforcement challenges are common when attempting to coordinate local and
national efforts for coastal marine management”. Lack of institutional capacity and inefficient
enforcement are major concerns for the sustainability of TURFs in the two systems studied in this
dissertation, but also in other regions where TURFs are implemented (Gelcich et al. 2017, Quynh
et al. 2017, Mason 2008). The inaction of government in both regions and likely elsewhere
provides disincentives for efficient and productive use of spatial property rights. For example, the
“use it or lose it” policy is not enforced in Virginia, and government punishment of poachers in
Chile are thought to be ineffective. Further research is required to determine incentives necessary
to produce stakeholder compliance with spatial rights-based policies (Joyce and Satterfield 2010).
Given the large populations and continued growth anticipated in coastal areas, secured
spatial property rights may be necessary for viable oyster aquaculture development and sustainable
coastal fisheries. Determining how property rights are allocated in coastal communities is therefore
a priority for successful management. For instance, shellfish aquaculture, which is often
acknowledged for its potential in achieving the “Blue Economy” or “Blue Growth” (Silver et al.
2015, Ehlers 2016), will likely continue to increase and face growing competition for space with
other coastal uses (e.g., waterfront residences, maritime transportation, offshore energy
development). Marine spatial planning can help address conflicts among human uses and between
human uses and the marine environment, to derive a more optimal utilization of space (SanchezJerez et al. 2016, Lombard et al. 2019). Both Chile and Virginia would benefit from enhanced
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coastal zoning to ensure use and production efficiency, while minimizing poaching and negative
externalities (e.g., environmental impacts) in the planning process.
In both systems, socioeconomic and management factors appear to be limiting productivity
and sustainability of TURFs and surrounding ecosystems (decreasing fisheries productivity in
Chilean TURFs, and non-use and use inefficiency of private leases in Virginia). Although spatial
rights were initially implemented for securing fisheries or promoting aquaculture, they are not
exclusively utilized for those purposes today. In Chile, TURFs have been argued to build
leadership and social cohesion among fishers (Gelcich et al. 2019) and may offer benefits for
conservation of benthic habitats (Fernández et al. 2017). In Virginia, leases may be obtained for
speculative and exclusionary uses (Mason 2008), which, though not their intended use may in
some cases represent legitimate concerns of coastal stakeholders. Therefore, TURFs may not work
as originally planned because of increasing economic or social costs, and confronting and
integrating these diverse uses and valuation of coastal habitats into management frameworks is
essential to simultaneously maximize production, sustainability, and biodiversity. The findings of
this dissertation should be valuable to management agencies in Chile and Virginia, who are
currently considering reforms to legal frameworks and also re-thinking their management systems
(e.g., with discussions about new monitoring report deadlines and a new system of fishermen
registration in Chile, and about lease associated fees and production requirements in Virginia).
The results of this work contribute to a better understanding of efficacy and challenges of
TURFs in Chile and in Virginia and likely have considerable applicability to spatial property rights
systems worldwide. Both examples show that rights-based management approaches are attractive.
They can promote new uses or developments of productive fisheries, however, their sustainability
is possibly jeopardized by socio-economic or management constraints, prompting the need for
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further analyses. Both systems present similar challenges, though enforcement and compliance
being likely the biggest challenges in Chile while zoning to address user conflicts being a primary
concern in Virginia. Lessons from these case studies include recognizing the importance of
incentives and enforcement, and the potential presence of trade-offs between economic, social and
biological sustainability.
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